Randy W. Tundidor v. State of Florida

Citation: Not availableDocket: SC2022-1732

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; April 13, 2023; Florida; State Supreme Court

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Randy W. Tundidor, a death row inmate, seeks judicial review of a nonfinal order that denied his motion to disqualify Judge Elizabeth Scherer from presiding over his postconviction proceedings. Tundidor, convicted of first-degree murder, had previously filed a motion to vacate his conviction, which is pending amendment in trial court. He argues that Judge Scherer displayed bias during her recent handling of the Nikolas Cruz case, citing heated interactions with the defense and her post-sentencing conduct, which included hugging members of the prosecution team, including Assistant State Attorney Steven Klinger, who is also prosecuting Tundidor's case. Tundidor claims these actions create an appearance of impropriety and raise concerns about his ability to receive a fair hearing. Judge Scherer denied the disqualification motion, deeming the allegations legally insufficient, prompting Tundidor to file this petition for relief on December 15, 2022. The Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction over the petition.

Tundidor’s petition is treated as a writ of prohibition, which allows for immediate review of a motion to disqualify a trial judge. A motion to disqualify must present specific facts that reasonably question the judge's impartiality, particularly if a party fears an unfair trial due to the judge's perceived bias. The judge can only assess the legal sufficiency of the motion, not the truth of its allegations. If legally sufficient, disqualification is mandatory.

The standard for this legal sufficiency is whether the allegations, assumed true, would cause a reasonably prudent person to fear an unfair trial. Actual bias is not required; rather, the appearance of bias suffices for disqualification. A subjective fear of bias is insufficient; it must be objectively reasonable. The review of a judge's decision on disqualification motions is de novo.

Tundidor claimed that Judge Scherer’s behavior during previous hearings indicated bias favoring the State, creating a reasonable fear of unfairness. Specifically, the judge's actions, including hugging an Assistant State Attorney (ASA) in court and engaging in a personal exchange with the ASA, suggested a sympathetic stance towards the prosecution. These circumstances collectively established a well-founded fear of unfair proceedings. Consequently, the trial court’s denial of Tundidor's motion was erroneous, leading to the quashing of that order, the granting of the writ of prohibition, and the directive for reassignment of Tundidor’s case.

Randy W. Tundidor, a death row inmate, filed a petition challenging the denial of his motion to disqualify Judge Elizabeth Scherer from his postconviction proceedings, which is treated as a writ of prohibition. Tundidor, convicted of first-degree murder, has a pending motion to vacate his conviction. He argues Judge Scherer displayed bias, citing her conduct during the highly publicized trial of Nikolas Cruz, who killed seventeen people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Tundidor's motion highlights Judge Scherer’s confrontational exchanges with Cruz’s defense during a November 1, 2022, sentencing hearing and her post-sentencing interactions with victims' families and prosecutors, particularly Assistant State Attorney Steven Klinger, who is also involved in Tundidor's case. He claims these interactions suggest an appearance of impropriety and a reasonable fear of bias, asserting that Judge Scherer’s actions indicate potential favoritism towards the prosecution. Tundidor cites the case Suarez v. Dugger, emphasizing the need for an impartial hearing.

Judge Scherer’s actions, including hugging and sympathizing with the Assistant State Attorney during Mr. Tundidor’s case, indicate a potential bias in favor of the prosecution, leading to a reasonable fear that Tundidor would not receive a fair hearing. On November 28, 2022, Judge Scherer denied Tundidor's motion for disqualification, claiming the allegations were insufficient. Subsequently, Tundidor filed a petition on December 15, 2022, seeking relief, which is treated as a writ of prohibition for immediate review of the disqualification motion’s denial. Florida law allows for disqualification if a party reasonably fears bias from the judge, as outlined in Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330. The judge may only assess the legal sufficiency of the motion without evaluating the truth of the claims. If found sufficient, disqualification must be granted. The standard for legal sufficiency relies on whether alleged facts would cause a reasonable person to fear a lack of impartiality, focusing on the appearance of bias rather than actual prejudice. Tundidor's assertions regarding Judge Scherer’s conduct raise concerns about an appearance of bias, which legally supports his request for disqualification without needing to prove actual bias. The review of the judge's determination on such motions is conducted de novo.

Disqualification of a judge is determined by whether a reasonable litigant could question the judge's impartiality, rather than the judge's self-assessment of fairness. In the case involving Tundidor, the allegations against Judge Scherer indicated actions that could instill a reasonable fear of bias, specifically her physical interaction with Assistant State Attorney (ASA) Klinger after the Cruz case and a subsequent personal exchange during Tundidor's proceedings. These actions suggested a potential sympathy with the State linked to another capital case. The court found that Tundidor's motion for disqualification was legally sufficient, leading to the conclusion that the trial court erred in denying it. The order denying disqualification was quashed, a writ of prohibition was granted, and the circuit court was directed to reassign Tundidor's case. The opinion was concurred by Chief Justice Muñiz and Justices Canady, Labarga, Couriel, Grosshans, and Francis. The decision remains provisional pending any rehearing motions.