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Mary Louise Serafine v. the Honorable Karin Crump, the Honorable Bob Pemberton, the Honorable Melissa Goodwin, and the Honorable David Puryear
Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-21-00053-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 30, 2023; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Mary Louise Serafine filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the trial court's determination that she is a vexatious litigant, as defined under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 11.051, 11.054, and 11.101. She sued a district-court judge and three former appellate justices (collectively termed the Judicial Defendants) for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. In response, the Judicial Defendants sought a ruling declaring Serafine a vexatious litigant, requesting security relief (set at $5,000) and pre-filing relief, which would require her to obtain permission before filing new litigation. The trial court issued two orders: the First Order, which found her to be a vexatious litigant and granted pre-filing relief, and the Second Order, which also included security relief. Serafine appealed these orders while her claims against the Judicial Defendants remained pending. In her appeal, she raised two issues: (1) a request to abate the appeal and remand for further proceedings, and (2) a request to reverse the orders. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s findings that Serafine is a vexatious litigant and the orders for pre-filing relief. It declined to require the trial court to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law, and determined it lacked jurisdiction to address her other issues. The background includes Serafine's previous litigation against her neighbors and the Judicial Defendants, as well as a prior federal court dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and standing. The trial court's hearings included evidence and testimony from both parties before reaching its determination. Interlocutory jurisdiction is established to review orders concerning pre-filing relief, but not regarding security relief in the context of vexatious litigant claims. Serafine's notice of appeal includes challenges to the First and Second Orders regarding her designation as a vexatious litigant and the pre-filing relief granted, while explicitly excluding the appeal of the $5,000 security requirement. The court affirms that it lacks jurisdiction over the security relief portion, as Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not permit interlocutory appeals for such orders. Furthermore, the trial court is not obligated to issue findings and conclusions, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review Serafine’s motions for those findings or her motions to dismiss and change venue. The Judicial Defendants contend that the appeal's jurisdiction is limited to the vexatious-litigant designation and pre-filing relief, while Serafine argues that her motions are integral to addressing the court's discretion in her designation. The court concludes that it can only review the vexatious-litigant finding and the pre-filing relief, dismissing any parts of the appeal related to security relief. Jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals encompasses issues included within the appeal itself. For interlocutory orders, the trial court is not mandated to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, although it may do so within a specified timeframe. While such findings can be beneficial, they do not hold the same weight as those made under Rule 296 and are not binding in discretionary reviews. The standard for reviewing vexatious-litigant orders is abuse of discretion. In evaluating interlocutory orders, the appellate court must view evidence favorably towards the trial court and determine if evidence reasonably supports its decision without needing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court upheld that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not providing these findings. Additionally, the appellate court indicated it lacks jurisdiction to review complaints regarding the trial court's refusal to address Serafine's TCPA motion and motion to change venue before issuing the First and Second Orders. The principle of strict construction applies to interlocutory-appeal statutes, which are designed to be narrowly interpreted, ensuring that only issues explicitly covered by the statute are reviewable. This strict construction limits the scope of appellate jurisdiction regarding interlocutory appeals, excluding issues that do not clearly fall within the statutory language. Serafine appealed under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 11.101(c), which permits appeals from prefiling orders designating a person as a vexatious litigant. However, the statute does not allow for interlocutory review of a court's decision to prioritize motions, leading to a lack of jurisdiction over Serafine's claims related to her TCPA motion and venue change motion. Previous cases cited (Paulsen v. Yarrell and Kaplan v. Tiffany Dev. Corp.) support this interpretation, establishing that distinct interlocutory rulings are not subject to review under the same jurisdictional provisions. The court overruled Serafine's complaints regarding the trial court's refusal to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed her arguments related to the other motions. Serafine's appeal included several specific claims against the trial court's decisions: (1) the quashing of her subpoenas, (2) consideration of allegedly fabricated evidentiary exhibits, (3) insufficient evidence supporting the vexatious-litigant finding, (4) an extension of the statutory period beyond seven years, (5) her claimed exemption from the statute, and (6) timeliness issues regarding the vexatious-litigant motions. The court explained that a determination of a vexatious litigant requires specific statutory findings, which can be challenged for sufficiency. The review standard for such determinations and for evidence admission or exclusion is abuse of discretion. