Georgia Clark v. Fort Worth Independent School District

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-21-00275-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 24, 2023; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Georgia Clark, a high school teacher at Fort Worth Independent School District (FWISD), appealed the termination of her continuing contract by the school district. An independent hearing examiner had recommended against termination, but FWISD proceeded with the decision. Clark appealed to the Commissioner of Education, who reversed the district's decision. However, the district court later reversed the Commissioner's ruling, reinstating the termination.

Clark's appeal raised several issues regarding the school board's written decision, asserting that the board did not adequately support its conclusion that there was good cause for termination. Specifically, she argued that the board failed to provide sufficient legal reasoning for rejecting the hearing examiner's conclusions and did not demonstrate that she violated the precedent set in Plyler v. Doe. Additionally, Clark raised a First Amendment claim related to her public tweets directed at then-President Donald Trump, in which she expressed concerns about illegal immigration and alleged misconduct within the school district.

The situation escalated following the tweets, which were publicly posted in May 2019, attracting media attention and prompting the school district to place Clark on administrative leave just days before the school year ended. The tweets led to numerous emails from concerned community members, indicating significant public backlash. Ultimately, the district court's judgment to uphold the termination was affirmed.

On June 4, 2019, during a school board meeting, fourteen public members raised concerns about tweets made by Clark, fearing they could lead to students staying home from school and negatively impact students' learning, mental health, and overall well-being. In response, the board unanimously voted to propose Clark's contract termination. Clark sought a hearing with an independent hearing examiner, who conducted an evidentiary hearing and recommended against termination. The examiner found no good cause for termination, stating Clark's tweets did not violate any laws or policies and were protected under free speech, with her interests outweighing the district's concerns.

The examiner noted that starting May 28, 2019, the district received numerous communications expressing concern and outrage about the tweets, along with media inquiries. One individual even tweeted an intent to confront Clark, prompting the superintendent to file a police report due to a perceived threat. The principal testified that a parent considered keeping their children home because of the tweets, while the social media coordinator experienced difficulties in monitoring threats due to the volume of reactions. The public response caused some disruption to district operations and raised safety concerns.

During the public comment portion of the meeting, several individuals, including parents and students, expressed doubts about Clark's ability to educate without bias, with at least one commenter warning that her tweets might intimidate immigrant students. Following the meeting, the district continued to receive numerous communications about Clark's conduct. Ultimately, the examiner concluded that Clark's tweets represented free speech on a public issue, and the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that the tweets caused significant disruption to the district's operations, affirming that her free speech rights were paramount.

The board decided to terminate Clark's contract, asserting good cause due to her tweets that allegedly violated district policies and federal law by attempting to incite the removal of students based on ethnicity and immigration status. The district believed its interests outweighed Clark's. Clark appealed to the Commissioner, who reversed the termination, ruling that the school district had not provided legal conclusions supporting good cause. The Commissioner ordered either her reinstatement with backpay or one year's salary. The Commissioner did not address the First Amendment implications of Clark's free speech claim. Subsequently, the school district appealed this decision to the district court, which reinstated the board's original decision. The current appeal focuses on the Commissioner's judgment. Under substantial-evidence review, the court can only reverse the Commissioner's decision if it lacks substantial evidence or contains erroneous conclusions of law. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla, and even if evidence opposes the agency's decision, it may still qualify as substantial. The court may affirm the Commissioner's decision based on any legal basis present in the record, regardless of the rationale used to reach the conclusion.

The Commissioner cannot override a school board’s decision unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or lacking substantial evidence. A school district has the authority to terminate a teacher's continuing contract for "good cause," defined as failing to meet recognized professional conduct standards. When termination is proposed, the teacher can request a hearing before an independent examiner appointed by the Commissioner, who must provide a written recommendation with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The school board must then issue a decision that includes these findings and must explain any changes made to the examiner's conclusions.

The board has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the examiner's conclusions regarding good cause but can only change findings of fact if they lack substantial evidence. The examiner's determination of good cause is treated as a conclusion of law. Teachers have the right to appeal termination decisions to the Commissioner, who can only reverse the board's decision under specific conditions. In this case, the board rejected the examiner’s conclusion about good cause, but the Commissioner noted that the board failed to adopt new conclusions of law regarding good cause. However, it was determined that the board's actions were supported by substantial evidence, and there is no requirement for the board to adopt conclusions in a particular format, as long as they provide the necessary findings and legal justifications.

