United States v. Quincino Waide

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-5827

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; February 12, 2023; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Quincino Waide's interaction with the Lexington police began following a shed fire adjacent to his property. Although he was not a suspect, an investigator requested his digital video recorder (DVR) for potential evidence. Waide refused, prompting the investigator to obtain a warrant (the DVR warrant) based on an affidavit that lacked sufficient probable cause linking the fire to criminal activity. Despite this, a state magistrate issued the warrant. 

When police arrived to execute the warrant, their inquiries about drugs led Waide to confess to possessing a small amount of marijuana, resulting in two additional warrants (the narcotics warrants) to search his duplex. These searches uncovered a firearm, drugs, and cash. Waide's motions to suppress the evidence were denied by the district court, and he subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea for drug possession and firearm charges. 

On appeal, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to suppress the unlawfully obtained evidence. The background established that the fire's cause was undetermined, with no evidence of accelerants, and that the shed had been vacant, possibly occupied by squatters.

Items appeared to have been removed from a shed and possibly set on fire, but no suspects or witnesses were identified by O’Bryan at the scene. He observed sophisticated cameras on a neighboring duplex at 430 Douglas Avenue, two facing the front and one at the rear. Later, O’Bryan spoke with Dorothy Waide, a resident of the duplex, who claimed the cameras belonged to her son and that he would likely not allow access to the DVR footage. O’Bryan also contacted Andrea Wallace, the owner of the adjacent property at 428 Douglas Avenue, who mentioned that the shed contained sentimental items from her deceased mother. O’Bryan recognized some burned items as belonging to Wallace.

Waide was noted to have a smell of marijuana when encountered by O’Bryan. Waide claimed ownership of the duplex and declined O’Bryan's request to view the DVR footage. Follow-up communications revealed that witnesses allegedly saw someone removing items from the shed before the fire, although O’Bryan could not identify these individuals. Wallace speculated that her vindictive ex-husband might be responsible for the fire, coinciding with the anniversary of her mother’s death.

O’Bryan applied for a search warrant to obtain the DVR from Waide’s apartment. After its issuance, he informed the Lexington Police Department about the potential for illegal narcotics activity linked to Waide. Although Waide was not suspected in the shed fire, O’Bryan, along with narcotics officers and arson investigators, attempted to execute the warrant but found no one in Apartment 3. Ms. Waide was present in her unit and later called her son, who arrived with a cousin. O’Bryan explained the warrant's intent, and Waide offered to retrieve the DVR, but O’Bryan insisted on executing the warrant as planned.

Curtsinger, identifying as a police officer in tactical gear, questioned Waide about potential drugs in his apartment, to which Waide admitted there might be some marijuana. Curtsinger then detected the smell of burnt marijuana from Waide's vehicle, leading to a search that uncovered a marijuana grinder and a partially smoked blunt. As a result of Waide's admission and the findings from the vehicle, he was handcuffed and detained. Curtsinger left to obtain a warrant for a drug search at Waide's apartment, having previously received information from drug traffickers about Waide's alleged narcotics sales.

While Waide was detained, he communicated with his cousin, Vance, and another individual, Ms. Waide. Concerns arose when officers reported noises from the duplex, suggesting potential evidence destruction. O’Bryan, an officer, pressed Waide for a key to Apartment 3, citing the risk of evidence being destroyed, and Waide eventually complied. Upon entering Apartment 3, officers discovered a substantial hole from Apartment 1, prompting a check of that unit, where they found overflowing sinks. After securing the premises, they did not conduct a full search but informed Curtsinger of their findings, which he included in his affidavit for a search warrant for Apartment 3 and sought a similar warrant for Apartment 1.

Two hours later, all three warrants (including one for the DVR) were executed, resulting in the seizure of a firearm, large amounts of cash and drugs, and the DVR. Waide faced federal charges for possessing significant quantities of cocaine and heroin, possessing a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He filed several motions to suppress evidence, challenging the probable cause for the DVR warrant, the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the validity of his statements under Miranda rights, and the justification for the police entry into his apartment based on exigent circumstances.

The district court denied all suppression motions, leading Waide to enter a conditional guilty plea for possession of drugs with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. Waide reserved the right to appeal the suppression rulings, and the district court sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Waide's appeal focuses on the validity of the DVR warrant, arguing that evidence obtained post-issuance should be suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'

In reviewing the district court's suppression decision, appellate courts apply a clear-error standard for factual findings and de novo review for legal conclusions, including assessments of probable cause. Waide contends that the affidavit supporting the DVR warrant lacked probable cause to suggest criminal activity, asserting that he was not implicated in the shed fire, and thus should be afforded protection. However, the Fourth Amendment does not require probable cause regarding individuals when only property is sought, as established in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.

