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Rubin, B. v. Stewart, P.
Citation: Not availableDocket: 2554 EDA 2021
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; February 14, 2023; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Paul A.R. Stewart, Helm Legal Services, LLC (HLS), and Alisha Alejandro appeal a judgment entered on November 22, 2021, by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which ruled in favor of Bruce Rubin in a wrongful use of civil proceedings case. Stewart seeks judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and remittitur, contending that the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings and that a punitive damages award against an attorney is unconstitutional. The appeals are consolidated due to a joint trial and a single opinion from the trial court denying both parties' post-trial motions. The appeals are formally noted from the judgment entered rather than from the denial of post-trial motions, as established by precedent. The trial court determined that any verdict against Stewart also implicated HLS by law, despite HLS being a separate entity. Alejandro claims Rubin did not prove her liability and argues that the trial court improperly disqualified her counsel without notice or a hearing. The underlying facts involve Alejandro's visit to Barco Optical, owned by Rubin, on December 8, 2016, for optometric services. Rubin, an optician, did not perform eye exams, and there is no evidence of direct communication between Alejandro and the optometrist who issued her prescription. The services were billed to Alejandro's insurance. Ultimately, the court affirms the lower court's decision. An optician, as explained by Rubin, fills prescriptions from eye doctors for eyeglasses but lacks medical training. After receiving optometric services, Alejandro consented to purchase glasses from Barco using her prescription, which included a request for anti-reflective coating. There were no allegations or evidence of misrepresentation by Rubin or Barco during the order process, and it was unclear how the prescription was relayed to Barco. Alejandro was responsible for the $399.00 payment, with an invoice created, and no deposit was requested or given. She was informed the glasses would be ready in about a week, but upon notification of their readiness, she refused delivery and requested her written prescription. A Barco employee informed her that payment was required before receiving the prescription, leading to repeated requests from Alejandro. On January 17, 2017, Alejandro contacted HLS and spoke to Stewart about the prescription issue. Stewart subsequently called Rubin, threatening legal action if the prescription was not provided. Rubin, feeling threatened, had an emotional reaction and eventually handed Alejandro her prescription without any payment exchanged. The issue appeared resolved when Alejandro informed Stewart she received the prescription. However, ten days later, Stewart sent a Notice of Claim for Negligence and Unfair Trade Practices against Rubin for failing to provide the prescription as mandated by law. The claim sought the preservation of documents from December 8, 2016, to January 18, 2017. Rubin responded, deeming the claim baseless, and Stewart warned of imminent legal action if the matter was not settled. On February 21, 2017, Stewart and HLS demanded $25,000 from Rubin, claiming to have found other clients with similar allegations, though he did not disclose his representation of them to Rubin. Alejandro was unaware of this demand. Stewart determined that Rubin breached HIPAA by posting medical patient information on social media. The case Alisha Alejandro v. Philadelphia Vision Center, Bruce Rubin was initiated on February 28, 2017, leading to pre-complaint discovery aimed at identifying defendants. Stewart identified 20-21 entities associated with the name 'Philadelphia Vision Center,' but only three were fictitious names; he did not investigate further into the relationships among the entities. The discovery included requests for admissions and documentation of professional liability insurance but not for details about Rubin's business size or scope. On June 17, 2017, Stewart and HLS made a second settlement demand of $7,000 to $10,000, based on the work invested, excluding compensation for Alejandro's injuries. The first complaint was filed on July 5, 2017, alleging Rubin's refusal to provide Alejandro with her prescription while demanding payment for eye frames. The complaints included various allegations, such as violations of the UTPCPL and Sherman Act. During Rubin's deposition on March 28, 2018, it was revealed he owned only one store but shared the fictitious name with others. Despite knowing the alleged activities involved only one entity, Stewart continued to assert antitrust violations in subsequent amended complaints. After the deposition, Rubin offered $5,000 to settle, which was rejected. Stewart then submitted a third demand for $159,000, which Alejandro did not authorize. A third amended complaint omitted any allegations about Rubin’s billing practices. Rubin self-reported a billing error to his insurance on April 11, 2018, and was never charged. The case was moved to federal court on May 22, 2018. A series of settlement demands