Andrew Colby Livingston v. Clinton L. Shaffer

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-22-00151-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; February 8, 2023; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Andrew Colby Livingston appeals the dismissal of his fraud lawsuit against Clinton L. Shaffer by the trial court, which found the action to lack legal or factual basis under Section 13.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In May 2021, Livingston, representing himself, filed a lawsuit alleging that Shaffer unlawfully took and disposed of his belongings in April 2017, claiming significant financial loss due to Shaffer's fraudulent misrepresentations about holding onto the property. Shaffer's motion to dismiss, filed in March 2022, led to the trial court's ruling that the case failed to state a cause of action. 

On appeal, Livingston contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his case without allowing him to amend his petition. The appellate court found these arguments unconvincing. Section 13.001 permits dismissal if a plaintiff’s affidavit of inability to pay is false, or if the action is deemed frivolous or malicious. The court may evaluate various factors, including whether the claim has any legal or factual foundation and the likelihood of success on the merits. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal.

The Texas Supreme Court has advised against relying on specific grounds for dismissal, referencing Brown v. Lynaugh and Johnson v. Lynaugh. Shaffer's motion for dismissal claimed that Livingston’s cause of action lacked a legal or factual basis, rendering discussion of alternative dismissal grounds unnecessary. A cause of action lacks a legal basis if the allegations, when taken as true, do not support the requested relief. It lacks a factual basis if no reasonable person could believe the pleaded facts. Trial courts have broad discretion under Section 13.001 for dismissals, and reviewing courts will not reverse such decisions unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.

To establish a fraud claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate six elements, including a material false representation and the plaintiff's reliance on it leading to injury. An examination of Livingston's petition shows that the only representation mentioned was Shaffer's statement about "holding on" to Livingston's property. This vague promise does not meet the certainty required for a fraud claim, as it lacks clarity regarding its meaning and duration. Additionally, Livingston did not allege that Shaffer intended for him to rely on this statement or that he actually did rely on it. Therefore, the petition fails to show an arguable legal basis for the fraud claim, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it under Section 13.001. Livingston's first issue is overruled.

Livingston contended that the trial court erred by dismissing his lawsuit without allowing him to amend his petition. The court ruled that it was not required to permit amendments prior to dismissal under Section 13.001, as supported by case law including Kendrick v. Lynaugh and Peterson. Livingston's references to County of Cameron v. Brown and KSNG Architects, Inc. v. Beasley were found irrelevant, as those pertained to special exceptions and pleas in abatement, not motions to dismiss under Section 13.001. No cited authority mandated that a trial court must grant leave to amend before dismissal under this section. Additionally, a related ruling stated that the trial court’s dismissal authority under Section 13.001 supersedes considerations regarding special exceptions. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Additionally, Livingston's motion for default judgment was denied as Rule 239 does not apply to this court.