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People v. Curiel
Citation: Not availableDocket: S272238
Court: California Supreme Court; November 27, 2023; California; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Freddy Alfredo Curiel was convicted of first-degree murder, along with gang-related enhancements, and sentenced to life without parole in 2006. In 2018, Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted, modifying accomplice liability for murder and allowing certain convicted individuals to seek retroactive relief if they could not be convicted under the revised law. Curiel petitioned for resentencing, arguing that his conviction was based on the now-eliminated natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court denied his petition, asserting that the jury's finding of intent to kill precluded relief. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, stating that the intent to kill finding alone was insufficient to demonstrate current murder liability under the amended law. The Supreme Court of California granted review to assess the impact of the jury’s finding on Curiel's petition. The Court determined that while the jury's intent to kill finding could be given preclusive effect, it did not conclusively render Curiel ineligible for relief. The Court ruled that Curiel’s assertion regarding his inability to be convicted under current law raised questions about all elements of murder, indicating that intent alone does not establish his culpability as an aider and abettor. The jury's findings regarding Curiel's liability for murder do not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief. The required mens rea for a direct aider and abettor includes knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful intent and the intent to assist in that act. The jury's verdicts and the court's jury instructions do not confirm that the jury made the necessary factual findings on these elements, preventing the trial court from rejecting Curiel's prima facie showing. Consequently, an evidentiary hearing on Curiel's resentencing petition should have occurred. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment reversing the trial court’s denial of relief, despite differing reasoning. In the factual background, it is noted that during an August 2002 incident outside Tejada's apartment, Curiel and another man, Hernandez, confronted Tejada's group. Witnesses provided conflicting accounts, with some stating Curiel attempted to calm the situation while others indicated he was aggressive. Ultimately, Hernandez shot Tejada after a confrontation. Curiel's gang affiliation was established, but he maintained he did not desire the shooting to occur. Testimonies varied, particularly regarding who instigated the confrontation, and Tejada's fatal wound indicated he was shot from close range. A prosecution gang expert provided insights into gang culture and dynamics related to loyalty and respect within gangs. Most Hispanic gangs are characterized as 'turf-oriented,' claiming specific neighborhoods. The phrase 'where are you from' serves as a serious challenge among gang members, often leading to violent confrontations, including fatal stabbings and shootings. The gang culture emphasizes 'respect,' which translates to 'fear and intimidation,' where violent individuals gain more respect and instill fear within the community. If a community member confronts a gang member, the gang member may react violently. Gang members are expected to provide 'backup' during criminal activities, and failure to do so can result in punishment. The gang expert, familiar with the O.T.H. gang, confirmed it is a criminal street gang claiming the territory where Tejada's apartment is located. He testified that during a hypothetical scenario related to the case, Curiel would have been expected to support Hernandez during a confrontation with Tejada. The expert asserted that Tejada's shooting served the interests of the gang, promoting its reputation through violent acts. Yelling the gang's name during the shooting further publicizes the gang's involvement and responsibility for the violence. On cross-examination, the expert acknowledged that gang members sometimes engage in crimes unrelated to gang activity and do not perpetually commit crimes; they also lead ordinary lives with jobs and families. Curiel, in his defense, stated he had limited prior interactions with Hernandez and described an incident where Hernandez approached Tejada's group, leading to a confrontation where Tejada told Hernandez he could not be in the area. Tejada shoved Hernandez, causing Hernandez to trip and subsequently shoot Tejada quickly, surprising Curiel, who was unaware of Hernandez's weapon. Following their arrests, Curiel expressed his anger towards Hernandez but did not hold a grudge, leading to correspondence between them. In letters, Curiel praised Hernandez and wished him a happy birthday while also discussing communicating in code regarding a person named Lupe, whom he referred to as Eva to avoid potential threats being misconstrued if the letters were intercepted. Curiel denied threatening Lupe or instructing others to do so. Prior to Tejada's murder, Curiel participated in a theft with an accomplice, leading to his arrest and guilty plea for theft and aiding an assault with a weapon. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that Curiel instigated the confrontation and aided Hernandez in the murder, asserting that Curiel acted with both express and implied malice. The prosecutor emphasized the need to prove Curiel's intent to kill to establish the gang-murder special circumstance. Conversely, the defense argued Curiel was not the shooter and contended that the prosecution had not proven Curiel's mental state or knowledge of Hernandez's intentions, asserting that mere presence at the scene did not constitute aiding and abetting. Defense counsel also accused a witness of lying about Curiel's involvement. Defense counsel argued that Raul had altered his testimony regarding Hernandez for Curiel’s trial, previously attributing a statement to him. The defense criticized the prosecution's gang expert for lacking academic qualifications, dismissing his expertise as 'junk.' Counsel contended that not all individuals identified as gang members behave similarly and rejected the notion that if one gang member possesses a gun, all gang members are aware of it. The court's jury instructions identified Hernandez as the alleged murderer of Tejada, stating that a person is equally guilty whether they committed the crime or aided, abetted, or conspired with the perpetrator. The instructions clarified that if evidence shows aiding and abetting in one crime, a person may also be guilty of other crimes occurring during that crime. For direct aiding and abetting, the jury was instructed that the prosecution must prove: 1) the perpetrator committed the crime; 2) the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; 3) the defendant intended to aid and abet; and 4) the defendant's actions actually aided the crime. Aiding and abetting occurs when a person knows of the perpetrator's unlawful intent and intends to assist in the crime. The court also provided instructions on aiding and abetting based on the doctrine of natural and probable consequences, requiring the prosecution to establish: 1) the defendant was guilty of disturbing the peace or carrying a concealed firearm as a gang member; 2) murder was committed during the commission of these crimes; and 3) a reasonable person in the defendant's position would recognize murder as a likely outcome of those crimes. The court emphasized that a natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would foresee unless interrupted by unusual circumstances. Lastly, the jury received instructions on the elements of disturbing the peace and carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member, as well as conspiracy liability for murder related to these offenses, explaining that a conspiracy member is criminally responsible for acts committed by any member if those acts further the conspiracy and are a natural and probable consequence of its common plan. To establish the gang-murder special circumstance, the jury was instructed to find that the defendant intended to kill, was a member of a criminal street gang at the time of the killing, and that the murder was committed to further the gang's activities. Curiel was convicted of first-degree murder, with the jury affirming the gang-murder special circumstance and a criminal street gang sentencing enhancement. He received a life sentence without parole, plus an additional 25 years to life. Following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, Curiel sought resentencing, arguing his conviction was based on the now-reformed natural and probable consequences doctrine, which he claimed rendered him currently ineligible for murder conviction. The prosecution argued that the jury's finding on the gang-murder special circumstance indicated he acted with malice aforethought, making him ineligible for relief. The trial court denied his petition, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. The appellate court acknowledged the jury's finding of intent to kill but ruled it insufficient to establish ineligibility for resentencing, noting that mere intent does not equate to having aided or encouraged the murder. The appellate court concluded that while Curiel had the intent of a murderer, the jury did not demonstrate he met the additional requirements for culpability under the aiding and abetting theory. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Attorney General sought review, raising the issue of when a jury's intent finding disqualifies a defendant from resentencing under Senate Bill 1437. The legislation aims to align sentencing with individual culpability, amending the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to exclude those not directly involved in the murder or lacking intent to kill. A conviction for murder requires malice aforethought, emphasizing a person's own actions and subjective mens rea. Senate Bill 1437 modified the felony-murder rule by adding Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e), which limits murder liability for participants in specified felonies resulting in death, establishing conditions under which they can be held liable. Specifically, liability arises if the individual was the actual killer, aided the actual killer with intent to kill, or was a major participant in the felony acting with reckless indifference to human life. Additionally, Senate Bill 1437 mandates that, except in felony murder cases, a principal must demonstrate malice aforethought for a murder conviction and that malice cannot be inferred solely from participation in a crime. This change abolished liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which previously allowed accomplices to be charged with murder if it was a foreseeable result of their actions, regardless of their intent regarding the murder. The bill also introduced former section 1170.95, allowing those convicted under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief based on these changes. Subsequent amendments expanded eligibility and clarified procedures, culminating in the renumbering of this section to 1172.6 without substantive change. These statutory modifications do not impact the issues in the current appeal, and references to the statute will use its current numbering. Under section 1172.6, individuals convicted of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, attempted murder, or manslaughter may petition the court for vacating their convictions and resentencing on remaining counts. The petition must include a declaration confirming eligibility, particularly that the petitioner could not currently be convicted due to changes in Penal Code sections 188 or 189 effective January 1, 2019. Upon receiving a petition with the necessary information, the court must assess whether the petitioner has established a prima facie case for relief. If the record shows the petitioner is ineligible, the court may dismiss the petition; if a prima facie case is made, the court will issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing within 60 days to