culminated in a final demand of $1,500 by August 2, 2018. On August 9, 2018, Rubin's motion for summary judgment was granted, with a memorandum from Judge Harvey Bartle III explaining the court's rationale. The court ruled against Alejandro, determining his claims were insufficient, particularly regarding the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), which does not apply to medical service providers. Judge Bartle noted there was no evidence to support Alejandro's allegations of unfair trade related to the sale of eyeglasses. Consequently, Alejandro's state claims were dismissed with prejudice, leading to a stipulation to dismiss remaining federal claims. Subsequently, Rubin filed a civil complaint against Stewart, HLS, and Alejandro for wrongful use of civil proceedings, seeking damages for business interference, attorney fees, emotional distress, and punitive damages. Rubin accused Stewart of making derogatory remarks, threatening him, and attempting to extort money. After preliminary objections were filed by Stewart and Alejandro's representation, the trial court overruled these objections. Rubin raised concerns about a conflict of interest due to Stewart representing both Alejandro and himself. Although Alejandro waived the conflict, the court removed Stewart as her attorney due to the severity of the conflict, allowing her time to find new counsel. Stewart's appeal against this decision was quashed as interlocutory, and Alejandro proceeded pro se. In June 2021, Stewart filed a motion in limine regarding evidence and punitive damages, with the court ruling on these matters before the jury trial commenced on July 14, 2021. On July 19, the jury ruled in favor of Rubin against Stewart and Alejandro, determining they acted with gross negligence or without probable cause for improper purposes regarding the underlying action. Damages awarded included: $100,000 for harm to Rubin's reputation, $480,000 for defense expenses (including attorney's fees), and $100,000 for emotional distress, with the jury attributing liability equally to Stewart (and HLS) and Alejandro. Punitive damages were set at $159,000 for Stewart and $5,399.99 for Alejandro. Following the verdict, Stewart filed a post-trial relief motion on July 29, 2021, and Alejandro filed his motion pro se on August 9. Rubin opposed these motions on October 18, 2021. An en banc hearing occurred on November 3, 2021, and the trial court denied both motions on November 22, 2021, entering judgment on the verdict. Stewart and Alejandro both filed timely appeals, with Stewart representing Alejandro. The trial court issued a joint opinion on April 5, 2022. Stewart's appeal is recorded as 2554 EDA 2021, and Alejandro's as 2555 EDA 2021. On January 22, 2022, prior appeals were dismissed as duplicative. In his appeal, Stewart raises multiple claims, including alleged errors in the trial court's denial of non-suit, admission of prejudicial evidence, and the appropriateness of the awarded damages. Alejandro raises two primary issues for review: 1) Whether Rubin demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Alejandro initiated and continued a consumer protection action without probable cause, thus potentially incurring liability under the Dragonetti statute; 2) Whether the trial court erred by disqualifying Alejandro’s pro bono trial counsel without notice or a hearing due to a speculative conflict of interest, despite Alejandro's written waiver of the conflict, which the court was aware could prejudice Alejandro's defense and infringe upon her due process rights. The Dragonetti Act, codified at 42 Pa.C.S. 8351-8355, addresses wrongful use of civil proceedings, which occurs when a lawsuit is filed with malicious intent and without probable cause. To establish liability under the Act, a plaintiff must prove five elements: the defendant initiated or continued civil proceedings, those proceedings terminated favorably for the plaintiff, the defendant lacked probable cause, the primary motive was not proper legal adjudication, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Probable cause exists if the defendant reasonably believes in the facts supporting the claim, believes the claim may be valid, relies on good faith legal advice, or acts in good faith as an attorney without malicious intent. While usually a legal question for the court, the issue of probable cause can be submitted to a jury if material facts are disputed. The court notes that liability can arise from gross negligence, defined as a severe lack of care. In addressing both Alejandro's and Stewart's claims under the Dragonetti Act, Stewart contends the trial court erred by not granting a compulsory nonsuit after Rubin's case-in-chief, asserting that Rubin did not prove that Stewart lacked probable cause in the underlying lawsuit or, without expert testimony, that he acted with gross negligence. Stewart argues that the outcome of his case should have favored him based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in *Gregg v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc.*, 245 A.3d 637 (Pa. 2021). Rubin contends that Stewart's challenge regarding the trial court's denial of his motion for compulsory nonsuit is waived because Stewart elected to present evidence after the denial, rendering the nonsuit ruling moot. Rubin highlights that Stewart did not contest the nonsuit ruling in his post-trial motions but instead sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). It is established that once a defendant proceeds after a nonsuit motion, the correctness of that ruling cannot be reviewed. However, the court may consider nonsuit arguments when made in support of a JNOV request. The court decides not to find Stewart's challenge waived and instead reviews it as an assertion of error in denying JNOV. The standard for reviewing an order denying JNOV involves assessing whether there is sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict, favoring the verdict winner in cases of conflicting evidence. JNOV is only appropriate when no reasonable minds could disagree on the verdict's impropriety and cannot be used to replace jury determinations on factual issues. Stewart does not dispute the first two elements of the Dragonetti claim—his initiation of civil proceedings against Rubin and the favorable termination of those proceedings for Rubin. He argues, however, that Rubin failed to demonstrate he acted without probable cause or in a grossly negligent manner. Stewart claims he reasonably pursued a UTPCPL (Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law) claim against Rubin under its catch-all provision, which allows individuals who suffer ascertainable losses due to unlawful acts under the law to seek damages. The UTPCPL defines various acts as unlawful, including unfair and deceptive practices, and Stewart contends his claim aligns with the catch-all provision as interpreted in *Gregg*. A couple sued their financial advisor and Ameriprise for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation after being induced to purchase certain insurance policies. Although a jury found in favor of the defendants on the common law claims, the couple succeeded in a bench trial regarding a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Ameriprise contended that the couple's failure to establish the advisor’s negligent misrepresentation barred their UTPCPL claim, but the trial court and an appellate court rejected this argument. The Supreme Court upheld that a strict liability standard applies to UTPCPL claims, meaning proof of the actor's intent or state of mind is unnecessary. The court emphasized that deceptive conduct merely requires showing that the practices could mislead consumers. The trial court found Ameriprise's representations misleading, as the advisor did not adequately explain the insurance policy's costs and terms, leading the couple to mistakenly believe they would not incur additional expenses. In a related argument, Stewart claimed that Alejandro's situation was similarly actionable under the UTPCPL's catch-all provision, which imposes strict liability on vendors whose conduct could mislead consumers. Stewart noted that Alejandro was denied her prescription after an eye examination unless she paid for glasses, constituting a deceptive act by Rubin. Stewart contended that Rubin's issuance of a "fake invalid prescription" after discussing the matter did not absolve him of liability, as it misled Alejandro regarding the conditions of receiving her prescription. Additionally, Stewart's primary claim against Rubin included an assertion that Rubin failed to demonstrate a lack of probable cause for initiating legal proceedings against him, arguing that Rubin had not provided evidence that Alejandro's claim was invalid under existing law. Rubin submitted a bill to Alejandro’s insurance for an eye exam that incorrectly listed the location and optometrist. Alejandro did not receive her prescription after the exam and was required to purchase glasses before obtaining it. Stewart argues there was no evidence that his lawsuit against Rubin was intended to harass or maliciously injure him, asserting that an attorney can pursue a belief in a valid claim even if it may not prevail, as long as the intent is not improper. Stewart contends that Rubin's claim of gross negligence is unfounded due to a lack of expert testimony, as he believes a Dragonetti action is akin to legal malpractice, which typically requires such testimony. However, the trial court found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Stewart acted without probable cause and in a grossly negligent manner. The court noted that Stewart filed a complaint based on falsehoods, as he was aware that Alejandro had received her prescription before the lawsuit was initiated. The court also pointed out that the complaint wrongly alleged Rubin's failure to provide the prescription, despite Rubin being an optician not obligated under the relevant regulations. The jury's verdict could have been based on findings of Stewart's gross negligence, and the trial court determined that expert testimony was not necessary because the issues were straightforward and understandable by the average person. Alejandro sought a prescription for glasses from Rubin, who initially refused to provide a copy after Alejandro rejected the glasses delivered under that prescription. After contacting Stewart via HLS, Alejandro received her prescription within an hour. By the time the Writ of Summons was filed on January 27, 2017, all parties were aware that Alejandro had the prescription