Pete Jason Polson v. State of Iowa

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-1508

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; January 10, 2023; Iowa; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Pete Jason Polson was involved in a shooting spree in November 2014, where he nearly killed two men and shot another. Following his conviction, Polson claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not securing an expert witness to discuss his impaired memory and inability to form intent after using methamphetamine prior to the shootings. The Iowa District Court granted Polson's postconviction relief application, which the State of Iowa subsequently appealed. The appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. 

Prior to the shootings, Polson had been using methamphetamine with Billi Jo Bailey, who testified that his behavior changed after he injected a new batch of meth around midnight. He reported feeling something was wrong after using it and claimed to have no memory of the events that occurred the following morning when he shot at three victims—Mark Mitchell, Zachary Whitehill, and Matthew Stephenson. Law enforcement arrested Polson shortly after the shootings, describing him as calm and compliant during the encounter.

Polson was charged with multiple serious offenses, including three counts of attempted murder, following an incident where law enforcement found no evidence of intoxication during their interactions with him. Despite the presence of drug-related evidence at his home, including marijuana and methamphetamine residue, two troopers and other officials did not believe he was under the influence. At his trial, Polson's attorney argued that the only defense was that Polson lacked control due to intoxication. The defense faced challenges as Polson did not display typical signs of methamphetamine influence. Instead, the defense posited he may have been under the influence of a different substance, suggesting the possibility of counterfeit drugs. The attorney opted not to hire an expert witness, believing it more effective to use the state’s witnesses to support their argument regarding counterfeit substances. This strategy resulted in a conviction for only one count of attempted murder and two counts of assault with intent to inflict serious injury.

On appeal, Polson contended that his trial counsel's failure to secure an expert witness on psychotropic drug effects was ineffective assistance. The reviewing court acknowledged the overwhelming evidence against Polson but noted uncertainty regarding his ability to form specific intent. Consequently, they preserved his claim for postconviction relief. Afterward, Polson retained Dr. Terriann Crisp, a retired pharmacology professor, who concluded that he likely experienced methamphetamine-induced psychosis, which could impair a person's ability to distinguish right from wrong and form intent. The district court found this new testimony compelling, determining that trial counsel’s failure to investigate and utilize such expert testimony constituted a breach of an essential duty.

Polson was found to have been prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to call an expert witness, Dr. Crisp, whose testimony could have supported his claims regarding his memory issues and ability to form intent. This lack of expert testimony raised doubts about the trial's outcome, prompting the court to grant Polson a new trial on all convictions. The State appealed, arguing that the defense was effective in pursuing an intoxication strategy based on Polson's use of a drug other than methamphetamine, and that the absence of an expert did not cause prejudice since the facts did not support the expert's views. 

The court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo, as established in prior cases. To prove ineffective assistance, Polson must demonstrate that his attorney failed to perform a critical duty resulting in prejudice, overcoming the presumption of competent representation. The primary defense centered on Polson’s intoxication affecting his specific intent, a valid argument under Iowa law. Counsel opted against calling an expert and instead aimed to leverage state witnesses against the prosecution, finding this strategy effective in past cases. During the trial, counsel questioned a law enforcement official about the potential for substances resembling methamphetamine to be something else, which supported the intoxication defense.

An attorney's obligation to retain an expert witness is not a strict requirement but rather a matter of trial strategy, as established in Dawson v. State. In Polson's case, the defense counsel believed their approach was effective, evidenced by the jury's decision to convict him of only one charge of attempted murder despite substantial evidence against him. The court emphasized that it will not second-guess reasonable trial strategies. Defense counsel noted that cross-examining witnesses while retaining an expert could potentially undermine the expert's credibility and negatively affect the jury's perception of law enforcement.

Polson failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the decision not to hire an expert. To prove prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome, which must be substantial rather than merely conceivable. This assessment requires a comprehensive review of the evidence and its implications on factual findings, considering whether any errors were significant or trivial.

Dr. Crisp's testimony suggested that individuals in methamphetamine-induced psychosis exhibit highly violent behavior, contrasting with law enforcement's observations of Polson, who appeared calm and compliant post-arrest. Testimonies from trained officials and Polson's ex-girlfriend highlighted a lack of typical signs of methamphetamine intoxication in Polson at the time of his arrest. Dr. Crisp acknowledged the inconsistency in Polson's behavior, questioning how he could be coherent enough to interact with police after such a psychotic episode. The defense attempted to argue that Polson's condition was due to a substance mixed with methamphetamine, but Dr. Crisp's testimony countered this claim, indicating no evidence supports that such mixtures enhance methamphetamine's psychoactive effects.

Dr. Crisp's testimony indicated that while methamphetamine typically does not alter pharmacological effects when "cut," it did induce a psychosis in Polson. However, her views on how this psychosis impacted his specific intent were less certain. Dr. Crisp defined specific intent as the capacity for complex cognitive behaviors, such as planning and executing tasks, exemplified by actions like driving or shooting accurately. She asserted that those affected by methamphetamine-induced psychosis have a diminished ability for such behaviors. Despite this, on the day of the shootings, Polson successfully drove a car and shot at three individuals, indicating he could foresee and navigate actions. The court concluded, upon de novo review, that Dr. Crisp's expert testimony would not have aided Polson's defense, drawing parallels to prior cases where lack of expert testimony did not equate to ineffective counsel. The court found that Polson could not demonstrate a breach of duty or prejudice, which are necessary for a successful ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Consequently, the district court's grant of postconviction relief was reversed and remanded for dismissal of Polson's application. The case background highlighted that Polson had been using methamphetamine heavily with an acquaintance before the shootings.

