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United States v. Melvin Shields
Citation: Not availableDocket: 22-1891
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 27, 2023; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Melvin Lavon Shields pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, following his arrest for violating supervised release conditions related to a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit carjacking. The district court sentenced him to thirty-two months of imprisonment, determining a base offense level of twenty under sentencing guidelines, categorizing his prior conviction as a crime of violence. Shields challenged the procedural calculation of his sentence, arguing that carjacking does not constitute a crime of violence since it can involve intimidation without force. However, this argument is contradicted by the Eighth Circuit's decision in Estell v. United States, which classified carjacking as a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Shields contended that the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Taylor could undermine Estell's interpretation. However, Taylor specifically addressed the nature of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and did not alter the established classification of carjacking. The court upheld the district court's calculations and affirmed the judgment. Shields argues that carjacking does not inherently involve threatened force, asserting that the intimidation element of the statute does not necessitate a communicated threat. However, the court clarifies that intimidation in bank robbery requires proof that the victim could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm from the robber's actions. This precedent applies equally to carjacking by intimidation. Additionally, Shields claims his conspiracy to commit carjacking should not be classified as a crime of violence, as conspiracy does not mandate the use or threatened use of physical force. This argument is countered by the commentary to USSG 4B1.2, which classifies conspiracy to commit a crime of violence as itself a crime of violence, a position upheld by the court. Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed.