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Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, Inc.
Citations: 155 F.R.D. 612; 3 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 515; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1760; 1994 WL 237021Docket: No. 93 C 7315
Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; February 14, 1994; Federal District Court
John Flasza has filed a lawsuit against TNT Holland Motor Express, Ltd. for handicap discrimination and retaliatory discharge under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Illinois law. He claims he was hired as a dock worker on July 17, 1992, but was terminated a month later, allegedly due to his perceived handicap and in retaliation for prior workers' compensation claims. Flasza asserts that his previous injuries do not hinder his job performance and that he received positive feedback from supervisors. TNT Holland has responded to the complaint with nine affirmative defenses, of which Flasza seeks to strike eight. The legal standards for affirmative defenses require them to provide a "short and plain statement" of the defense, as outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). Defenses that are vague or merely conclusory can be stricken. The first affirmative defense from TNT Holland argues that Flasza fails to state a claim. The court finds this defense inadequate, as it does not specify any deficiencies in Flasza's complaint and thus must be struck. The second affirmative defense claims that Flasza's ADA claim is barred by the statute of limitations, acknowledging that Flasza filed with the EEOC 276 days after his discharge. TNT Holland's assertion that the EEOC mishandled the claim introduces disputed factual issues, leading the court to determine that this defense should not be struck. TNT Holland asserts several affirmative defenses against Flasza's claims. The third defense contends that Flasza's claims are barred due to deceptive statements made in his employment application, allowing for a 'resume fraud' defense under Title VII, which, if proven, could defeat his ADA claim. The fourth defense argues that Flasza is unqualified for his position, a disputed fact that also survives a motion to strike. The fifth defense, claiming Flasza is not entitled to damages under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, is acknowledged as an unsupported legal conclusion and must be stricken. The seventh defense states that Flasza was a casual employee without rights to continued employment, which involves disputed factual matters and thus remains intact. The eighth defense, asserting Flasza was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time, is deemed an unsupported legal conclusion and stricken. The ninth defense claims Flasza was less qualified than other applicants, another disputed factual matter that is not stricken. Consequently, Flasza's motion to strike certain defenses is partially granted, resulting in the striking of affirmative defenses 1, 5, and 8.