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Petersen v. Johnson

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-20565

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 3, 2023; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Brian Petersen, a 39-year-old teacher, was arrested during a sting operation by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force in Conroe, Texas, after he communicated via the dating app Grindr with an undercover detective, Darrick Dunn, posing as a 14-year-old boy. Petersen engaged in a conversation that included inquiries about age and sexual experience, ultimately agreeing to meet Dunn. Following his arrest for online solicitation of a minor, Petersen posted bail but tragically committed suicide two days later. His parents filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 against multiple defendants, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, municipal liability, and negligence. The district court dismissed the case, a decision that was upheld on appeal. The court noted that it could consider attached documents relevant to the complaint, including the Grindr chat, which provided context for the allegations.

Petersen and Dunn made tentative plans to meet at 2 p.m., during which Petersen requested a "shirtless pic" and a voice message. Dunn sent a non-shirtless photo and a voice message, prompting Petersen to comment on Dunn's unexpected voice. Petersen declined to share his own picture due to concerns about their age difference and suggested an initial meeting to discuss further. They communicated about meeting at a Sonic Drive-In, with Petersen giving detailed directions on where to meet. 

Dunn's incident report indicates that detectives observed Petersen driving a silver passenger car near Sonic, suspecting him as the driver based on his behavior. Following this observation, they stopped Petersen and, according to the second amended complaint, Dunn seized Petersen's phone without a warrant, accessing the Grindr app where their conversation was visible, which led to Petersen's identification as a suspect. Petersen was arrested for online solicitation of a minor, a second-degree felony, and taken to Montgomery County jail.

After his arrest, Petersen reported experiencing severe anxiety and suicidal thoughts. EMT Bridgitt Johnson, who was responsible for mental health screenings at the jail, had Petersen fill out a suicide prevention form but did not provide any further evaluation or care. Petersen was released on bail the following day but tragically committed suicide two days later. The document highlights significant mental health concerns and procedural issues surrounding Petersen's arrest and subsequent treatment in custody.

Petersen, in a suicide note attached to the second amended complaint, expressed a belief he was meeting an adult for "age play." On December 14, 2020, Petersen’s parents filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas against the Wellpath Defendants, claiming violations of Petersen’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, along with Texas state law claims for medical and gross negligence. In February 2021, they amended their complaint to include Montgomery County as a defendant. The district court dismissed the Wellpath Defendants but did not rule on Montgomery County's motion. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint against Dunn in his personal capacity and the City of Conroe, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations due to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and illegal search of Petersen’s phone, seeking wrongful death damages. Dunn and the City moved to dismiss, with Dunn citing qualified immunity. On October 5, 2021, the district court granted the motions to dismiss, leading the Plaintiffs to appeal both this order and the earlier dismissal of the Wellpath Defendants.

The standard for reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is de novo, requiring the complaint to contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right by a person acting under state law. The Plaintiffs argue they have made plausible claims against Dunn for false arrest and illegal search, and against the City for municipal liability, seeking wrongful death damages for these alleged violations. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless they violate clearly established rights; the burden is on the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity does not apply.

Plaintiffs argue that Dunn is not entitled to qualified immunity for arresting Petersen without a warrant and probable cause, claiming he violated Petersen's constitutional rights. However, the court determines that Dunn had probable cause for the arrest, thus not violating any clearly established rights. In cases of false arrest, qualified immunity is applicable if a reasonable officer could conclude there was probable cause based on the facts available. Probable cause requires sufficient facts within the officer's knowledge to warrant a prudent belief that the suspect has committed or is about to commit an offense. Notably, mere arguable probable cause suffices to invoke qualified immunity, and plaintiffs must present facts showing defendants lacked reasonable but mistaken probable cause. The court emphasizes that overcoming qualified immunity is a significant challenge, which the plaintiffs fail to meet in this case.

