United States v. Schilling

Citations: 696 F. Supp. 407; 28 ERC (BNA) 1930; 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11198; 1988 WL 102535Docket: Civ. No. H 87-229

Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana; September 8, 1988; Federal District Court

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A motion for summary judgment has been filed by the plaintiff, the United States, against R. J Enterprises, Inc. and its officers, John and Robert Schilling, for violations of the Clean Air Act and related regulations. The alleged violations stem from an inspection of Schilling Brothers Gas Stop in Indiana, which revealed multiple infractions: 1) failure to label four gasoline pumps appropriately as 'unleaded gasoline' and two as containing lead; 2) absence of required signage about federal prohibitions on leaded gasoline; and 3) permitting leaded gasoline to be dispensed into vehicles designated for unleaded fuel. Defendants are subject to fines of $10,000 for each of the twelve cited violations. 

The court notes procedural requirements under Fed. R.Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment motions, emphasizing that the opposing party must provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial rather than relying solely on mere allegations. The local rules of the Northern District of Indiana further stipulate that a motion must include a statement of undisputed material facts, and the opposing party must respond with a statement of genuine issues. This structured approach ensures clarity in the proceedings and assists the court in making informed decisions regarding the motion.

The plaintiff asserts that the defendants owned and operated a gasoline retail facility named 'Gas Stop' in St. John, Indiana, on August 2, 1985, and that the outlet qualifies as a retail outlet under 40 C.F.R. 80.2(k). On that date, EPA representative Ruth Mancos inspected the facility for compliance with the Clean Air Act. During the inspection, she observed customers fueling a 1978 Chrysler Reliant and a 1980 Chevrolet Camaro Z-28, both labeled 'Unleaded Gasoline Only,' using pumps designated for leaded gasoline. The vehicles were designed to require unleaded fuel and bore the correct labeling. 

The gasoline dispensed from pumps with serial numbers 0439293 and 0439294 was leaded, while several pumps lacked proper labeling indicating the type of gasoline dispensed. Additionally, four pump stands did not display required signage regarding the prohibition of leaded gasoline in vehicles labeled for unleaded use. All statements made by the plaintiff are supported by affidavits.

In response, the defendants challenge the existence of genuine issues regarding the cause of leaded fuel being introduced into unleaded vehicles, the conspicuousness of required notices at the pump, and the visibility of the fuel labels. Defendant Robert Schilling provided an affidavit claiming that the required notices were affixed and prominently displayed at each pump, and that the necessary labels were also correctly positioned for customer visibility. The defendants include photographs as evidence to support their position.

Defendants fail to provide evidence or even a basic assertion that photographs were taken on August 2, 1985, limiting their relevance to the credibility of the claim that labels and notices were present on that date. Plaintiff counters by highlighting contradictions in defendants’ earlier statements about when the labels and signs were affixed, but even if accepted, this only affects the credibility of defendants’ claims and does not definitively prove the absence of the labels on the specified date. The court clarifies that its role during the summary judgment stage is to identify genuine issues for trial rather than weigh evidence. Consequently, the court finds a genuine dispute exists regarding the presence of the labels and notices, leading to the denial of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on those allegations.

Regarding the allegation that defendants allowed leaded gasoline to be dispensed into cars labeled "unleaded fuel only," defendants contest the claim that this occurred within view of a station attendant, citing an obstructed view due to a plywood piece in the cashier’s booth window. Although the photograph submitted lacks proof of the booth's condition on the relevant date, it raises a factual dispute about the cashier's ability to oversee the fuelings. Defendants also introduce a legal defense based on 40 C.F.R. 80.23(b)(1), arguing that they should not be liable if the misfueling was caused by the car owners rather than their employees. However, the court finds this interpretation flawed, stating that such a reading would negate the liability for merely allowing violations, contradicting established legal principles regarding statutory interpretation.

The Environmental Protection Agency argues that the defendants misinterpret regulation 80.23(b)(1) and that an agency's interpretation of its regulations is binding on courts unless extraordinary circumstances arise. The court concludes that 80.23(b)(1) applies only if a violation, such as misfueling, occurs due to factors beyond the defendants' control, not simply the act of misfueling itself. For instance, an external event like severe weather or the attendant's sudden illness could absolve the defendants of liability. The court identifies disputed material facts regarding the attendant's ability to see the misfuelings, which are crucial for determining liability. As a result, summary judgment regarding the defendants' alleged allowance of leaded gasoline into cars marked for unleaded fuel is denied. The court acknowledges that while the defendants contested certain facts, they did not dispute others, leading to the acceptance of facts numbered 1 through 6 and 8 from the plaintiff's statement as true and undisputed. Consequently, the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is fully denied, and the admitted facts do not need to be proven at trial.