and could obtain glasses at no charge. Despite this, Stewart falsely claimed Rubin was withholding the prescription and submitted a settlement demand without Alejandro's consent, based on unrelated issues. The lawsuit, based on inaccurate information, persisted for nearly 18 months before the state claims were dismissed and federal claims were withdrawn with prejudice. The trial court found sufficient evidence to hold Stewart liable under the Dragonetti Act. The evidence indicated Stewart lacked probable cause, as he knew Rubin had already provided Alejandro with her prescription before filing the lawsuit. Both Rubin and Alejandro confirmed they informed Stewart of this fact prior to the claim. Despite this knowledge, Stewart continued to assert that Rubin had not provided the prescription unless Alejandro paid for frames, demonstrating awareness that the claim's factual basis was false. Stewart's later assertion that the prescription was fraudulent was dismissed as irrelevant since it was not raised during the initial proceedings, and Alejandro successfully used the prescription to purchase glasses elsewhere. Additionally, evidence supported that Stewart did not reasonably believe Alejandro had a valid claim under the relevant law, as she had purchased services and suffered no ascertainable loss due to Rubin's actions. The UTPCPL (Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law) does not extend to medical service providers, as established in Walter v. Magee-Womens Hospital. Consequently, Alejandro's failure to receive her prescription immediately post-examination is not actionable under UTPCPL. Stewart did not demonstrate that Alejandro experienced an "ascertainable loss of money or property" due to any alleged deceptive act, particularly since she received her prescription for free and was not charged for glasses she later declined to buy. Additionally, the case cited by Stewart, Gregg, is distinguished as it did not involve medical services and the plaintiffs there incurred a clear financial loss. The trial evidence supported the jury's finding that Stewart acted without good faith in pursuing the action against Rubin, as he sent a notice of claim shortly after Alejandro received her prescription, made demands for settlement without her knowledge, and without addressing her alleged damages. The court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Stewart lacked probable cause in initiating Alejandro's action, rendering the consideration of gross negligence unnecessary. The court also noted that expert testimony was not necessary to establish an attorney's liability in this context, given the straightforward nature of the issues involved. Alejandro's challenge to the jury's verdict on her Dragonetti Act claim, asserting that Rubin failed to show she lacked probable cause for the underlying consumer protection action, was ultimately unpersuasive. Alejandro argues that the trial court should have determined the presence of probable cause for initiating and continuing the underlying action, rather than leaving it to the jury. She claims Rubin did not prove she lacked probable cause or acted with gross negligence or improper purpose in the case. Alejandro contends that she had probable cause after providing her attorney, Stewart, with all relevant facts and seeking his advice in good faith. She cites precedent to support her allegations under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). The court notes that while an attorney disqualified from representing a client at trial cannot represent them on appeal except to challenge the disqualification, Alejandro should not be penalized for Stewart's actions, and her Dragonetti claim will be addressed on appeal. However, Alejandro is not entitled to relief, as the existence of probable cause in a Dragonetti action is typically a legal question for the court, though it may be submitted to a jury if relevant facts are disputed. Despite Alejandro's claims of good faith reliance on Stewart's advice, she fails to substantiate her assertion. The record shows she did not testify about relying on Stewart's advice before pursuing the UTPCPL lawsuit, instead indicating her primary concern was obtaining her prescription. Additionally, she did not provide details about the legal advice received and rejected a settlement offer from Rubin without clarifying the legal merit of her claims. The jury was justified in inferring that she continued the proceedings for an improper purpose, particularly since she admitted to suffering no damages, leading to the conclusion that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find she had no probable cause to initiate or continue the action. Alejandro has not countered Rubin's claim of her gross negligence regarding the underlying action, which the jury was instructed to consider alongside the lack of probable cause. The jury's verdict slip explicitly allowed for a determination of gross negligence, and since Alejandro does not contest this finding on appeal, her first claim is deemed unsuccessful. Stewart challenges the trial court's admission of certain evidence, arguing an abuse of discretion, which is defined as a significant misapplication of the law or a clearly unreasonable judgment. He disputes the inclusion of several items: Judge