Williams v. City of Dallas

Citations: 178 F.R.D. 103; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2583; 1998 WL 97816Docket: No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-0296D

Court: District Court, N.D. Texas; March 4, 1998; Federal District Court

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The court is addressing motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum filed by two attorneys from previous related litigation involving plaintiff Erik Williams. The core issue is whether compliance with the subpoenas would impose an undue burden on the attorneys under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(A)(iv). The court finds that while the subpoenas are overbroad, they can be modified for enforcement. Williams, a lineman for the Dallas Cowboys, has brought claims against the City of Dallas and various police officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as state-law claims. These claims stem from allegations made by Nina Shahravan, who accused Williams and another man of raping her in his home while Dallas Cowboys teammate Michael Irvin allegedly threatened her with a gun and recorded the incident. The court outlines that Shahravan had prior social ties with Cowboys players and had attempted to leverage her relationships for sensational stories with reporter Martin Griffin. In November 1996, Shahravan and Griffin approached police with allegations against Cowboys players, but law enforcement dismissed her credibility. Following a series of events, including Shahravan's plan to falsely implicate Irvin in a drug scheme, she later contacted Williams, leading to a consensual sexual encounter at his home on December 29, 1996, involving no threats or drugs, and with Irvin absent from the situation.

On December 30, 1996, Shahravan contacted Williams under the pretense of requesting playoff tickets, intending to document that he called her the day after she alleged he assaulted her. She later conferred with Griffin about her claims that Williams had raped her while Irvin videotaped the incident and threatened her with a gun. Griffin either recognized the allegations as false or acted with negligence, and both approached the Dallas Police Department (DPD) to report these claims. Detective Sanders, upon meeting Shahravan, noted her lack of distress and absence of evidence supporting her allegations, yet advised her to seek examination at Parkland Memorial Hospital, which she declined, citing an inability to find it—though her true concern was the absence of physical evidence.

Shahravan later met with Sgt. Salverino from the DPD’s Sexual Assault Unit, to whom she reiterated her allegations, falsely claiming Williams had violently assaulted her. An examination at Parkland revealed only minor bruises, inconsistent with a violent sexual assault, suggesting consensual intercourse instead. Despite this, Sgt. Salverino executed an affidavit for a search warrant, mischaracterizing the examination results and omitting critical information regarding Shahravan’s credibility. The warrant was issued early on December 31, 1996, leading to a police search of Williams’ home, during which items including a video showing consensual sex were seized.

Following the search, DPD officials, including Chief Click and Sgt. Salverino, breached departmental policy by publicly identifying Williams and Irvin as suspects in the alleged rape. Lt. Goelden further made unfounded claims regarding the likelihood of charges and the existence of videotaped evidence of the assault.

Defendants quickly became aware that evidence contradicted Shahravan’s allegations following a press conference. A videotape showed consensual sex and indicated that Irvin was not present, nor were drugs used. Despite this, Sgt. Chandler misled the media, claiming there was no reason to doubt Shahravan's credibility. One defendant inaccurately stated that Irvin's voice was on the videotape. On January 10, 1997, the DPD announced that Williams and Irvin were cleared and that Shahravan had recanted, leading to Shahravan being charged with making a false report, a Class B misdemeanor in Texas. The DPD has not returned the videotape to Williams, and it has been circulated within the department for non-investigatory entertainment purposes.

Around the same time Williams filed a lawsuit, he also sued Griffin and Lin Television for related matters in Texas state court, which settled in August 1997. Subsequently, Williams served Babcock and Carter with subpoenas for documents related to the case, focusing on three categories: documents about Williams, Irvin, and Shahravan; documents Lin provided to the Dallas County District Attorneys’ office; and documents received from the District Attorneys’ office. Babcock and Carter moved to quash the subpoenas, citing attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, and the journalist’s privilege. They argued that the requests were overly broad and burdensome. They claimed that Lin had already provided all documents responsive to the second category and that there were no documents for the third category. Williams has since limited his request to the first category.

Babcock and Carter argue that the subpoenas issued to them are overly broad and burdensome. They claim Williams has not specified any documents to be produced, and the requests lack limitations in time or topic related to the litigation. Additionally, they point out that the term 'document' is not clearly defined, potentially encompassing irrelevant information about Williams, Irvin, or Shahravan. Babcock and Carter assert that they hold extensive materials that fall under the subpoenas, and compliance would be costly and time-consuming due to the need to assess each document for privilege and relevance. They also note that many required documents have already been provided to Williams and can be sourced from other parties.

In their reply, Babcock and Carter emphasize their entitlement to protection due to their role as opposing counsel in a related state court case. Williams defends the relevance of the first category of the subpoenas, asserting it pertains directly to allegations made by Shahravan that are central to his claims against KXAS and Griffin. He argues that Babcock and Carter have not demonstrated that compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive, contending that any burden is outweighed by the necessity for discovery.

Under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iv), the court must quash or modify subpoenas causing undue burden upon timely motion, with the burden of proof resting on the movant to show that compliance is unreasonable. The court evaluates the reasonableness of a subpoena based on factors such as relevance, necessity, breadth, and specificity. A subpoena may be deemed facially overbroad, as is the case with category 1, which demands all documents relating to Williams, Irvin, and Shahravan without reasonable temporal or descriptive limits. This could compel the production of irrelevant materials, akin to an attempt to gather all conceivable documents related to the case.