Polson exhibited unusual behavior compared to previous methamphetamine use, leading Bailey to ask him to leave her home around midnight. His last memory before leaving was injecting a new batch of meth, which he later described as not tasting like typical methamphetamine. After the injection, Polson felt something was wrong, experiencing a sudden change in sensation that he could not explain. The following morning, he shot three individuals: Mark Mitchell, Zachary Whitehill, and Matthew Stephenson, without recollection of the events. Law enforcement apprehended Polson around 7:00 a.m. after the shootings, noting his calm demeanor and lack of concern during the encounter, leading them to believe he was neither intoxicated nor under the influence of drugs. He faced multiple charges, including three counts of attempted murder and drug offenses, with evidence found at his residence suggesting methamphetamine use. During the postconviction-relief hearing, Polson's attorney argued that intoxication was his only defense against the attempted murder charges, but they struggled with the State's assertion that he did not behave like someone under the influence of meth. Ultimately, the defense shifted to claim that Polson believed he was under the influence of a different substance.

Polson's attorney opted not to hire an expert witness, relying instead on the testimony of law enforcement to suggest that Polson could have unknowingly consumed counterfeit substances, leading to a reaction distinct from actual methamphetamine use. The strategy aimed to leverage the credibility of the state's witnesses, with the belief that their testimony would resonate more with jurors. Ultimately, this approach resulted in Polson's conviction for one count of attempted murder and two counts of lesser assault charges.

On direct appeal, Polson claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to secure an expert on psychotropic drug effects, raising doubts about his ability to form the specific intent required for the charges. The appellate court noted the overwhelming evidence against Polson but acknowledged the potential impact of expert testimony regarding his mental state post-drug use. This claim was preserved for postconviction relief.

After seeking postconviction relief, Polson enlisted Dr. Terriann Crisp, a retired pharmacology professor, who testified that Polson was likely experiencing methamphetamine-induced psychosis, affecting his ability to differentiate right from wrong and form specific intent. The district court found Dr. Crisp's testimony compelling, determining that trial counsel breached a critical duty by failing to fully investigate and utilize expert testimony. The court ruled that this failure prejudiced Polson, as an expert could have corroborated his claims regarding memory loss and intent, ultimately undermining confidence in the trial's outcome. Consequently, the court granted Polson a new trial.

The State appealed, arguing that counsel's performance was adequate since they pursued an intoxication defense based on Polson's consumption of a different drug and contending that the absence of an expert on meth's effects did not prejudice Polson, positing that the facts did not support Dr. Crisp's opinion regarding specific intent.

A district court's ruling on postconviction relief is generally reviewed for legal errors, but in cases of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, a de novo review is applied. To prove ineffective assistance, Polson must demonstrate that his trial attorney failed to fulfill an essential duty, resulting in prejudice, as established by the Sixth Amendment and relevant Iowa law. The presumption is that counsel performed competently, which Polson must rebut by showing his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This assessment considers the primary defense theory, which in Polson's case was that he was intoxicated by a substance other than methamphetamine, impairing his ability to form the required specific intent.

Trial counsel opted against calling an expert witness regarding intoxication, believing that leveraging the State's witnesses would be more effective, based on past experience. This strategy involved cross-examining law enforcement officials about the possibility of substances resembling methamphetamine. There is no absolute duty for attorneys to retain expert witnesses; determining this is a matter of trial strategy. Counsel believed their strategy was effective since the jury convicted Polson of only one attempted murder charge despite overwhelming evidence against him.

Determining whether an attorney failed in an essential duty involves refraining from second-guessing reasonable trial strategies. Defense counsel opted not to cross-examine the State’s witnesses while retaining an expert, reasoning that such cross-examination could negatively influence the jury's perception of the expert's credibility and the police officers' testimonies. This decision was deemed a reasonable trial strategy, as referenced in State v. Majors. Furthermore, the defendant, Polson, did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s choice to forgo an expert. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would have been different, with the standard requiring a substantial likelihood rather than a mere conceivable one. 

The totality of the evidence must be considered, focusing on how the factual findings may have been altered and the pervasiveness of any error. Dr. Crisp testified that behaviors indicative of methamphetamine-induced psychosis would typically include extreme aggression and agitation, contradicting the accounts from law enforcement who observed Polson as calm and lucid post-arrest. Further, Polson's ex-girlfriend's testimony highlighted his usual hyperactive behavior when intoxicated, which he did not display after the shootings. This inconsistency was noted by Dr. Crisp, who found it unusual for someone in psychosis to be capable of coherent interaction with the police. The State leveraged this testimony to argue that Polson was not intoxicated, while defense counsel attempted to suggest that Polson's behavior was altered by an unknown substance mixed with methamphetamine. However, Dr. Crisp undermined this theory, stating that mixtures used to cut methamphetamine do not enhance its psychoactive effects.

Dr. Crisp testified that while Polson was suffering from methamphetamine-induced psychosis, which significantly impairs complex cognitive behaviors, he demonstrated the ability to engage in such behaviors on the day of the shootings. Specifically, Polson drove a car and used a gun to shoot at three individuals, indicating he could foresee necessary actions and execute them. The court concluded that Dr. Crisp's testimony would not have benefited Polson's defense, as similar cases have established that failure to call an expert does not equate to ineffective counsel if the defendant cannot show prejudice. Thus, Polson did not meet the criteria for proving ineffective assistance of counsel, leading to the reversal of the district court's grant of postconviction relief and a remand for dismissal of his application.