Bartle’s August 29, 2018, memorandum on the federal lawsuit, references to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, his compromise offer and settlement negotiations, testimony from his brother, and Rubin’s legal invoices. Specifically, Stewart claims that Judge Bartle's memorandum was confusing and prejudicial, potentially forming the basis for liability against him, and argues its admission violated federal and state procedural rules. He further contends that the memorandum constitutes inadmissible hearsay, as he was not a party to the underlying action. However, the court concludes that Stewart is not entitled to relief, referencing a precedent that judicial opinions are admissible if relevant, not considered hearsay, and not unfairly prejudicial. The court found Judge Bartle’s opinion pertinent in demonstrating the favorable termination of the underlying proceedings for Rubin and underscoring Stewart's lack of probable cause to initiate or continue those actions. Stewart contended that Judge Bartle's decision in favor of Rubin was solely due to the lack of opposition to the motion for summary judgment. However, Judge Bartle clarified that Alejandro's claims were deficient for multiple reasons, particularly noting the absence of evidence supporting her assertions under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Stewart mischaracterized Rubin's arguments regarding the "undisputed" nature of the facts, which were only referenced in Judge Bartle's memorandum outlining Alejandro's claims—facts that neither Stewart nor Alejandro contested. Stewart's claim that the admission of the memorandum violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4014(d) was dismissed as unfounded. The federal rules do not apply in state court, and Rule 56 merely allows a federal court to consider unopposed facts as undisputed, without a requirement to do so. Additionally, Rule 4014 pertains only to pretrial discovery requests for admissions and was not relevant to Judge Bartle's memorandum. Stewart's arguments regarding the memorandum being inadmissible hearsay and not binding on him due to his non-party status were deemed waived, as he failed to raise these points in his pretrial motions or during the trial. Consequently, his evidentiary challenges were rejected. Furthermore, Stewart argued that the court erred by allowing references to alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct to underpin Rubin's case for liability and damages, asserting that such violations were irrelevant to a Dragonetti claim and did not establish civil liability or damages. The trial court ruled that any objections by Stewart and HLS regarding the use of the Rules of Professional Conduct were waived. During the trial, which began on July 15, 2021, Stewart and HLS raised nine objections related to the questioning about the Rules, primarily concerning relevance and form. Notably, they did not object when the document was published. Objections included claims about the lack of document exchange before trial and questions regarding potential conflicts of interest. After all parties had rested, Stewart and HLS made their first objection to the Rules' use, which the trial court found to be untimely and insufficient to preserve the objection for appellate review. The court emphasized the necessity of timely, specific objections to ensure orderly judicial proceedings. Additionally, Stewart contested the admission of an email he sent on April 5, 2018, where he rejected Rubin's $5,000 settlement offer in favor of a counteroffer totaling $159,411.53, which included statutory penalties, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. The court's decision to admit this email into evidence is part of the contested issues raised by Stewart. Stewart argues that an email sent to his brother on April 5, 2018, should have been excluded from evidence under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 408, which governs the admissibility of compromise offers and negotiations. He claims the jury should have been instructed not to consider the email as proof of punitive or emotional damages and cites judicial immunity as an additional basis for exclusion. Rule 408(a) prohibits the use of evidence related to compromise attempts to prove or disprove claims, but exceptions exist under Rule 408(b) for other purposes. Rubin counters that the email was admissible under Rule 408(b) to demonstrate that Stewart's actions were taken with gross negligence and improper intent. Rubin's Dragonetti action highlighted Stewart's unreasonable demands and threats, including a demand for $159,411.53 and threats of legal repercussions for alleged billing errors. Rubin's complaint alleges that Stewart's actions constituted blackmail, supporting his request for punitive damages. The court agrees with Rubin's position, affirming that the April 5th email was relevant to establishing Stewart's improper motives rather than the validity of underlying claims. Additionally, the court clarifies that the exceptions to Rule 408(b) are not limited to the three specified in the rule, allowing for broader admissibility of evidence under the rule's provisions. Stewart's claim that the trial court should have instructed the jury to disregard the email as proof of damages is deemed waived