decide on vacating the conviction and resentencing, ensuring the new sentence does not exceed the original. At the hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner's guilt under amended California law. Additionally, the court addressed an issue of preclusion raised by Curiel, who argued that the jury's finding of intent to kill should not influence his resentencing petition. While the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's dismissal based on that finding, it still considered it conclusive regarding Curiel's intent. Curiel's reliance on issue preclusion principles was ultimately deemed unpersuasive, with the court referencing prior case law that confirmed the statute permits the consideration of jury findings during resentencing. The court emphasized that the structure of section 1172.6 suggests that prior factual findings should be acknowledged rather than disregarded. Curiel's argument centers on the doctrine of issue preclusion, which impacts the conclusive effect of prior findings in subsequent proceedings. The document outlines the principles of collateral estoppel, emphasizing its role in preventing redundant litigation and protecting parties from relitigating identical issues. To apply issue preclusion, several requirements must be met: the issue must be identical to one previously decided, actually litigated, necessarily decided, final, and involve the same party or one in privity with them. Curiel challenges two of these requirements: whether his intent to kill was actually litigated and necessarily decided. The text clarifies that an issue is considered actually litigated if it is properly raised and determined. An issue is deemed necessarily decided if it was essential to the judgment in the prior case. The court examines the full record of the previous proceeding to evaluate these criteria. In Curiel's case, the evidence shows that his intent to kill was both actually litigated and necessarily decided, as the prosecution included this element in the gang-murder special circumstance, and the jury found it true beyond a reasonable doubt. Curiel argues his intent was not litigated because his counsel did not address it in closing arguments, but the requirement pertains to the opportunity to litigate, not the extent of the argument. Curiel had indeed disputed this issue by pleading not guilty, and the jury ultimately resolved the dispute, affirming that the requirements for issue preclusion were satisfied. Curiel's counsel's decision not to address the special circumstance was a strategic choice that does not negate the applicability of collateral estoppel, as established in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co. Ltd. The issue of Curiel's intent to kill was explicitly addressed in the jury instructions regarding conspiracy, which stated that a conspirator is responsible for the actions of other members under certain conditions. However, the jury also received specific instructions requiring proof of Curiel's intent to kill for the special circumstance. The prosecutor emphasized this during closing arguments, clarifying that a guilty verdict for first-degree murder does not automatically confirm the special circumstance without a finding of intent. The jury's conclusion that the special circumstance applied indicates they determined Curiel intended to kill, which satisfies the criteria for issue preclusion. This aligns with the understanding that relevant jury findings typically establish a defendant's ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437. Despite meeting the threshold requirements for issue preclusion, the doctrine's application must still promote efficiency and fairness. An established equitable exception allows for reexamination of issues if there is a significant change in the law that could lead to an inequitable application of preclusion. Curiel has not demonstrated any relevant legal changes since his trial that would warrant such an exception; the standards governing the intent to kill finding remain unchanged. Although he cites changes in the law regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, he fails to convincingly link these changes to the jury's finding of intent to kill, thus not providing grounds for an equitable exception to issue preclusion. The court has not addressed whether changes in the law regarding evidence admissibility can trigger an equitable exception to issue preclusion. Even if such exceptions could apply, Curiel has failed to demonstrate the necessity for one in this case, lacking evidence of a significant legal change that would alter previous factual findings. Curiel notes the court's narrowing of expert testimony in *People v. Sanchez*, which allows experts to testify about matters beyond their personal knowledge, including hearsay, unlike lay witnesses. Traditionally, experts have been barred from providing case-specific facts without independent knowledge; however, Sanchez has blurred this line, permitting experts to explain the basis of their opinions, even if that basis includes inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, experts cannot present hearsay as facts under the guise of providing reasons for their opinions if the statements are considered true. This raises concerns about the jury's evaluation of the expert's opinion, since the hearsay's truthfulness underpins the opinion's validity. Expert testimony that includes case-specific out-of-court statements to support opinions is treated as hearsay, requiring proper admission through a hearsay exception or the use of a hypothetical question that assumes the truth of the statements. While experts may rely on hearsay to form their opinions, they must avoid presenting case-specific hearsay as fact unless it falls under a statutory exception. The ruling in Sanchez clarifies that experts can discuss the general kind and source of information relied upon for their opinions, but it does not allow the introduction of case-specific hearsay without appropriate justification. Despite these limitations, the ability to use hearsay for forming opinions remains intact. Curiel's argument against the preclusive