Jeremiah Stevenson v. the State of Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-21-00142-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 14, 2022; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jeremiah Stevenson was convicted of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to life in prison after the jury found an habitual-offender enhancement applicable. He challenged the jury instructions regarding voluntary acts, claiming they were inadequate. The incident occurred on May 3, 2020, at a Fort Worth gas station where Stevenson threatened cashier Ashley Jefferson with a gun, fired a shot, and stole approximately $100 and a pack of cigarettes before fleeing. 

During the trial, Stevenson testified that he suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which he claimed could cause him to "black out" and perform actions involuntarily. He described a stressful incident with his grandmother prior to the robbery that triggered this state, stating he had no recollection of the robbery itself. Despite his defense, the court found no error in the jury instruction, leading to the affirmation of the conviction.

Evidence presented during cross-examination included documents found in Jeremiah Stevenson’s wallet after his arrest for robbery. Notably, one document was a handwritten note with a bail bond company’s contact information, while another outlined a detailed plan for committing multiple robberies, including specific instructions on obtaining vehicles, scoping out ATM locations, and using firearms. The trial court provided a jury instruction regarding voluntary acts, stating that a person commits an offense only if they voluntarily engage in conduct, and clarified that lack of intent regarding the outcomes does not render the act involuntary. The jury was instructed that if they believed Stevenson committed theft while using a deadly weapon but had reasonable doubt about the voluntariness of his actions, they should acquit him. Stevenson did not object to this instruction, but was ultimately found guilty of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, Stevenson contends that the jury instructions were insufficient regarding voluntary acts and that this inadequacy resulted in significant harm. The State argues that the jury was correctly instructed and that Stevenson has not demonstrated that any error resulted in egregious harm. The review of jury charge errors is required regardless of whether they were preserved at trial.

A jury charge serves to inform jurors of the applicable law and guide its application, as established in Beltran De La Torre v. State. The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on relevant law irrespective of the defendant's objections, supported by Taylor v. State and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 36.14. While there is no duty to provide instructions on defenses unless requested by the defendant, any defense instruction given sua sponte by the trial court becomes applicable law, requiring correct instruction as per Mendez v. State and Vega v. State. The trial court bears ultimate responsibility for the jury charge's accuracy (Delgado v. State).

Texas law stipulates that an offense occurs only when a person voluntarily engages in conduct, encompassing acts, omissions, or possession (Tex. Penal Code Ann. 6.01(a)). This voluntariness requirement applies universally to all offenses, including strict-liability offenses (Farmer v. State). Voluntariness pertains solely to physical actions; movements resulting from external forces, reflexes, or conditions like unconsciousness or hypnosis are deemed nonvolitional (Rogers v. State). Additionally, the concept of voluntariness is distinct from culpable mental state, meaning that involuntariness does not arise simply from a lack of intent regarding the conduct's outcome (Febus v. State; Adanandus v. State).

Stevenson argues that the trial court's jury instructions on voluntary acts were insufficient, particularly failing to clarify that the voluntary-acts inquiry pertains solely to bodily movements, distinct from the culpable-mental-states inquiry. He also points out that the court did not define "involuntary acts," which could lead to confusion for the jury. Additionally, he claims the application section of the voluntary-acts instruction lacked necessary mental state specifications, potentially misleading the jury. The State counters by referencing a similar case, Simpkins v. State, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld comparable jury instructions regarding voluntary conduct. In Simpkins, the jury was instructed that a person commits an offense only if they voluntarily engage in conduct and that lack of intent does not render actions involuntary. The court found that the instructions adequately presented the law and did not require further clarification on the distinctions between voluntary acts and mental states. The similarities between the instructions in Stevenson’s case and those in Simpkins suggest that the trial court's guidance was legally sound, as the charge included the culpable-mental-states inquiry in other parts, thereby addressing Stevenson's concerns regarding intent related to the alleged aggravated robbery.

Stevenson argues that the trial court inadequately instructed the jury on the law of voluntary acts, referencing Hervey v. State. In Hervey, the defendant was convicted of murder, and the appellate court found the trial court's instruction on voluntariness-of-conduct deficient for three reasons: (1) it failed to allow acquittal if the jury believed the shooting was due to the victim's actions; (2) it did not apply the law of voluntariness to lesser-included offenses; and (3) it did not distinguish between culpable mental state and voluntariness-of-conduct. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding the defendant was harmed by the erroneous instruction.

In contrast, the court finds that the deficiencies noted in Hervey do not apply to Stevenson’s case. Specifically, Stevenson was identified as the robber, negating the need for an instruction on independent acts. Additionally, there were no lesser-included offenses requiring separate instructions on voluntariness. Finally, the instruction in question aligns with approved instructions from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Consequently, the court rejects Stevenson’s claim of error and affirms the trial court’s judgment.