due to his failure to request such an instruction or object to the court's charge prior to jury deliberations, as per Pa.R.A.P. 302(b). A general exception does not preserve issues for appeal; specific objections must be made. Though Stewart argued in a motion in limine for the email's exclusion, he did not request a specific jury charge on this matter and failed to provide legal support for his assertion regarding its inadmissibility as proof of damages. Additionally, his reliance on "judicial immunity" is unfounded since the email was an extra-judicial communication between attorneys, which does not qualify for immunity unless it pertains directly to judicial proceedings. The trial court's determination that the email was admissible was thus upheld. Regarding the testimony of Brother, who had previously represented Rubin, Stewart contends that it confused the jury into perceiving Brother as an expert witness and criticizes the use of Brother’s "attorney notes" during rebuttal. The court clarified that Brother was not presented as an expert and limited his testimony to factual matters. Rubin's attorney confirmed this distinction during the trial. Stewart did not substantiate his claims that the jury mistook Brother for an expert or that the rebuttal evidence was improperly admitted. The trial court has discretion over the admission of rebuttal evidence, and no violation of discovery rules was established. Rebuttal evidence is appropriate when it counters the credibility of a proponent's witnesses. In this case, Brother testified that Stewart threatened Rubin and insulted him during a deposition. During cross-examination, Stewart questioned Brother about whether he documented the insult, to which Brother replied he mentioned it in court filings but did not request it be recorded by the court reporter. After Stewart denied making the statement, Rubin called Brother as a rebuttal witness, who later found notes from the deposition confirming Stewart's insult. Despite Stewart's objections concerning the lack of opportunity to review the notes and claims of privilege, the court allowed Rubin to present this evidence to the jury. The court's decision was deemed within its discretion, as Stewart had not sought supporting evidence during discovery and did not substantiate his privilege claims. Additionally, Stewart contended that the trial court erred in allowing Rubin to introduce legal invoices as evidence, claiming they were unauthenticated hearsay and lacked testimony on the reasonableness of the fees. The trial court found this argument waived. Rubin had previously testified about his legal expenses and the need for a loan to cover them. While Stewart initially objected to invoices from another attorney as hearsay, he later withdrew this objection after clarification was provided. The invoices were eventually moved into evidence after Rubin’s case-in-chief concluded. Stewart's objection to the invoices, claiming they were not authenticated, was deemed untimely, resulting in waiver of his claim. He contested the jury's award of $480,000 for expenses incurred in defending the underlying action, arguing the evidence only supported $41,000 in reasonable attorney's fees. Stewart maintained that the record lacked evidence for additional expenses and requested a reduction of the verdict accordingly. He also challenged the $100,000 award for emotional distress, asserting Rubin failed to prove a causal link to the underlying legal actions and argued that judicial immunity barred such claims. Furthermore, he contended that an email not sent directly to Rubin could not have caused emotional distress, citing Pennsylvania law requiring personal presence of the victim. The standard for judicial remittitur requires a jury award to be excessively high to warrant reduction, and the trial court has discretion over such decisions. Rubin countered that Stewart's challenge to the $480,000 award for pecuniary losses was waived due to his failure to object to the jury instructions that allowed for such damages. The jury was instructed to compensate Rubin fully for all harm resulting from Stewart's conduct, including expenses for defending the underlying case, reputational harm, financial losses, and emotional distress, which aligned with instructions requested by Stewart himself. The jury was allowed to award Rubin for any financial losses he incurred due to the actions of Stewart and Alejandro. Rubin testified that the lawsuit consumed him, significantly affecting his work performance and causing him to reduce his hours to 20 per week. He recognized that while he did not claim a specific loss of revenue, he believed he lost income as he was the primary income generator for his practice. The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that Rubin's expenses related to the lawsuit extended beyond just attorney fees. Stewart's opportunity to contest the jury instructions was waived as he did not object or request a limitation on damages to reasonable attorney fees. Additionally, the court upheld the $100,000 award for emotional distress, as the Dragonetti Act allows for such damages resulting from legal proceedings without requiring medical testimony. The jury’s assessment of emotional distress was supported by Rubin's testimony, which detailed the