Darryl Lewis v. Kalev Mutond

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-7120

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; March 17, 2023; Federal Appellate Court

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Darryl Lewis, a U.S. citizen and veteran, appeals a district court decision regarding his claims against Kalev Mutond and Alexis Tambwe Mwamba, foreign officials from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Lewis alleges that the officials detained and tortured him for over six weeks in 2016 to extract a false confession that he was an American mercenary. He asserts that this conduct establishes personal jurisdiction over the officials under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and requests jurisdictional discovery if necessary. The court, however, affirms the district court's ruling, stating that Lewis' claims do not establish jurisdiction. 

In 2016, Lewis served as a security advisor to a former DRC presidential candidate, while Mutond was the General Administrator of the DRC’s National Intelligence Agency and Mwamba was the Minister of Justice. Lewis was subjected to harsh treatment, including long interrogations, irregular meals, sleep deprivation, and denial of hygiene products, with the aim of coercing a false confession. Mutond allegedly taunted him during detention, and after Lewis refused to confess, Mwamba publicly accused him of being a mercenary at a press conference, presenting dubious evidence to support this claim. The U.S. Embassy in the DRC later issued a statement refuting the allegations against Lewis, asserting he was not armed and denying any involvement in mercenary activities.

The district court dismissed Lewis' complaint due to a lack of personal jurisdiction and denied his request for jurisdictional discovery. Lewis appealed the decision, and appellate jurisdiction is established under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The appellate review of the dismissal is conducted de novo, while the denial of jurisdictional discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The central issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting the Foreign Officials' motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction. The court must determine if the Foreign Officials purposefully availed themselves of the United States by torturing Lewis to obtain a false confession. The court concludes they did not.

Lewis' theory of personal jurisdiction hinges on two types: general and specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction is not applicable since the Foreign Officials are domiciled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Therefore, Lewis must demonstrate specific jurisdiction. Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, specific jurisdiction requires that a defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum, ensuring that the suit does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. These contacts must be purposefully directed at the forum to establish foreseeability that the defendant could anticipate being brought into court there.

Lewis does not seek specific jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1), which pertains to domestic defendants. Instead, he claims jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment in conjunction with Rule 4(k)(2), which allows for personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants if consistent with U.S. constitutional principles and laws, provided there is no general jurisdiction.

Rule 4(k)(2) allows for specific jurisdiction over a defendant with sufficient contacts to the United States. The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on whether the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause necessitates the same minimum contacts as the Fourteenth Amendment, but most circuits, including this Court, recognize that the standards are largely similar. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments generally follow analogous inquiries regarding due process, with exceptions for certain entities like states and sovereign foreign states, but not for foreign individuals.

For foreign defendants, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case of jurisdictional facts. These facts must support a reasonable inference that the defendant intended to target the U.S. The Fifth Amendment requires meaningful contacts with the U.S. to provide fair notice of potential jurisdiction. Conclusory statements or bare conspiracy allegations are insufficient. Courts evaluate the defendant's overall contacts with the U.S., rather than focusing solely on the forum state.

The Court has rejected Lewis’ argument that the torture he experienced by Foreign Officials satisfies jurisdiction, stating that torture alone, unless directed at the U.S., does not meet the minimum contacts standard. Lewis's attempt to distinguish his case from relevant precedent (Price) is unsuccessful; both cases involve similar claims of torture targeting U.S. citizens without the necessary jurisdictional connections.

Libya's potential status as a 'person' under the Fifth Amendment does not establish jurisdiction for the torture of two American citizens, as it fails to meet the 'minimum contacts' requirement. Lewis contends that the Foreign Officials' propaganda campaign against him qualifies as targeting the United States. He seeks to refine the precedent set in Mwani, proposing that a foreign defendant should be accountable for actions that are clearly harmful and felt in the U.S. However, this interpretation misaligns with the Court's previous findings. In Mwani, significant contacts with the U.S. included orchestrated terrorist attacks on American soil and against U.S. interests. In contrast, the actions attributed to the Foreign Officials lack any direct connection to the U.S.; their focus lies on the political situation within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Official Tambwe's claims about American citizens destabilizing the DRC highlight that the concern is not specifically about Americans but rather about foreign influence in the DRC's elections. Lewis's assertion that he has been targeted as an American is unsupported by specific allegations, paralleling the Court's dismissal of vague claims in Livnat regarding the Palestinian Authority's practices. Thus, mere allegations of persecution do not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction over the Foreign Officials.

