State of West Virginia v. Benjamin R. Taylor

Citation: Not availableDocket: 20-0222

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; January 17, 2023; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Benjamin R. Taylor appeals a Circuit Court order from February 12, 2020, which resentenced him to reset the timeframe for direct appeal. Taylor is serving a life sentence without mercy for first-degree murder, alongside a consecutive forty-year sentence for child abuse resulting in death and a ten to twenty-year sentence for sexual abuse. His convictions stem from the death of his girlfriend's ten-month-old daughter, found with severe injuries, including skull fractures and signs of smothering, after Taylor had been drinking and using marijuana.

Taylor's account includes a blackout period before the child's mother discovered him with her child's body. He testified about using his phone and viewing pornography before the incident and attempted CPR when he regained awareness of the child’s condition. The appeal does not challenge the reliability of the underlying testimony but focuses on three pretrial issues, particularly the denial of a change of venue due to the extensive publicity surrounding the case. The court's decision on the venue is subject to review for abuse of discretion, requiring Taylor to demonstrate "good cause" for the request.

Mr. Taylor contends that the notoriety of his charged crimes and their surrounding circumstances warranted a change of venue due to potential jury bias. However, he fails to provide concrete evidence of prejudicial notoriety, relying instead on speculative claims drawn from approximately 1800 juror questionnaires without pinpointing specific instances of bias. The circuit court effectively managed media influence, restricted courthouse demonstrations, sealed discovery, and implemented thorough voir dire procedures, concluding that there was no justification for changing the venue.

In a second issue, Mr. Taylor argues that the circuit court wrongly excluded evidence of a potential alternative suspect. He attempted to present testimonies linking another individual, "M.S.," to the crime, asserting that M.S. was near the scene shortly before the attack. However, testimonies revealed that M.S. had an alibi, and the circuit court determined that the evidence presented was too speculative to directly implicate anyone other than Mr. Taylor. Thus, the court's decision to suppress this evidence was deemed appropriate.

Finally, Mr. Taylor challenges a pretrial ruling regarding DNA expert testimony, initiated by his motion to exclude sixteen DNA samples for not meeting the “stochastic threshold,” a standard for ensuring sample reliability. The excerpt emphasizes that the Supreme Court may overlook unsubstantiated claims lacking specific references to the record on appeal.

The State filed a motion to suppress DNA evidence from a vaginal swab taken from the victim, with an agreed order resolving all DNA-related issues except for this sample. The State's forensic analyst testified that the vaginal swab yielded low-level DNA, necessitating two amplifications to establish reliability. The first amplification, which indicated Mr. Taylor was likely excluded as a contributor, returned ten results at nine loci, while the second yielded only three results, failing to meet the requirement of eight concordant loci. Consequently, the analyst deemed the results unreliable, allowing for Mr. Taylor's inclusion as a potential contributor.

In contrast, Mr. Taylor’s expert argued that the first amplification was reliable since the stochastic threshold applied to only one locus, maintaining sufficient reliable loci. The State’s motion would prevent Mr. Taylor from presenting evidence from the first amplification, which favored his defense. The circuit court, after reviewing the expert testimonies, found neither party provided persuasive evidence regarding the DNA sample's reliability based on the stochastic threshold and denied the State’s motion to suppress. However, it allowed for future motions regarding suppressed results if introduced at trial.

Mr. Taylor claimed this ruling placed him in a "Catch-22," leading him to forego presenting his expert’s testimony. The court found this argument problematic, as it challenged an order that permitted his expert's testimony. Ultimately, the ruling was not adverse to him, and he provided no authority to support his claim that the court overstepped its authority. Thus, the circuit court's denial of the State's motion to suppress was affirmed.