effect of the jury's findings lacks merit; he misinterprets Sanchez and fails to demonstrate that substantial portions of the gang expert's testimony would be inadmissible under current standards. Generalized expert testimony about gang behavior and culture is typically admissible, even if it contains hearsay, provided that such information is deemed reliable by experts. Curiel's claims regarding case-specific hearsay do not warrant an exception to issue preclusion, as he has not shown that the inclusion of such evidence would have significantly altered the jury's findings. Hernandez was identified as a member of the O.T.H. gang and found guilty of murdering Tejada for the gang's benefit in a previous trial. An expert's opinion linking Hernandez to the gang was supported by this finding, and although the use of Hernandez's letter as evidence might have been improper under the Sanchez ruling, it did not significantly impact the jury's verdict regarding Curiel's intent to kill. Curiel failed to demonstrate that the jury would have reached a different conclusion about his intent had the letter not been admitted. The changes in law from the Sanchez case do not necessitate a reevaluation of the jury's intent to kill finding. Curiel argued that the intent finding should not have preclusive effect due to insufficient incentive to litigate at trial; however, the court noted that the opportunity and incentive to challenge the gang expert’s testimony were present and that previous rulings on expert testimony had not meaningfully expanded Curiel's ability to object. The court also addressed the State Public Defender's reference to changes in the legal definition of a criminal street gang and clarified that even if these changes applied, they would not affect the definition of intent to kill, thereby not altering the preclusive effect of the intent finding. Curiel did not provide adequate justification for any equitable exception to issue preclusion. Curiel had a significant incentive to contest his intent to kill, as it was a crucial element of the murder charge against him. The jury was instructed that he could be found liable for murder if he caused the victim’s death and had the intent to kill. The prosecutor argued that Curiel’s actions leading to the confrontation and his support for Hernandez were substantial factors in the murder, reinforcing the need for Curiel to address his intent to kill, irrespective of the relevance of the special circumstance finding. The special circumstance finding could affect future legal proceedings, including appeals or petitions for writs of habeas corpus, by establishing the harmlessness of trial errors and influencing requests for clemency from the Governor. The court rejected Curiel's claim that the special circumstance was of minimal importance and should not preclude further litigation. Curiel also contended that the enactment of Senate Bill 1437 constituted a significant alteration in the law, arguing against the application of issue preclusion based on prior jury findings. However, this argument was dismissed based on precedent, which suggests that the legislature intended for many findings to remain effective during resentencing. The court noted that if the record contradicts the allegations in a petition, it could justify a negative credibility determination against the petitioner. Curiel's defense strategy centered on asserting his non-guilt of murder rather than contesting his intent to kill, but the court determined that this choice did not excuse him from the doctrine of issue preclusion. The court concluded that Senate Bill 1437 does not provide grounds for an equitable exception to issue preclusion, affirming that it typically applies in these cases. The jury's finding of intent to kill is deemed to have preclusive effect, but its application during resentencing under section 1172.6 requires further clarification. This finding is critical for the trial court in assessing a petitioner's prima facie showing, as the record of conviction aids the court in differentiating between potentially meritorious and clearly meritless petitions. The trial court must accept the petitioner’s factual allegations as true when making a preliminary assessment for relief eligibility; it cannot dismiss these on credibility grounds without conducting an evidentiary hearing. If the record contradicts the petitioner's claims, a credibility determination against the petitioner is justified, allowing for dismissal if the evidence conclusively shows ineligibility for relief. The Attorney General asserts that the intent to kill finding is dispositive under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), which necessitates that an otherwise-eligible petitioner claim they could not be convicted of the relevant homicide offense due to changes in law effective January 1, 2019. However, the court disagrees, stating that an intent to kill finding does not automatically render a petitioner ineligible for relief. While the allegation under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) is part of the prima facie requirement necessary for an evidentiary hearing, the court emphasizes its interpretation of the statute must align with legislative intent, considering the statute's language and context. The court's approach involves examining the entire substance of the statute to understand its purpose and harmonizing its various parts. Changes in section 1172.6(a)(3) refer to substantive amendments to sections 188 and 189 introduced in Senate Bill 1437, specifically affecting the definitions and implications of malice in murder convictions. The amendment to section 188 mandates that, barring felony murder cases, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and malice cannot be imputed solely based on participation in a crime. The Attorney General argues that Curiel's intent to kill, established by the jury, contradicts his claim that he could not be convicted of murder due to these changes. Legislative history indicates a concern for fairness in imposing murder liability on individuals who did not intend to kill. However, the Attorney General's interpretation