severe impact of the lawsuit on his personal life, including anxiety, insomnia, and strain on his marriage. Testimonies from others, including Rubin’s brother, corroborated the detrimental changes in Rubin's demeanor and mental state. The court found ample evidence to justify the jury's emotional distress award, rejecting Stewart's claims that relied on a misinterpretation of case law related to different legal claims. The Taylor Court addressed the issue of whether a third party, specifically a mother, could recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress when not present during the infliction of an intentional tort on her child. The Supreme Court concluded that the presence of the third party is necessary for such recovery, indicating that the facts and issues in Taylor are not relevant to the current case. The court also dismissed Stewart's renewed claim of judicial immunity, stating that emotional distress could still arise from communications not directed at the individual. The April 5th email, deemed an extra-judicial communication between attorneys, was shared with Rubin, who did not assert that his emotional distress stemmed solely from this correspondence. Therefore, Stewart's argument against the denial of a remittitur fails. On the matter of punitive damages, Stewart contended that allowing the jury to impose such damages against him was erroneous, arguing that only the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board have the authority to sanction attorneys. He cited the Dragonetti Act, acknowledging it permits punitive damages but claimed it conflicts with existing regulations and constitutional provisions governing attorney conduct. Stewart asserted that the circumstances did not warrant punitive damages as Rubin did not provide evidence of malice or reckless disregard by Stewart. He also noted a lack of evidence regarding his wealth, which he argued is necessary when considering punitive damages. The Dragonetti Act allows for punitive damages in appropriate cases, defined as actions that are malicious, willful, or reckless, taking into account the nature of the conduct and the relationships involved. Admission to the bar and the practice of law involve oversight by the Judicial Branch, including the administration of courts and supervision of officers. A punitive damages award is argued to conflict with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1023.4, which allows trial courts to sanction attorneys for violations of Rule 1023.1. Rule 1023.1 mandates that an attorney’s signature on legal documents certifies compliance with several criteria, including ensuring the document is not for improper purposes, that claims and defenses are warranted by law, and that factual allegations are supported by evidence. If a violation of these provisions is determined after appropriate notice and response, the court may impose sanctions on responsible attorneys and parties. Stewart argues that the sanctions outlined in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are the only allowable penalties against attorneys and cites the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Villani v. Seibert, which addressed whether the Dragonetti Act infringed on the court's power to regulate legal practice. The Court concluded that it did not and indicated that while it did not address punitive damages directly, there could be future arguments against such awards in Dragonetti cases involving attorneys, considering existing sanction provisions. Stewart suggests that the current case offers the court an opportunity to clarify this issue. Stewart's claim is rejected for multiple reasons. Firstly, Rule 1023.1 does not serve as the sole means for a litigant to seek relief from frivolous proceedings, as noted in the Judicial Code, specifically sections 2503 and 8351 et seq., which provide additional remedies, including counsel fees and addressing wrongful use of civil proceedings. Furthermore, a sanctions hearing under Rule 1023.1 is narrower compared to a Dragonetti action, which includes a broader scope of improper actions by an attorney. The court asserts that punitive damages awarded under the Dragonetti Act do not conflict with Rule 1023.1 nor infringe on the Supreme Court's regulatory authority over legal practice, thus dismissing Stewart's constitutional challenge to the punitive damages. The court also refutes Stewart's claim that the case is inappropriate for punitive damages, emphasizing that the determination of outrageous conduct lies within the discretion of the jury, which was adequately supported by evidence of Stewart's conduct, including unreasonable settlement demands and unfounded threats of criminal prosecution. Lastly, Stewart's argument that the jury required evidence of his wealth to assess punitive damages is dismissed, as the assessment can focus on the nature of the defendant's conduct rather than wealth. While wealth can be considered, it is not a prerequisite for punitive damages, and the jury can base its decision solely on the defendant's conduct. Rubin's failure to seek a judicial order for wealth discovery or present evidence of Stewart's wealth does not invalidate the jury's punitive damages award against him. Alejandro's appeal highlights the trial court's alleged violation of her