Petersen was arrested for online solicitation of a minor under Texas Penal Code § 33.021(c), which prohibits knowingly soliciting a minor for sexual contact. The law defines a minor as someone under 17 years or someone the actor believes to be under that age. The key issue is whether a reasonable officer in Dunn's position would believe Petersen knowingly solicited someone he thought was a minor for sexual purposes. The plaintiffs claim that a reasonable person would not believe Petersen thought he was communicating with a minor, citing factors such as the age of images sent and the context of the communication. However, the district court ruled that Petersen's subjective belief regarding Dunn's age is irrelevant to the probable cause evaluation, which must focus on what a reasonable officer would believe given the known facts at the time of the arrest.

A reasonable officer could have perceived that Petersen was communicating with someone he believed to be under 17 years old, as evidenced by Petersen's interactions with Dunn, who identified himself as a 14-year-old boy. Throughout their exchanges, Petersen exhibited a belief that Dunn was underage, stating concerns about sending pictures due to an age differential and referencing "back to school shopping." Furthermore, Petersen's inquiries about Dunn's sexual experience and their plans to meet indicated an intent to engage in sexual contact. Despite arguments from the Plaintiffs that the eventual plan to meet in public negated this intent, Texas law dictates that the crime of soliciting a minor online is completed at the time of solicitation, regardless of subsequent actions. Given Petersen's questions about availability and sexual experience, a reasonable officer could conclude that Petersen intended to engage in sexual contact with Dunn. Consequently, the district court's determination that there was at least arguable probable cause for Petersen's arrest was upheld, leading to the proper dismissal of the false arrest claim.

Probable cause existed for Petersen’s arrest, independent of the alleged improper search and seizure of his phone, undermining the Plaintiffs' claims of illegal arrest. The Plaintiffs contended that the search was necessary to confirm Petersen's identity as a suspect, but evidence existed prior to the search that identified him, rendering any evidence obtained from the search irrelevant to the arrest. The Plaintiffs did not demonstrate any injury from the search beyond the arrest, nor did they request damages unrelated to it, leading to the dismissal of their illegal search and seizure claims. 

The malicious prosecution claim was also dismissed because the Plaintiffs misinterpreted the applicable statute regarding the felony charge against Petersen. The correct charge was a second-degree felony under Texas law, as Petersen believed the victim to be under 17, satisfying the criteria for that classification. 

Furthermore, the municipal liability claim against the City of Conroe was dismissed, as it relies on proving a constitutional violation, which the Plaintiffs failed to establish. 

Lastly, the claims against the Wellpath Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of Petersen's due process rights and state law negligence, were found to lack merit. The Plaintiffs argued that the Wellpath Defendants acted under color of state law due to their contractual relationship with Montgomery County. However, the claims were dismissed because the Wellpath Defendants did not have a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of Petersen's suicide.

Duties owed to pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment stem from a "special relationship" between the state and the detainee, as established in McClendon v. City of Columbia. This duty requires the state to protect detainees from certain dangers during incarceration but does not extend beyond custody, as clarified in DeShaney v. Winnebago County. Once a detainee, like Petersen, is released from custody, this "special relationship" ends, and the state has no constitutional obligation to protect him. The court referenced Hare v. City of Corinth, which affirms the state’s duty to provide basic needs during confinement but noted that liability does not continue post-release.

The plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983 and § 1985 were dismissed because the state had no duty to prevent Petersen’s suicide after his release. The court also highlighted that no precedent exists for due process liability concerning suicide based on police conduct outside of custody. 

Regarding the plaintiffs’ state law negligence claims against the Wellpath Defendants, the essential elements of medical negligence were evaluated. Causation is crucial, requiring a substantial factor relationship between the alleged negligence and the harm. The Supreme Court of Texas stipulates that a failure to hospitalize a person who later commits suicide constitutes proximate cause only if hospitalization would probably have prevented the suicide. The plaintiffs failed to meet this standard, particularly given the brief interaction between Petersen and EMT Johnson and the time lapse before Petersen’s suicide.

Ultimately, the district court’s dismissal of all claims was affirmed, concluding that the plaintiffs did not establish plausible claims under federal law or demonstrate the necessary causation for their state negligence claims.