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Hans v. Louisiana
Citations: 134 U.S. 1; 10 S. Ct. 504; 33 L. Ed. 842; 1890 U.S. LEXIS 1943Docket: 4
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 2, 1890; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The court addressed whether a State can be sued in a U.S. Circuit Court by one of its own citizens when the case concerns the U.S. Constitution or laws. The argument presented hinges on the interpretation of the Constitution and a congressional act, which state that federal jurisdiction extends to cases arising under federal law without exceptions based on party character. The relevant clauses assert that the judicial power includes all cases in law and equity that arise under the Constitution or U.S. laws. While it is established that a State cannot be sued by citizens of other States or foreign entities on such grounds, the current issue is whether a State can be sued by its own citizens. Previous rulings have indicated that cases involving a State as a defendant, even when they involve federal questions, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects States from being sued by citizens of other States or foreign entities. The plaintiff argues that, as a citizen of Louisiana, he should not be impeded by the Eleventh Amendment, which applies to suits by citizens of other States. However, this raises the question of whether it is permissible for a State to be sued by its own citizens in federal courts for federal questions, creating an inconsistency where a State could be subject to federal jurisdiction by its citizens but not by others. The excerpt emphasizes the significant impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, which held that a state could be sued by citizens of another state or foreign countries, based on the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789. This ruling was met with widespread surprise and prompted Congress to propose the Eleventh Amendment, which effectively reversed the decision by stating that the judicial power of the United States does not extend to such lawsuits. The amendment does not explicitly prohibit these suits but clarifies that the Constitution does not grant the power to allow them. Following the amendment's adoption, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that it could not exercise jurisdiction over any such lawsuits, both past and future. The text highlights the division among justices regarding the interpretation of state suability, with Justice Iredell arguing against the notion of allowing individuals to sue sovereign states, contending that such powers were never intended in the Constitution. The reaction to the Chisholm decision reflects a broader sentiment among constitutional defenders who had opposed the idea of individual lawsuits against states during the Constitution's ratification. Hamilton argues against the notion that citizens of one state could sue another state in federal courts for assigned public securities. He asserts that state sovereignty inherently protects states from being sued without their consent, a principle recognized throughout history and currently enjoyed by all states in the Union. Unless explicitly surrendered by the Constitution, this immunity persists, making the concern about alienation of state sovereignty unfounded. He emphasizes that contracts between a nation and individuals only bind the sovereign's conscience and lack coercive power, rendering the idea of enforcing state debt suits impractical and potentially leading to conflict. The clause in question allows for federal jurisdiction in controversies between states and citizens of other states, which opponents argue would enable lawsuits against states. While the Supreme Court, in Chisholm v. Georgia, supported this interpretation, Hamilton and others, including Madison, countered that individuals cannot compel states into court, and the provision primarily facilitates state claims against citizens, ensuring fairness in legal processes. The clause in question is interpreted as granting citizens the right to be heard in federal courts, particularly in cases involving a state as a party. Historical commentary by Marshall emphasizes that states, as sovereign entities, should not be compelled to appear in federal court as defendants, a notion which aligns with the intent to allow states to pursue claims against individuals in other states. There is an acknowledgment of the potential for perceived partiality if states could not be sued; however, this limitation is deemed necessary and unavoidable. The argument is made that the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to allow citizens to sue their own states in federal courts, while permitting suits by citizens from other states or foreign states was rejected. The document argues that the Constitution did not envision suits that contravene established law, and that the judicial power does not extend to matters that were not justiciable at common law. Historical context shows that some disputes, such as boundary issues, were previously justiciable, but the general principle maintains that states cannot be sued without their consent, as consistently upheld by courts and legal scholars since the foundational cases like Chisholm v. Georgia. In multiple cases, including Osborn v. Bank of United States and Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, the courts determined that actions were against individuals rather than the State or the United States, emphasizing that sovereign immunity protects states from lawsuits without their consent. Mr. Webster articulated that state loans are backed by the good faith of the state, akin to contracts with established governments, highlighting the obligation of the state to fulfill its agreements. Justice McLean noted that no sovereign state can be sued without consent, citing the limited circumstances under the Articles of Confederation where a state could be sued. Justice Miller reinforced that neither a state nor the U.S. can be sued without consent, except in specific cases under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. While states may consent to be sued, as seen in Curran v. Arkansas, that consent can be modified or revoked, as established in Beers et al. v. Arkansas. Chief Justice Taney clarified that sovereign immunity is a fundamental principle, and states retain the right to dictate the conditions under which they can be sued, which does not constitute a binding contract. Thus, legislative acts permitting lawsuits do not imply irreversibility or an inability to amend such laws for public interest. The State has the authority to repeal prior laws or alter conditions for lawsuits against it without violating any contracts. This principle is supported by precedents, including Railroad Company v. Tennessee, Railroad Company v. Alabama, and In re Ayers. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is questioned based on the language of the relevant act of Congress, which grants concurrent jurisdiction with State courts only for civil suits arising under federal law. Since state courts cannot hear cases against a State without its consent, the Circuit Court cannot claim such power either. While the judiciary act of 1789, referenced in Chisholm v. Georgia, did not limit the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction according to the majority opinion, Justice Iredell disagreed, and his view is favored in light of subsequent developments like the Eleventh Amendment and historical context. Chief Justice Marshall's commentary in Cohens v. Virginia clarifies that the power to review state court judgments involving states does not equate to initiating a suit against the State. A writ of error does not assert a claim against the State, merely seeking to have a constitutional defense examined by the appropriate court. This consistent interpretation across courts maintains that no suit can be filed against the United States, as the judiciary act does not permit such actions. Writs of error have consistently been issued for the transfer of judgments in favor of the United States to a superior court, without being regarded as lawsuits against the United States. It was argued that such writs do not constitute suits against a State in the context of jurisdictional amendments. Even if the court were mistaken in this interpretation, it would not impact the specific case at hand, as the writ of error was not initiated by a citizen from another State or foreign nation, but rather fell under the general judicial authority concerning U.S. Constitution and laws, independent of the parties involved. Although the Chief Justice's remarks supported the plaintiff's argument, they were deemed extrajudicial and did not outweigh the prevailing legal principles. Historically, writs of error involving judgments favoring the crown or the State have not been seen as exceptions to the principle that sovereign entities cannot be sued. While a State cannot be compelled to fulfill its obligations through legal action unless it consents, any violation of rights or properties granted by the State can be contested in court. Laws that impair contractual obligations related to such properties are invalid. The principle that sovereign States are exempt from lawsuits by individuals is acknowledged but not analyzed in detail, as it is well-documented in public law literature. The State legislature is tasked with upholding justice and public obligations, with any deviation from this duty potentially incurring public reproach and harming the State. Ultimately, limiting legislative discretion in matters of State honor and safety could lead to greater issues than failing to meet public debts. The Circuit Court's judgment is affirmed.