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of testimony from the subpoenas and found no abuse of discretion in quashing the subpoenas. The trial court required Serafine to proceed without the testimony of the Judicial Defendants or the paralegal at the hearing. Orders and instructions from the hearing are not included in the First or Second Orders that declared Serafine a vexatious litigant and provided pre-filing relief. Interlocutory jurisdiction under Section 11.101(c) does not extend to reviewing denials of testimony, which are separate from the vexatious-litigant determination and pre-filing relief. Consequently, Serafine's second issue regarding this matter cannot be considered. She argues that the trial court improperly admitted two exhibits presented by Judge Crump, which aimed to demonstrate that Serafine had no reasonable probability of succeeding in her lawsuit—a prerequisite for a vexatious-litigant declaration. The exhibits included a June 2019 recusal order by Judge Crump and docket excerpts indicating the order's entry in five pending cases. The trial court's admission of evidence is assessed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, defined as arbitrary or unreasonable decisions lacking legal basis or evidence support. Judge Crump's recusal indicated that Serafine faced no threat of future injury, undermining her standing for Fourteenth Amendment claims for prospective relief. Serafine objected to the exhibits as irrelevant and unauthenticated; however, the court overruled these objections, affirming the relevance of the evidence to the arguments presented. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits, as they were pertinent to establishing the lack of risk Serafine faced regarding future claims against Judge Crump. An exhibit is admissible only if properly authenticated, requiring evidence that supports its claimed identity. Authentication can occur by demonstrating that a document was recorded in a public office, as established by Texas law. In this case, Exhibits 3 and 5 were authenticated through a paralegal's affidavit, which confirmed retrieval from the Travis County Courts Case Management System. The recusal order was stamped as filed with the Travis County District Clerk, and the docket excerpts indicated their origin from the District Clerk’s office, thus supporting the trial court's ruling on authentication. Serafine challenged the authenticity of the exhibits, claiming they were fabricated. She argued that the recusal order's cause number and case caption matched this suit but not others from which Judge Crump sought to recuse herself, suggesting the order was ineffective for those cases. Serafine also contended that the notation 'Presiding Judge' on the order invalidated its effectiveness since Judge Crump was a party to the suit. These points pertained to the order's legal effectiveness rather than its admissibility. The trial court concluded that the documents were what they claimed to be, and it acted within its discretion, supported by conflicting evidence. Additionally, the court found Serafine to be a vexatious litigant, which is intended to curtail frivolous litigation and protect defendants from abuse of the legal system. The court's findings on this matter were also supported by sufficient evidence. To classify a plaintiff as a vexatious litigant, a defendant must demonstrate two criteria: (1) there is no reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail in the current litigation, and (2) the plaintiff has initiated at least five unsuccessful litigations as a pro se litigant in the past seven years, excluding small claims court cases. The court's assessment of the plaintiff's likelihood of success is reviewed for abuse of discretion and can incorporate various evidence forms, including exhibits, testimony, and the plaintiff’s pleadings. A trial court is assumed to have judicially noticed its own records, even without explicit statements to that effect. Additionally, a plaintiff's lack of standing can singularly establish that they are unlikely to succeed in their claims. The Judicial Defendants have presented multiple arguments indicating that the plaintiff, Serafine, is unlikely to prevail, particularly noting that her pleadings do not indicate ongoing or future harmful conduct by them. Standing is a constitutional requirement for a lawsuit, necessitating a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a genuine controversy that the court can address (Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150, Tex. 2012). In Texas, when seeking prospective remedies like declaratory or injunctive relief, plaintiffs must demonstrate an imminent deprivation of rights; past injuries do not suffice. For instance, in Garcia v. City of Willis, the plaintiff lacked standing for prospective relief because he only alleged past injuries without indicating future violations of traffic laws. Serafine's claims of violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights by the Judicial Defendants stem from past court proceedings, including alleged deprivation of notice, the right to be heard, and other procedural issues. However, the Judicial Defendants argue that these allegations do not establish standing for prospective relief since they are not expected to preside over future cases involving Serafine, similar to the reasoning in Heckman. Judge Crump provided evidence of her recusal from cases involving Serafine, including a letter confirming her withdrawal from further action. The procedures for recusal differ whether initiated by a party or by the judge's own motion, but neither Texas Rules nor the Government Code specifies a required format for the recusal order. The court emphasized not to prioritize form over substance in interpreting orders. Despite the technical details of the recusal order, it was deemed effective, leading to the conclusion that Serafine is unlikely to suffer the alleged rights deprivations in the future. Consequently, Serafine lacks standing to pursue her claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Crump. Serafine lacks standing in her claims against Judge Crump, as the trial court reasonably determined there was no likelihood of her prevailing, referencing Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code 11.054 and relevant case law. Her pleadings identify former appellate justices Puryear and Pemberton as former officeholders, leading the court to conclude that Serafine would not face future deprivations by them, thus also lacking standing against them. The court appropriately exercised discretion in its findings regarding these justices. Concerning Justice Goodwin, the trial court inferred from