is deemed insufficient, as it overlooks the broader implications of the amendment, which fully abolished the doctrine of natural and probable consequences in murder liability. As a result, after the passage of Senate Bill 1437, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder solely under this doctrine, necessitating a valid theory of murder liability, such as direct aiding and abetting, due to the changes in section 188. Changes to California's homicide laws, particularly Sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, have altered the legal landscape regarding murder liability, impacting the doctrine of natural and probable consequences. A petitioner asserting inability to be convicted of murder based on these changes raises questions about all elements of the offense under valid legal theories. The legislative amendments aimed to restrict murder liability to established theories requiring requisite intent, thereby allowing petitions for relief from convictions based on invalid theories. At the prima facie stage, courts must accept a petitioner's claims unless the record conclusively disproves them. If even one element of the offense is not established in the record, the petitioner may still argue that they cannot be convicted under the new law. Specifically, a finding of intent to kill is just one element and does not alone establish liability under any valid theory. For instance, accomplices must possess knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful intent and act with intent to assist. Additionally, a trial court's inquiry does not end with intent findings; other jury findings within the record may provide crucial context that could refute a petitioner’s claims of non-conviction under current laws, thus helping to differentiate between meritorious and meritless petitions. The statute's purpose is to align murder culpability with a person’s actions and to efficiently handle clearly meritless petitions through a single-step prima facie review process. If the record, including court documents, contains facts that refute the petitioner's allegations, the court can make a credibility determination against the petitioner. Parties are encouraged to use the conviction record to help the court assess whether a prima facie case for relief has been established. In the case of Strong, it was determined that prior special circumstance findings do not preclude resentencing under section 1172.6, especially if the jury established elements of felony murder, including the commission of an enumerated felony and intent to kill. In the current case involving Curiel, the Attorney General argues that the jury’s prior findings, combined with the intent to kill, cover all elements of murder under direct aiding and abetting, which would preclude relief under section 1172.6. This argument parallels a recent case, Lopez, where the Attorney General claimed that erroneous jury instructions were harmless due to the jury's factual findings, which included elements of murder under a valid theory of aiding and abetting. The court assessed this by examining jury instructions against murder elements under valid legal theories. The analysis concludes that the relevant legal language is similar but not comprehensive regarding direct aiding and abetting elements. Unlike in the Lopez case, harmless error principles do not apply here; however, the jury's verdicts and the factual findings they entail can be examined to assess Curiel's petition. If the jury made a factual determination that is issue preclusive, a court must honor that finding without re-evaluating evidence or exercising discretion. This process helps distinguish potentially meritorious petitions from those deemed clearly meritless. Despite the Attorney General's valid framework, the conclusion that the jury's verdicts encompass all necessary factual findings for a murder conviction under amended sections 188 and 189 is disputed. The jury's findings do not dismiss Curiel's claim that he cannot be convicted of murder under current law, nor do they conclusively indicate his ineligibility for relief. In the context of harmless error, reviewing courts can consider the entirety of the case, including all evidence, not just the verdict. They must ascertain whether a rational juror, based on the jury's findings and trial evidence, could have reached the additional necessary findings for valid liability if properly instructed. Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is culpable for both the target offense and any other offense that is a natural and probable consequence of the crime aided. The jury was instructed on two target offenses: disturbing the peace and carrying a concealed firearm as a gang member. For Curiel to be convicted of murder under this doctrine, the jury needed to find that he knew of the perpetrator’s intent to commit the underlying crime, intended to aid in that crime, and actively assisted in its commission. The jury was tasked with determining whether Hernandez committed murder while engaging in either disturbing the peace or carrying a concealed firearm as a gang member. It was concluded that any rational juror would have reached the same findings based on the evidence presented at trial, making the error in the jury's instructions harmless and not contributing to the verdict. In this context, there was no need for further exploration of how these principles apply to section 1172.6 resentencing petitions. The jury was informed that a reasonable person in Curiel's position would recognize that murder could be a natural and probable consequence of disturbing the peace or carrying a concealed firearm as a gang member. Criminal liability extends to all individuals involved in a crime, whether as direct perpetrators or as aiders and abettors. For murder liability under direct aiding and abetting, the prosecution must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the perpetrator's unlawful intent and their intention to facilitate the crime. Additionally, an aider and abettor can be liable for murder through implied malice if they assist in a life-endangering act, knowing the perpetrator’s