Lewis asserts that the actions of Foreign Officials from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against him aimed to involve the United States in a geopolitical conflict. He contrasts his situation with the case of Livnat, where a clear relationship existed between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, arguing that his case lacks such a connection. Lewis claims that the Foreign Officials sought to influence U.S. foreign policy amid U.S. pressure on the Kabila regime for electoral reform. However, articles referenced in his complaint contradict this assertion, indicating that Lewis was entangled in DRC’s internal power struggles rather than a direct U.S.-related conspiracy. One article highlights the DRC's then-President's resistance to international pressure, failing to link the Foreign Officials' actions to a targeted effort against the U.S. Lewis also argues that a public denial by the U.S. Embassy of the allegations against him indicates the Foreign Officials’ intent to target the U.S. However, the Embassy's statement does not imply any conspiracy or deliberate targeting but merely disputes the allegations made by the DRC officials. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Foreign Officials purposively availed themselves of the United States.

The Embassy's brief condemnation does not establish personal jurisdiction in Lewis' case. Torture allegations are crucial for a claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), but personal jurisdiction cannot be assumed where the Constitution does not permit it. Lewis contends that the district court should have allowed jurisdictional discovery, but the court has discretion to deny such requests if no further facts would alter the jurisdictional assessment. A plaintiff must show a good faith belief that reasonable discovery could enhance jurisdictional claims. While Lewis sought to obtain evidence regarding the Foreign Officials' impact on the U.S. and relevant correspondence, the district court rightly denied the request due to a lack of specific allegations linking the officials to the claims. This denial was also upheld on appeal as Lewis failed to make precise requests until his reply brief, which waived that argument. Ultimately, Lewis did not demonstrate that exercising specific jurisdiction over the Foreign Officials complied with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, nor did he specify how discovery could remedy his jurisdictional deficiencies. Consequently, the district court's dismissal due to lack of personal jurisdiction and denial of jurisdictional discovery were affirmed. Additionally, one Circuit Judge concurred, highlighting the need to reassess whether the personal jurisdiction requirements under the Fifth Amendment differ from those under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The excerpt addresses the application of personal jurisdiction standards under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, referencing Livnat v. Palestinian Authority, where the D.C. Circuit held that the same standards apply. However, the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. left the question open as to whether the Fifth Amendment imposes identical due process limits. The case involves Lewis suing two Congolese officials for imprisonment and torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act, utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to establish personal jurisdiction. The only contested issue is whether asserting personal jurisdiction complies with the Fifth Amendment. 

The Livnat court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's specific jurisdiction requirements also apply to the Fifth Amendment analysis, necessitating an examination of the defendants' "minimum contacts" with the United States. This conclusion was based on three arguments: the uniform view among other circuits, the absence of a reason to distinguish the amendments, and the administrative ease of applying the same standards. However, subsequent developments have questioned these premises. Notably, the Supreme Court's Bristol-Myers decision reiterated the open nature of the question regarding Fifth Amendment restrictions, while recent scholarship suggests potential differences between the standards, indicating that historical interpretations did not support a minimum contacts requirement under the Fifth Amendment.

Justice Story noted that if Congress had clearly defined its authority, it could compel individuals from foreign nations to comply with U.S. legal proceedings. However, in the case of Picquet v. Swan, the court declined to assert jurisdiction over an American expatriate not due to constitutional constraints but because Congress had not granted the necessary authorization. A decade later, the Supreme Court acknowledged Story’s reasoning as compelling and adopted it in Toland v. Sprague. The consensus established that personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in federal courts was contingent upon congressional guidance. Livnat's application of the minimum contacts test imported due process limits from the Fourteenth Amendment into the Fifth Amendment, suggesting a shift in understanding. Current doctrine assumes the Fourteenth Amendment's principles apply to the Fifth, but this may misinterpret original meanings. Livnat's justification for ease of administration does not equate to legal correctness, and there is substantial evidence that the Fifth Amendment may not impose the same due process limits as the Fourteenth in state courts. A thorough reassessment of the Fifth Amendment's due process protections should be conducted by the en banc court in a suitable case, with comprehensive briefing. The court's reliance on established precedent in this instance is correct, leading to a concurrence with the decision.