The determination of whether a school board's decision to terminate an employee is valid hinges on the issue of policy and the presence of substantial evidence supporting that decision, rather than solely on labels like 'finding of fact' or 'conclusion of law.' The board concluded that good cause existed for terminating Georgia Clark based on her public Twitter statements, explicitly rejecting the Hearing Examiner’s recommendations. The board provided a detailed justification for its decision by outlining the relevant facts, policies, and legal theories in its report. It identified which of the Hearing Examiner's findings were accepted or rejected, clarifying the distinctions between findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The review of the board's written decision revealed that it had adopted conclusions of law regarding good cause, contrary to the Commissioner’s determination that such conclusions were not present. Consequently, the Commissioner’s ruling lacked substantial evidence. For the termination to be upheld, the board’s decision must be substantiated by substantial evidence. The court's ability to overturn the commissioner’s decision is limited to instances of procedural error that could have influenced the outcome. The Texas Supreme Court has clarified the definition of 'good cause' for termination under a continuing contract, emphasizing that it necessitates evidence of professional misconduct without requiring comparative evidence from other districts. Generally accepted standards of professional conduct are delineated by district policies that align with state and federal laws.

Evidence indicating non-compliance with a district policy that aligns with state law supports a determination of good cause for termination. The Fort Worth Independent School District (FWISD) articulated good cause for Clark’s termination due to her violation of a policy adopted on February 28, 2017, which emphasizes creating a safe and inclusive educational environment for all students, irrespective of their immigration status. This policy is grounded in the 1982 Supreme Court ruling in Plyler v. Doe, affirming that all children are entitled to a public education regardless of immigration status.

Clark's tweets, which called for investigating and potentially removing students based on their immigration status, were identified as violations of this district policy. The school board's findings indicated substantial evidence supporting the termination decision based on this violation. Clark's argument that her tweets were protected free speech was countered by the school district, which invoked the Pickering balancing test to justify the termination. Although the tweets addressed public concerns, they were not made in the context of her official duties. The appellate court maintained its responsibility to independently review the record to ensure no infringement on free expression occurred. The inquiry into the protected status of speech is a legal matter, requiring a constitutional analysis to determine its protection status.

Speech is deemed to be of public concern when it pertains to issues of political, social, or community interest, as established in *Snyder v. Phelps* and reaffirmed in *King v. Paxton*. In this context, the school district contends that Clark waived her free speech rights through her employment contract; however, it is assumed for this opinion that she did not waive these rights. The nature of her tweets, which addressed immigration, school safety, and public employee effectiveness, is considered relevant to the public concern, and their potentially controversial nature does not diminish this classification. 

The legal framework for evaluating whether Clark's speech is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment involves the Pickering balancing test, which weighs her interests in expressing concerns against the school district's interest in maintaining efficient operations. Key considerations include whether her statements disrupt workplace discipline, harm coworker relationships, or impede job performance. 

Clark argues that her off-campus tweets, made after hours and directed at a public official, should not be seen as disruptive, asserting they involved topics of public concern and were believed to be private. Conversely, the school district claims significant disruption occurred, impacting its ability to create a safe educational environment, particularly citing fears among undocumented families that could lead to decreased school attendance. The school district also references threats received following the public disclosure of Clark's communications and numerous complaints, thus presenting a strong argument regarding disruption to its operations.

The school district concluded that its interests outweighed those of Clark regarding her tweets, which led to her contract termination. The hearing examiner found that the district faced significant public concern, including threats and fears among parents about the impact of Clark's tweets on students. The Fifth Circuit has indicated that the Pickering balancing test may involve both law and fact, and it is ultimately for the court to assess the weight of the interests involved. The district acknowledged that community response decreased after the school board recommended terminating Clark's contract, which it argued supported its decision to address the disruption caused by Clark's tweets. 

Despite Clark's assertion that the disruption was minimal and had ended soon after the tweets, the board concluded that the concerns raised about students' well-being and safety justified the termination. The court found substantial evidence supporting the board's decision, affirming that the First Amendment did not prevent the termination. The Commissioner could not substitute his judgment for that of the board, which acted within its rights based on the evidence presented. Consequently, the district court’s judgment was affirmed.