A-Cal Copiers, Inc. v. North American Van Lines, Inc.

Citations: 180 F.R.D. 183; 50 Fed. R. Serv. 193; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20861; 1998 WL 484056Docket: Civ.A. No. 96-12496-JLA

Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; July 24, 1998; Federal District Court

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The court addressed multiple motions from the Plaintiff following a jury trial where the Defendant was found not liable for damages related to three used photocopiers. The Plaintiff's motions included a request for reconsideration of a contempt order against David Hvizda, a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and amendments to the judgment. The court noted that the Plaintiff's motions demonstrated misstatements of law and attempts to introduce previously excluded evidence. 

Regarding Hvizda, who was subpoenaed but only appeared on the first day of trial, the court had previously denied the contempt motion because the Plaintiff did not demonstrate new facts, law, or any prejudice resulting from Hvizda's absence. The court emphasized that Hvizda's testimony would only pertain to issues of damages and did not affect the jury’s verdict. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Additionally, the Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, as defined under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was also addressed, where the court can rule against a party if no sufficient evidence supports their case. Ultimately, the court indicated that the Plaintiff's motions were unlikely to succeed and highlighted the lack of merit in the claims presented.

The movant can renew its request for judgment as a matter of law within 10 days after judgment entry, as per Fed. R.Civ. P. 50. A court may grant this motion if no reasonable jury could rule for the non-movant. Conflicting evidence was presented at trial regarding whether the photocopiers were delivered in "good condition." Mitch Woodard indicated the machines could pass paper but acknowledged uncertainty about their mechanical state and noted damages documented on the bill of lading. He lacked information on maintenance history and testing prior to sale. Manuel Dias, the delivery driver, confirmed the machines were appropriately secured for transport. The Plaintiff attempted to shift the burden of proof regarding the machines' condition to the Defendant, asserting that the Defendant had a legal obligation to assess the machines' condition upon delivery. This assertion was deemed a misstatement of law concerning the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13501 and 14706. The Court reiterated that the Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, demonstrating that the goods were delivered in "good condition." Due to the evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the Plaintiff did not meet this burden, leading to the denial of the Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Plaintiff also sought a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, citing various reasons, including claims that the verdict was against the evidence weight, the judgment was improper, and trial unfairness due to court rulings or opposing counsel's actions. The decision to grant a new trial rests with the trial judge's discretion.

The standard of review for a motion for a new trial differs from that for a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court determined that the verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, thus rejecting the plaintiff's argument for a new trial. The plaintiff also argued that the opposing counsel's phrase “junk in, junk out” was prejudicial and confusing to the jury, as no expert testified that the photocopiers were "junk" at the point of origin. For a new trial to be warranted due to counsel misconduct, it must be shown that such misconduct influenced the verdict. The court found no misconduct in the use of the term "junk," emphasizing that aggressive advocacy does not constitute improper behavior. The jury was instructed that counsel statements are not evidence, undermining the plaintiff's claim of prejudice.

Additionally, the plaintiff sought a new trial based on various court rulings, including issues regarding jury instructions on the burden of proof, the inadmissibility of certain evidence, and the allowance of specific evidence introduced by the defendant. The court addressed each point: it reiterated that the defendant bore the burden of proving the photocopiers' good condition at origin warranted no further discussion; the refusal to admit trade publications and photographs was justified as these were hearsay and not admissible for the truth of the matter asserted. The court noted that the “Minella Copy Guide” specifically depicted new photocopiers, further reinforcing the hearsay argument against its admission.

The Court upheld the denial of the Plaintiff's request to submit trade publications and photographs of photocopiers taken shortly before trial. The Plaintiff had ample opportunity to photograph the machines during discovery, and the timing of the photographs—taken just a week before trial—was deemed problematic, as they might not accurately reflect the photocopiers' condition at delivery. The Court noted that even photographs taken immediately after delivery would not demonstrate their condition at the point of origin, and this alone would not justify a new trial.

Additionally, the Court ruled against admitting the MTI report signed by David Hvizda, emphasizing that without Mr. Hvizda's testimony, the report constituted an out-of-court statement inadmissible unless falling under a hearsay exception. The Plaintiff's argument invoking Rule 801(d)(2)(C) was rejected, as no evidence established an agency relationship with MTI or indicated that the Defendant controlled MTI’s investigation.

The Court also clarified the jury's discretion in determining damages, allowing them to award less than the $5.00 per pound stated value on the bill of lading if warranted by the evidence. Finally, the Court denied the Plaintiff's requests for juror transportation to inspect the photocopiers or to bring them into court, deeming these requests unnecessarily costly and burdensome.

Plaintiff's requests for juror inspection of photocopiers were deemed untimely and unnecessary, as the condition of the copiers at delivery would not establish their state upon arrival. The Court found no prejudice in jurors not viewing the copiers firsthand, leading to a conclusion that even an inspection would not support Plaintiff's prima facie case. The introduction of a photograph of the delivery truck during the trial was justified due to a discrepancy in witness testimonies regarding the truck's door, which became relevant as the trial progressed. Consequently, Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was denied.

Plaintiff sought a directed verdict for damages of $21,000, claiming each of the three photocopiers cost $7,000 to replace. The Court denied this motion, finding Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any grounds for altering the judgment, including changes in law, new evidence, legal error, or preventing injustice.

Defendant requested costs for depositions, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d), which allows costs to the prevailing party unless directed otherwise. However, Rule 54(d) is constrained by 28 U.S.C. 1920, which specifies allowable costs. The Court clarified that it cannot award costs beyond those defined in the statute, creating a strong presumption for granting cost requests unless the opposing party can show that the costs were unreasonable, unnecessary, or if misconduct or procedural defects occurred.

The court addresses costs related to the deposition of Mitch Woodard, determining that the parties had agreed to split expenses, including the $650.00 paid by the Defendant for Woodard’s travel. The Plaintiff argues against absorbing the full cost, citing shared savings from conducting the deposition in Boston instead of New York. However, due to the pre-existing agreement, the Defendant's motion for reimbursement is denied.

In the case of Richard Panning, the Plaintiff contends it should not bear costs because it stipulated to the information presented in Panning's testimony. However, the court finds that Panning’s testimony included more than just a recital of North American’s tariffs, thus allowing the Defendant's motion for $1,307.35 in costs associated with Panning’s testimony.

Regarding witness Manuel Dias, who testified over four days, the Plaintiff argues that only one day's presence was necessary for the Defendant, while the other three days were for the Plaintiff's needs. The court determines that Dias's testimony was indeed necessary, and while the Defendant's request for costs is within statutory limits, it should not receive double compensation. The Plaintiff must pay the Defendant for Dias's presence, minus any amounts already paid by the Plaintiff.

The court outlines allowed costs: $120.00 for Clerk fees, $132.50 for the court reporter for Woodard's deposition, and $1,307.35 for Panning's testimony, adjusted by any prior payments made by the Plaintiff. The court also addresses procedural issues regarding the testimony of Mr. Hvizda, indicating that he should not be penalized for the Plaintiff's counsel's failure to notify the court about his brief testimony. Woodard's testimony was read into the record, and the court finds no need to address additional aspects of the Plaintiff's case given the potential for a reasonable jury to favor the Defendant. Finally, the court deems the Defendant's motion to strike moot and confirms the taxable nature of deposition costs to the losing party.