To establish probable cause for a search warrant, an affidavit must demonstrate a likelihood that items are connected to criminal activity and that they will be found at the location to be searched. Waide argues that the affidavit presented to the state magistrate lacked a substantial basis to connect the shed fire to criminal activity. The affidavit detailed that responders found a structure fire at a specific address, and a witness reported seeing someone removing items from the shed around the time of the fire, which Waide claims does not adequately establish the necessary probable cause.

The victim valued the items in the shed at approximately $8,000, noting they were antiques belonging to her deceased mother. The investigation concluded that the fire was incendiary. Nearby, at 430 Douglas Ave., surveillance cameras could have captured the arson incident, but the property owner denied consent to access the footage. The affidavit supporting probable cause relied principally on hearsay from an unidentified individual, relayed second-hand, regarding someone allegedly removing items from the shed at an unspecified time. Courts require verification of such hearsay, including the reliability and knowledge basis of informants. The affidavit contained multiple levels of hearsay, with no corroboration or evidence of the informants' credibility or past reliability. Despite additional facts from the investigation—such as the vacant status of 428 Douglas Ave. and burned items on the lawn—the uncorroborated hearsay information was deemed insufficient for establishing probable cause. However, under the totality of circumstances, there could be a fair probability of finding evidence of arson, as indicated in relevant case law.

O'Bryan’s affidavit for the DVR warrant lacked essential facts necessary to establish probable cause. The court emphasizes that only the information within the affidavit is relevant in determining probable cause, as established in prior case law. The affidavit’s deficiencies are critical because it failed to provide specific, particularized facts, which are necessary for a magistrate to independently assess probable cause rather than merely endorsing the conclusions of others. 

Key points from the affidavit included: (1) the storage shed contained approximately $8,000 worth of antiques belonging to the owner’s deceased mother; (2) the shed had been significantly involved in a fire; (3) a neighboring property had surveillance cameras that may have recorded the incident; and (4) the neighbor declined to provide DVR footage to law enforcement. However, the occurrence of a fire alone does not indicate a crime, and the affidavit's claims that the fire was incendiary or constituted arson were deemed conclusory without supporting facts.

The government’s assertion that the rare occurrence of spontaneous combustion justifies the finding of probable cause was rejected. The existence of surveillance cameras did not contribute to a conclusion that a crime occurred, as reliable evidence of wrongdoing is required for a valid search warrant. Furthermore, the neighbor’s refusal to share DVR access was irrelevant to the probable cause assessment. The court noted that interpreting the refusal as suspicious would require significant inference and reiterated that exercising constitutional rights is not indicative of guilt.

Incriminating evidence should be suppressed due to its derivation from an unlawful DVR warrant. The principle of excluding the fruits of an unlawful search warrant applies even if the warrant was not executed, as established by the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. The government argues that this doctrine only pertains to executed unlawful searches, but the Supreme Court has not differentiated between actual and threatened Fourth Amendment violations in relation to evidence suppression. The Court has recognized that the doctrine applies beyond Fourth Amendment violations, encompassing instances of Sixth and Fifth Amendment violations as well. The rationale for applying the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained through unlawful police conduct is to deter constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has previously indicated that exigent circumstances can justify warrantless searches when no actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation occurs. Furthermore, consent to search cannot be valid if obtained after an officer asserts the authority of a warrant, as such claims create inherent coercion. Given the Supreme Court's treatment of threatened violations, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine should also apply to evidence obtained following a declaration of intent to act on an unlawful warrant. Additionally, the 'attenuation' exception to this doctrine does not apply in this case.

To exclude evidence under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, a defendant must demonstrate more than just a "but-for" causal link to a constitutional violation; they must show that the evidence was obtained through exploitation of the illegality or by means that are sufficiently distinct to eliminate the primary taint. The attenuation exception involves evaluating three factors: the temporal proximity of the unlawful conduct and the emergence of incriminating evidence, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

In this case, Waide confessed to having marijuana in his apartment during a conversation with Officer O’Bryan, who had threatened to execute a DVR warrant. This confession and Waide's subsequent provision of a key for a search occurred within the same afternoon, supporting a finding of temporal proximity favoring Waide. The absence of intervening circumstances further complicates the argument for attenuation, as Waide's confession was directly prompted by the threat of the unlawful warrant execution.