Williams proposes to modify category 1 to focus specifically on documents associated with Shahravan's allegations that instigated the current litigation and his lawsuit against Griffin and Lin, thereby narrowing the request in both scope and temporal reach.

Allegations state that Williams and an unnamed male raped Shahravan in Williams' home, while Irvin threatened her with a gun and videotaped the assault, occurring around December 29, 1996, and concluding no later than January 10, 1997, when the DPD cleared Williams and Irvin after Shahravan recanted. Williams claims violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and asserts Texas law claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, conversion, and trespass. Key components of his case involve the defendants' alleged role in Shahravan's false claims, dissemination of false information to the media, possession of a videotape showing consensual activity, and the allegedly unreasonable investigation conducted by the defendants. Babcock and Carter argue that Williams can obtain relevant materials from other sources, which was partially valid due to the initially broad request. However, the modified request is deemed critical for Williams to confirm whether Babcock and Carter possess materials that should have remained private or were improperly disclosed. The individual defendants have claimed qualified immunity, leading to a stay of discovery and limited scope for evidence from them unless Williams overcomes this defense. Additionally, some of Williams' claims rely on the assertion that the defendants knew or should have known Shahravan was lying. Babcock and Carter argue for protection against undue burden as nonparties and counsel for defendants in related litigation, but the court finds the harassment argument against opposing counsel unconvincing, as the cited cases involve depositions of opposing party counsel.

Babcock and Carter, opposing counsel in Williams’ lawsuit against Griffin and Lin, have not proven that Williams’ request for documents is harassing in nature. Williams did not lose the case but settled, indicating his pursuit of relevant evidence to support his current claims. Although Babcock and Carter are nonparties, which the court considers when deciding on the subpoenas, this status does not solely constitute undue burden. They argue that compliance would necessitate reviewing thousands of documents and incurring approximately $9,000 in attorney fees. However, the court asserts it can provide relief to mitigate these expenses, as outlined in Rule 45, which includes protections against undue burden and expense for nonparties. Rule 45(c)(1) allows for sanctions against parties breaching obligations to avoid undue burden, while Rule 45(c)(2)(B) mandates protection from significant expenses incurred due to subpoenas. Nonetheless, these protections are not applicable here, as Williams has not filed a motion to compel and the relevant provisions do not cover discovery subpoenas. The court retains discretionary authority to condition subpoena enforcement on the serving party covering production costs, a power it retains even post-1991 amendments. Babcock and Carter also claim the subpoenas are overly broad due to the undefined term 'document,' suggesting it may encompass irrelevant information related to Williams and others, which complicates the assessment of relevance.

The term 'document' is not explicitly defined in the subpoenas but gains meaning through Rules 45 and 34, which govern subpoenas and document production, respectively. Rule 45(c)(2)(A) suggests that 'documents' may encompass more than traditional forms like books and papers, while Rule 34(a) indicates that they include various forms of data such as writings, drawings, and photographs. The court finds the subpoenas valid despite lacking a specific definition of 'documents.' Babcock and Carter's claim of overbreadth has been resolved, as the modified subpoena does not impose an undue burden on them. The court next considers whether the subpoenas should be quashed due to claims of attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and Texas journalist’s privilege. Williams argues that Babcock and Carter failed to comply with Rule 45(d)(2), which requires a clear claim of privilege with a description of withheld documents to allow for contestation. The court notes that Babcock and Carter's failure to comply with this rule does not constitute a waiver of their protections, as Williams' subpoenas were overly broad, relieving them of the obligation to object to potentially expansive protected materials. The court will not assess the merits of the privilege claims or the crime-fraud exception until Rule 45(d)(2) procedures are followed, avoiding hypothetical determinations about documents needing in-camera review.

Babcock and Carter's requests to quash their depositions are denied by the court, which finds that a mere assertion of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product is insufficient to deny Williams his right to evidence. The court emphasizes that privilege claims must be established on a document-by-document basis. While the motions to quash are denied in full, the court will modify subpoenas as necessary. The stay from the prior order is lifted, and Chief Click is identified by his true name. Irvin’s separate case against the City of Dallas is noted as pending. The defendants deny liability for Williams' claims. The court applies the relevance standard from Rule 26(b)(1) to evaluate the motions to quash, considering factors from previous case law regarding undue burden under Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iv). The court states that undue burden claims are fact-specific and emphasizes the need for a balance between the right to discovery and protection from unwarranted intrusions. The court criticizes Babcock and Carter for not seeking clarification on the subpoenas and reaffirms the obligation of attorneys to adhere to established standards of litigation conduct.

Counsel for Williams and for Babcock and Carter should have engaged in discussions to limit the scope of the subpoena, as suggested by Dondi standards. Previous cases, such as **In re Exxon Valdez** and **Shelton v. American Motors Corp.**, illustrate the importance of negotiations regarding subpoenas and depositions involving opposing counsel. A prior court order from December 11, 1997, denied a request to depose Williams’ counsel, which differs from the current context as it involved opposing counsel from the same case. Babcock's affidavit claimed undue burden in responding to the subpoenas but demonstrated a clear understanding of the term "documents" within legal usage, aligning with Rule 45(c)(2)(A). This rule specifies that a person commanded to produce documents does not need to appear in person unless required for deposition, hearing, or trial. Additionally, Rule 34 allows a party to request the production of documents relevant to disputed facts. The clarity of the term "documents" is essential for the self-executing nature of the rules. Babcock and Carter raised objections regarding the production of materials under attorney-client and journalist's privilege but failed to provide the necessary supporting descriptions as mandated by Rule 45(d)(2).