a recusal order that she would recuse herself in future cases involving Serafine, which she did in this appeal. Judicial notice was taken of Justice Goodwin's recusal and her subsequent departure from office. The court credited evidence presented by the Judicial Defendants supporting the reasonable-probability ruling against Serafine, despite her arguments to the contrary. The court concluded that Serafine's lack of standing established a lack of reasonable probability for her claims, aligning with the Fifth Circuit's analysis and the Texas Supreme Court's instruction to parallel federal standing doctrine. Additionally, evidence supported the finding that Serafine had commenced at least five adverse litigations as a pro se litigant in the seven years before a specific date, meeting the criteria of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 11.054(1)(A). Serafine contends that the evidence supporting a finding against her is both legally and factually insufficient, claiming much of it is irrelevant due to being outside the seven-year timeframe. During the vexatious-litigant hearing, the Judicial Defendants presented various exhibits, including denials of her motions and petitions in both state and federal courts, judgments against her, and orders dismissing her complaints. A key argument from Serafine focuses on the definition of 'pro se' as used in Chapter 11, asserting that the Judicial Defendants failed to demonstrate that she was acting pro se in any of the ten litigations cited. However, her challenge is unsuccessful regarding exhibits F, G, and I, which explicitly identify her as proceeding pro se. Additionally, in the context of exhibit I, Serafine herself provided evidence confirming her pro se status, including court notices and her brief that only included her name. The legal sufficiency review requires analyzing all evidence favorably towards the prevailing party while disregarding contrary evidence unless no reasonable factfinder could find otherwise. Serafine's no-evidence challenge, based on her pro se status, could only affect the separate litigations represented by exhibits A, B, C, D, E, H, and J. There is a dispute between Serafine and the Judicial Defendants regarding the definition of 'pro se' under Chapter 11. Serafine contends that 'pro se' means a litigant must be 'without the benefit of a lawyer,' while the Judicial Defendants argue that a litigant can represent herself even if assisted by an attorney. Serafine testified that she had 'co-counsel' or 'limited-scope counsel' in her litigations, asserting she was not pro se. Conversely, the Judicial Defendants maintain that 'pro se' encompasses self-representation regardless of attorney assistance. Texas courts have adopted both interpretations of 'pro se.' The analysis includes references to two cases defining 'pro se' in varying terms, alongside dictionary definitions that suggest lack of an attorney is not a necessary component. The conclusion reached is that while evidence of lacking an attorney can demonstrate pro se status, it is not required. Consequently, there was insufficient evidence regarding the litigations represented by exhibits C and J, as they did not indicate that Serafine acted on her own behalf. Evidence presented during the hearing related to these exhibits was not part of the official record and thus could not be considered. For the remaining litigations, there was adequate evidence demonstrating that Serafine acted pro se, particularly in exhibits F, G, and I, which identified her as such. Exhibits A and B pertained to Supreme Court actions regarding a petition for review filed by Serafine, relating to a previous court decision. Serafine submitted exhibits during the vexatious-litigant hearing, demonstrating that she filed her petition for review and motion for rehearing pro se, supported by amicus briefs and certificates of service indicating her self-representation. Her testimony confirmed that she signed her own filings at the Fifth Circuit and maintained pro se status in related litigations, specifically for exhibits A, B, D, and E. Exhibit E included a federal magistrate judge's report referring to her as "an attorney representing herself," which the trial court could reasonably interpret as evidence of her pro se status. The trial court is presumed to have judicially noticed the records of the case, and the evidence indicated that her pro se status was not contradicted by her testimony regarding retained counsel. Consequently, the court found sufficient evidence to support its rulings about her pro se status, although it determined that exhibits C and J did not provide legal evidence of her pro se representation. Additionally, Serafine challenged the separate countability of litigations represented by exhibits A, B, and F, arguing they should be considered one case due to their connection to a single trial-court judgment. The Judicial Defendants contended that the litigations could be counted separately, even if one was an appeal of another. The court must resolve this under Section 11.054(1). Proceedings related to a motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court of Texas, a petition for review, and an intermediate-court judgment may be categorized as distinct “litigations.” The competing arguments regarding exhibits E and I suggest that the first separate litigation occurs in a trial court, with the second being the related appeal in the court of appeals. The statutory definition of "litigation" is specified as any civil action that is commenced, maintained, or pending in any state or federal court, according to Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code. 11.001(2). The Supreme Court of Texas has not addressed the specific statutory interpretation at issue. In prior cases, such as Leonard v. Abbott, trial court proceedings and related appeals were counted together; however, the original document indicates that this does not establish a binding precedent regarding separate litigations. The definition of "civil action" from 1997 is referenced, which describes it as an action to enforce or protect private rights, excluding criminal proceedings. The document also notes that two decisions support the Judicial Defendants’ position while a third supports Serafine’s stance, leading to inconclusiveness in the interpretation of “litigation.” Furthermore, the Fourth Court of Appeals has ruled that an appeal from a civil action does