The affidavits for the narcotics warrants were based on information obtained from Waide's confession, which itself was elicited due to the threat. Curtsinger's questioning of Waide regarding drugs was not considered an intervening spontaneous action that could support attenuation. Additionally, any evidence found in Waide's vehicle and during the protective sweep of his apartment was also linked to the threat of executing the DVR warrant, reinforcing the argument that all evidence was tainted by the initial unlawful conduct.

The occupants of the duplex were likely to destroy evidence only due to the imminent threat of unlawful police entry. O’Bryan obtained access to Apartment 3 by informing Waide that police intended to prevent the destruction of the DVR, which supports Waide’s position against attenuation. The court noted a lack of intervening circumstances connected to unlawful police conduct. Curtsinger's actions, which exploited the unlawful DVR warrant, further indicated a purposeful investigatory motive, as he was already aware of potential illegal activity at the residence. The evidence obtained resulted from Curtsinger's inquiries about criminal conduct, suggesting a purpose that weighs against finding attenuation. Furthermore, the 'inevitable-discovery' exception to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply, as there was no independent investigation unrelated to the unlawful warrant. Although prior tips and discoveries indicated criminal activity related to Waide, they were insufficient to justify a warrant for his apartment. The affidavit lacked direct connections between the residence and drug-related activities, meaning drugs could not be inferred to be present solely based on Waide's known dealings. Finally, the 'good-faith' exception to the exclusionary rule is also deemed inapplicable in this case.

In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court established that evidence obtained through an invalid warrant may not be suppressed if the officer acted in objective good faith based on a warrant from a judge or magistrate. However, good faith is negated if the warrant is based on an affidavit lacking probable cause to an unreasonable extent. The issue at hand is whether this good-faith exception applies when the supporting affidavit for a DVR warrant fails to demonstrate probable cause of a crime. The court ruled that it does not.

In United States v. Christian, the court referenced its earlier decision in United States v. Hython, which illustrated the threshold for an affidavit to qualify for the good-faith exception. The affidavit in Hython included details of a controlled drug buy, but the court found it insufficient due to its reliance on a single undated transaction, lacking contextual information. This led to the conclusion that a reasonable officer could not rely on such an affidavit. Although the Hython affidavit contained some assertions of criminal activity, the affidavit supporting the DVR warrant was deemed even less adequate and did not meet the minimum standards. Additionally, the court emphasized that good-faith determinations must be confined to the affidavit's content, without considering external facts known to the officer.

A court can examine evidence beyond the warrant affidavit to assess an officer's good faith under the Leon standard, but in this case, no additional information was provided to the magistrate beyond the affidavit itself. The DVR warrant was deemed inadequate, lacking probable cause, and thus the Leon good-faith exception does not apply. The court emphasized the importance of Fourth Amendment protections, regardless of the suspect's guilt, leading to the reversal of the district court's judgment and the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence. In dissent, Judge Siler argued that this situation does not fit the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as the evidence was not directly obtained through illegal actions. He noted that Waide's incriminating statement about marijuana occurred before any illegality and that the officers had legitimate interactions with Waide and his mother before obtaining the search warrant. The dissent highlighted that Waide voluntarily offered to retrieve the recording equipment and that the officers detected marijuana in his vehicle following lawful inquiries.

Officers sought a warrant to search Waide's apartment for marijuana but had not executed a prior DVR search warrant or entered the apartment at that time. While Curtsinger obtained the marijuana warrant, Waide was handcuffed outside his apartment. Officers observed suspicious activity in Apartment 1 below Waide's, including banging noises and movement in Apartment 3, which was believed to be unoccupied. They conducted a clearing search of Apartment 1, discovering a hole connecting the two apartments, but did not execute the warrant immediately. Later, during the execution of the narcotics warrant, marijuana and a firearm were found.

The majority opinion claims Waide was coerced into admitting drug possession after the investigator suggested executing the DVR warrant, interpreting this as a threat. However, it is argued that Waide was not in custody and therefore not compelled to speak, indicating no "fruit from a poisonous tree." Waide contended the DVR warrant lacked probable cause, but since it was never executed, this claim is deemed irrelevant. The majority's reliance on cases like Kentucky v. King and Bumper v. North Carolina is contested, as they do not parallel Waide's situation where no consent issue arose.

Evidence from United States v. Williams is distinguished since Waide was not in custody when he made his admission. The decision in United States v. Elmore is cited to support the argument of attenuation, noting that several hours passed between Waide’s admission and the execution of the search warrant. Additionally, Curtsinger’s observation of marijuana residue in a vehicle and subsequent actions in response to potential destruction of evidence further support the government's position. The conclusion emphasizes that the actions taken by law enforcement do not constitute a "poisonous tree," advocating to uphold the district court's decision.