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Andrew Timothy Martinez v. the State of Texas
Citation: Not availableDocket: 11-21-00051-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 20, 2023; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Andrew Timothy Martinez was convicted by a jury of third-degree felony possession of methamphetamine and sentenced to forty-seven and one-half years in prison, following the jury's acceptance of two enhancement allegations that elevated his punishment to habitual offender status. Martinez claimed that the trial court erred by providing an incorrect parole law instruction during sentencing, which he argued misrepresented the impact of "good conduct time" on his parole eligibility. He contended this error caused him egregious harm, warranting a new trial. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, noting that the issue of egregious harm due to similar instructions has been consistently addressed by various courts of appeals, which found no support for such claims in the record. The court also outlined that after the initial appellate counsel filed an Anders brief and withdrew, new counsel was appointed to address the merits of the case. On January 18, 2019, the Appellant was a passenger in a tan SUV driven by David Cortinez. Abilene Police Sergeant Randy Brown observed the SUV leaving a residence linked to suspected drug activity and initiated a traffic stop due to a malfunctioning brake light. During the stop, Sergeant Brown detected the smell of alcohol and requested a canine unit after obtaining identification from Appellant and Cortinez. The canine alert led to a search, revealing a baggie with what appeared to be methamphetamine in Appellant’s front pocket. A field test was inconclusive, but subsequent testing confirmed the substance weighed 1.3 grams. Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony. During the punishment phase, Officer Tim Cox testified about a traffic stop involving Appellant on December 1, 2020, where Appellant was driving a vehicle that failed to signal and was speeding. Officer Cox’s canine alerted on the vehicle, leading to the discovery of a bank bag containing 23.1 grams of methamphetamine under the front passenger seat. Testimonies from Appellant’s mother and brother highlighted his struggles with medical issues and drug addiction, with his brother acknowledging Appellant's seven prior DWI convictions and felony history, which were relevant for enhancing the charges. The analysis section outlines the standard of review for alleged charge errors during appeals, emphasizing a two-step process: first, determining if charge error exists, and second, conducting a harm analysis to assess if the error warrants reversal. It underscores the jury's role in fact-finding while being guided by the law provided by the court, aimed at ensuring the jury understands and applies the law appropriately. Charge error arises from the trial court's failure to provide accurate jury instructions on the law pertinent to the case, as mandated by Bell v. State and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14. The trial court bears the responsibility for ensuring the correctness of its jury charge, and inaccuracies warrant a harm analysis. Specifically, under Article 37.07, Section 4(b), the trial court must include appropriate parole law instructions in the punishment charge, which depend on the degree of felony for which the defendant was convicted. In this instance, because the jury affirmed enhancement allegations, the punishment had to align with the statutory range for habitual offenders. A 2019 amendment to Article 37.07, Section 4(b) stipulates that good conduct time, if awarded, allows for early parole eligibility rather than merely reducing the incarceration period for defendants sentenced as habitual offenders. This amendment applies to all sentences imposed post-September 1, 2019, which includes the Appellant's sentence from March 30, 2021. Both the Appellant and the State agree that the trial court was obligated to use the updated Section 4(b) instruction. However, the trial court mistakenly provided the outdated instruction, omitting the necessary language regarding early parole eligibility and retaining references to reduced periods of incarceration. The accurate instruction should clearly state that a defendant may earn early parole eligibility through good conduct time, contingent on behavior and misconduct while imprisoned. The trial court's failure to submit the correct instruction constituted an error, necessitating adherence to the statutory language without deviation. A harm analysis is necessary due to the identified charge error, specifically regarding an erroneous parole law instruction included in the punishment charge. Appellant's trial counsel did not object to this error, prompting a review under the "egregious harm" standard established in Almanza. Under this standard, reversal is warranted only if the error was so severe that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Egregious harm is defined as an error that impacts the case's foundation, denies a significant right, or critically influences a defensive strategy. The determination of egregious harm is challenging and must be supported by the trial record. The analysis involves assessing whether the appellant experienced actual harm due to the error, as opposed to theoretical harm. The Court of Criminal Appeals has outlined specific factors for this assessment, including the charge itself, the evidence presented, the arguments from counsel, and any other pertinent information from the trial record. In this case, the punishment charge was reviewed in its entirety. It was noted that the purpose of the parole instruction was to provide general information while preventing jurors from factoring it into their punishment assessment. The charge adequately informed the jury of the applicable punishment range and instructed them not to consider aspects like "good conduct time" or the applicability of parole law when determining punishment. Additionally, it made clear that eligibility for parole does not guarantee its approval. The presumption is that the jury followed these instructions, as there is no contrary evidence in the record. The jury likely did not take into account "good conduct time," parole eligibility, or the parole law when determining Appellant’s punishment, and the punishment charge did not confuse or mislead the jury, indicating that the first Almanza factor does not favor finding egregious harm. Appellant does not dispute the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction but questions if the charge error influenced the jury’s punishment recommendation. As a habitual offender, Appellant faced a punishment range of life imprisonment or 25 to 99 years, with the jury recommending a 47.5-year sentence. Despite being closer to the lower end of the range, the evidence of Appellant's criminal history, including seven DWI convictions and multiple felony offenses, was compelling. This history, combined with his status on parole at the time of the current offense, supported the jury's decision. Therefore, the state of the evidence does not suggest egregious harm. Regarding the third Almanza factor, trial counsel's arguments did not exacerbate the charge error. The State mentioned "parole" briefly without elaborating on its implications, while Appellant’s counsel only referred to it once, focusing on advocating for a minimum sentence. There was no mention of "good conduct time," leading to the conclusion that this factor also does not support a finding of egregious harm. The fourth Almanza “catch-all” factor requires consideration of any additional relevant information that may indicate whether Appellant experienced egregious harm due to a charge error. Appellant claims that the jury's lengthy punishment deliberations and their unique sentencing indicate improper considerations regarding parole laws and "good conduct time." However, this assertion lacks support in the record, as the jury did not inquire or communicate with the trial court about these topics during deliberations. There is no evidence suggesting the jury was influenced or confused by the punishment charge instructions, nor did they mention early parole eligibility or related matters. Consequently, there is no pertinent information that demonstrates the punishment recommendation was affected by the charge error, specifically the omission of "early parole eligibility" language. Though the trial court erroneously included outdated language in its charge, this did not result in egregious harm that would compromise Appellant's right to a fair trial. The appeal is thus overruled, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.