not constitute a separate "litigation" under Chapter 11, although this is not universally accepted, as evidenced by other rulings that consider multiple matters related to the same case as a single litigation. The court in Estate of Aguilar referenced a ruling from the Eighth Court of Appeals, which determined that three interlocutory appeals and three original proceedings arising from the same trial-court case could be treated as six distinct litigations. This conclusion is based on the premise that all appeals and original proceedings filed by a litigant contribute to the count of litigations against them. Definitions from legal dictionaries clarify that "civil action" encompasses lawsuits, appeals, or original proceedings that are not criminal in nature. Applying these definitions to Chapter 11, the court found that the litigations represented by exhibits A and B should not be counted separately but rather as part of a single litigation distinct from that represented by exhibit F. Exhibits A and B pertained to the motion for rehearing and the petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas. The lack of success in the rehearing did not create a new litigation, as the same Supreme Court case number indicated they belonged to the same set of proceedings. However, when comparing these to earlier litigation in a different court, the different case numbers suggested that moving between courts constitutes new litigation. Additionally, a favorable outcome for Serafine in the exhibit A/B litigation would not automatically result in new decisions regarding the exhibit F litigation. Insufficient evidence exists to classify the litigations represented by exhibits A and B as separate; however, there is legally sufficient evidence to count them separately from exhibit F. Serafine’s testimony, asserting that the litigations were not separate, does not outweigh the summarized evidence supporting the trial court's rulings. A similar determination applies to exhibits E and I, which may also be counted separately, despite exhibit I being an appeal from the judgment in the exhibit E litigation. This conclusion is supported by prior case law (Restrepo) indicating that multiple appeals from the same trial court suit do not violate statutory definitions of "litigation." The analysis identifies seven purported litigations: exhibits A/B, D, E, F, G, H, and I. Serafine challenges the countability of exhibits G and H, arguing that mandamus proceedings should not be considered separately unless they do not relate to the underlying case's merits. The court rejects this argument, stating that mandamus petitions are separate civil actions, as supported by case law (Retzlaff and Restrepo). Additionally, Serafine contests that certain litigations should not count as they were not “finally determined adversely” against her, referencing exhibit D, where she claims to have won a ruling in the Fifth Circuit regarding the constitutionality of parts of Texas’s Psychologists’ Licensing Act. The argument regarding exhibits A/B, E, F, and I centers on their status as unresolved litigations at the time the vexatious-litigant motions were filed, asserting they did not meet the final determination requirement under the applicable statute, which considers litigations that have been “finally determined adversely” to the plaintiff within a seven-year period. The Judicial Defendants counter that any partially adverse outcomes qualify as “finally determined adversely.” Judge Crump determined that while the litigations were not conclusively resolved when the motions were filed, they were initiated within the relevant timeframe, thus validating the inclusion of these cases in identifying Serafine as a vexatious litigant. Furthermore, the exhibit D litigation is discussed, where the Fifth Circuit’s ruling—though affirming a lower court's judgment against Serafine—also acknowledged victories for her regarding parts of the law deemed unconstitutional, indicating that exhibit D does not serve as sufficient evidence of an adverse determination. The statute's language requires that five litigations be “finally determined adversely” to the plaintiff, and the interpretation of this provision suggests that ongoing litigations can count as initiated within the seven-year period, even if not conclusively resolved. The defendant has demonstrated the necessary criteria to establish that litigations represented by exhibits A/B, E, F, and I are considered finally determined, irrespective of whether remanded proceedings are pending or if the final determination occurred beyond the seven-year limit, as long as the litigations were commenced, maintained, or prosecuted within that timeframe. The court rejected Serafine's challenge regarding these litigations, validating the trial court's findings based on sufficient evidence of six qualifying litigations under Section 11.054(1)(A). Serafine's argument against being classified as a vexatious litigant under Chapter 11 was also dismissed; despite her claim that the statute does not apply to licensed attorneys unless they proceed pro se, the court found that she effectively represented herself during the hearing. Her retained attorney only contributed at the end, indicating that Serafine acted pro se and is thus subject to Chapter 11. Additionally, the court ruled that the timing of the vexatious-litigant hearing was not obstructed by laches, as trial courts have the authority to initiate such hearings independently. Serafine’s concerns about the hearing occurring over a year after the motions were filed were also overruled, affirming the court's ability to hold hearings sua sponte for pre-filing relief purposes. A trial court may declare a plaintiff a vexatious litigant on its own initiative, provided the plaintiff receives notice and a hearing opportunity, even if the motion is deemed untimely. The court has the authority to address the vexatious litigant issue sua sponte, which negates any argument about delays impacting the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that Serafine is a vexatious litigant, finding sufficient legal and factual evidence supporting this conclusion. The court also ruled there was no abuse of discretion in ordering pre-filing relief. Additionally, Serafine's objections regarding the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law were overruled, while portions of the interlocutory appeal lacking jurisdiction were dismissed.