due process rights and right to counsel when it disqualified her attorney, Stewart, on the morning of the trial. Stewart had represented Alejandro since the beginning of the Dragonetti action. Prior to the trial date of January 21, 2020, Rubin filed a motion in limine to prevent Stewart from arguing on his behalf while representing Alejandro. During the trial, the court acknowledged a clear conflict of interest regarding Stewart's dual role. Stewart contended that he did not intend to call himself as a witness and believed there was no violation of professional conduct rules. He noted that Alejandro had not filed cross-claims against him, which could indicate a conflict. Despite Stewart's assertions that Alejandro waived the potential conflict, the court ultimately found the conflict “palpable and blatant,” emphasizing the impracticality of Stewart testifying against Alejandro without a clear advocate for her interests during cross-examination. The court expressed concern over the implications of allowing Stewart to continue as counsel given the potential conflict. A significant conflict of interest arose when one co-defendant, an attorney, represented another co-defendant in a case. The trial court ordered the removal of attorney Stewart as counsel for Alejandro, allowing 60 days for Alejandro to find new representation, resulting in her proceeding pro se. Alejandro argued that the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to represent a client despite a concurrent conflict if the attorney believes they can provide competent representation, there is no claim against one client by another, and informed consent is given. Alejandro claimed that Stewart had such belief and that her consent was given during a court colloquy. She contended that disqualifying Stewart imposed substantial hardship on her as an indigent single mother forced to defend against a million-dollar lawsuit without counsel. Alejandro also asserted that there were alternative remedies to ensure fairness for the opposing party, Rubin, who sought only to limit Stewart's courtroom presentation. Additionally, she criticized the trial court for disqualifying her attorney without a hearing. The court explained its decision was to protect Alejandro's right to a fair trial from potentially biased advice due to the co-defendant relationship. Disqualification of counsel is a serious matter and should not be taken lightly, only warranted when no other remedy exists and due process requires it. Concurrent client conflicts are prohibited under the Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Pa.R.P.C. 1.7, which recognizes that a lawyer's personal interests can create such conflicts. The Comments to Rule 1.7 emphasize that a lawyer’s own interests must not adversely impact client representation. In this case, the integrity of Stewart's actions in a related matter is under scrutiny, as he and Alejandro are both defendants in a lawsuit involving claims of Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings and Abuse of Process. This situation complicates Stewart's ability to provide impartial advice to Alejandro, as he may need to present evidence that could harm his own defense. The court argues that Stewart cannot effectively represent Alejandro without facing a conflict of interest, as he has already demonstrated an inability to maintain separation between his interests and hers. Instances in court show that both Stewart and his co-defense attorney, Mr. Del Bove, have represented each other's clients, further blurring the lines of representation. Despite Stewart's claims of maintaining a distinction between their cases, the realities of their intertwined defenses undermine this assertion. Additionally, Stewart's potential role as a witness complicates matters further, as he is a named defendant in the case, and it is anticipated that he will be called to testify. This dual role presents practical challenges and raises ethical concerns regarding his capability to advise Alejandro, particularly when decisions could favor his own interests over hers. Overall, the rules are designed to protect clients from inadequate representation and to shield attorneys from conflicts arising from their personal interests. During the January hearing, Stewart was unable to identify who would cross-examine him during his testimony. The Court expressed concerns that allowing Stewart to testify in his defense while representing Alejandro would disadvantage both Alejandro and the jury. The trial court found a significant conflict of interest in Stewart's dual role, as he represented Alejandro in a previous case. It ruled that Alejandro's purported waiver of this conflict was uninformed, and Stewart's belief that he could represent her was unreasonable. Alejandro's additional complaints were deemed waived due to her failure to request a hearing or raise certain arguments during the trial. The court also determined that Alejandro's due process rights were adequately protected during the proceedings. Lastly, Alejandro did not provide sufficient evidence of hardship resulting from Stewart's disqualification, nor did she argue that less severe remedies were available during the trial. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgments against both Stewart and Alejandro on appeal.