intent and acting with conscious disregard for human life. Establishing aider and abettor liability requires proof of three elements: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea, including knowledge of the intent to commit the crime, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus, demonstrating conduct that assists in committing the crime. The jury convicted Curiel of first-degree murder and recognized the gang-murder special circumstance but did not specify which theory was persuasive. The Court of Appeal found the jury’s findings insufficient under current law due to the absence of the aider and abettor’s actus reus. The Attorney General asserts that the jury must have found Curiel's actus reus by determining he aided an underlying target crime, such as disturbing the peace or carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member, which could foreseeably lead to murder. The argument hinges on the causal link between the underlying crime and the murder, suggesting that aiding the former inherently supports the latter. The actus reus for aiding and abetting requires at least encouragement or participation in activities likely to result in homicide. For instance, purchasing a gun for a perpetrator could qualify as aiding both the concealed firearm offense and the resulting murder. However, it is crucial to establish that the jury definitively identified the necessary actus reus for direct aiding and abetting murder as mandated by trial court instructions. While many facts might suggest that the same act fulfills the requirements for both aiding the target crime and the murder, it is not legally certain that it must do so. Importantly, the court concludes that the jury did not necessarily find the requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting liability. The necessary mens rea involves knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful intent and the intent to assist in achieving that intent. In the case of implied malice murder, the aider must be aware of the dangerous nature of the act and consciously disregard the risk to human life. Under the jury's instructions, they were not required to find these mens rea elements, focusing instead on Curiel's knowledge of the intended underlying offense and his intent to assist with it, not with murder. The jury's separate finding of Curiel's intent to kill does not suffice to establish the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, as aiding and abetting requires a deeper involvement in the crime itself, where the aider consciously aligns their actions with those of the perpetrator. Intent to kill alone is not enough to hold someone culpable for another's actions; the aider and abettor must be aware of the direct perpetrator's intent to commit murder or a life-endangering act and must intend to assist in that act. This mental connection is essential for establishing liability. The Court of Appeal identified a lack of actus reus in the case, highlighting that merely having intent to kill does not demonstrate whether the aider and abettor actually encouraged or assisted in the murder. The Attorney General's reliance on McCoy is noted, but it does not contradict this principle. McCoy clarified that an aider and abettor could be liable for more serious offenses based on their more culpable mens rea, separate from the actual perpetrator’s actions. The liability of an aider and abettor is determined by both their own mens rea and the combined actions of all involved. For instance, if a primary actor negligently kills someone, the secondary party could still be guilty of murder if they intended to encourage that act. Using the example of Iago and Othello, if Iago incites Othello to kill, Iago can be held liable for murder if his intent was malicious, even if Othello's actions are deemed manslaughter. Thus, the culpability of Iago is based on his own mental state, independent of Othello's guilt. Intent to kill is critical, but it must be coupled with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to commit life-endangering acts. An aider and abettor, like Curiel, must demonstrate both knowledge and intent regarding the primary actor's unlawful purpose. In McCoy, the court emphasized that for liability, the aider and abettor must foresee the potential for homicide resulting from the perpetrator's actions. The Attorney General's argument that Curiel's intent to assist in a target offense suffices for liability is insufficient if Curiel did not appreciate the dangerousness of the conduct. Aider and abettors may intend to kill but can still lack the requisite mental state if they do not foresee or understand the life-threatening consequences of their actions. This scenario, where a defendant has malice aforethought yet is not liable as a direct aider and abettor, is rare and only applicable if jury instructions do not preclude such a possibility. The mental state for felony murder differs and is not addressed in this context. A trial court may only deny a defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage if the law precludes the possibility of the defendant's claimed mental state. The record of conviction only conclusively establishes a defendant's ineligibility for relief under specific circumstances. Contrary to the Attorney General's argument, this determination does not involve re-litigating trial issues or allowing a petitioner to challenge the original trial's factfinding. The jury's factual findings are to be given preclusive effect, and the focus is on identifying these findings and their relevance to murder elements under a valid theory. The ruling does not extend to cases with different jury instructions, which may require distinct factual findings. In this case, the jury's findings were inadequate to definitively establish Curiel's liability for murder under current law, as they could have relied on a theory that does not encompass all murder elements required today. Consequently, the trial court's denial of Curiel's petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage was erroneous. The Court of Appeal's reversal of the trial court's order is affirmed.