You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

Sunny Guerin, Elizabeth Asisuan Toovak, and Vera Lincoln v. State of Alaska, Division of Elections

Citation: Not availableDocket: S18457

Court: Alaska Supreme Court; April 28, 2023; Alaska; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves an appeal related to Alaska's special elections following the death of a U.S. Representative, focusing on the use of ranked-choice voting as introduced by Ballot Measure 2. The controversy arose when a candidate who placed third in the special primary withdrew, and the Division of Elections did not replace this candidate with the fifth-place primary candidate, citing a statutory 64-day deadline for candidate replacement. Voters filed a lawsuit challenging this decision, but the superior court ruled in favor of the Division, granting summary judgment and affirming the application of the deadline to special elections. The appellate court expedited the review due to the urgency of election matters and upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statutory framework did not infringe upon voters' constitutional rights. The court applied a sliding-scale approach to statutory interpretation, aligning with the intent of Ballot Measure 2 and concluding that the regulation was reasonable and nondiscriminatory, thereby supporting significant regulatory interests. The ruling emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines for orderly election management, ultimately affirming the Division's interpretation and application of election statutes.

Legal Issues Addressed

Agency Interpretation of Election Statutes

Application: The Division's interpretation of the election statutes was reviewed under the reasonable basis standard, affirming that the agency's application of the 64-day deadline was consistent with statutory requirements.

Reasoning: An administrative interpretation of election statutes can be given weight even under the independent judgment standard.

Application of AS 15.25.100(c) to Special Elections

Application: The court upheld the application of AS 15.25.100(c), including the 64-day replacement deadline, to special elections, confirming that the statute applies broadly unless otherwise specified.

Reasoning: The superior court ruled in favor of the Division, stating their actions were lawful, and granted summary judgment.

Ballot Measure 2 and Voter Intent

Application: The court examined the intent of Ballot Measure 2, affirming that voters were aware of the 64-day deadline, which was aligned with the statutory language and voter information.

Reasoning: Ballot Measure 2 reflects the intention to enforce the 64-day replacement deadline for special elections.

Constitutionality of Election Regulations

Application: The court determined that the statutory deadline did not infringe upon constitutional voting rights, as the regulation was reasonable and non-discriminatory, supporting regulatory interests.

Reasoning: The decision not to place Sweeney’s name on the general election ballot does not infringe upon Guerin’s constitutional rights.

Statutory Interpretation and Election Deadlines

Application: The court applied a sliding-scale approach to statutory interpretation, concluding that the 64-day deadline for candidate replacement applies to both regular and special elections.

Reasoning: Statutory interpretation follows a 'sliding-scale approach,' where clearer language demands stronger evidence for contrary intent.