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Brooks v. Baker Packers Completion Systems
Citations: 142 F.R.D. 340; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8098; 1992 WL 114786Docket: Civ. A. No. 88-1090-T
Court: District Court, D. Kansas; May 20, 1992; Federal District Court
The plaintiff filed a motion for relief from two orders issued by Magistrate Judge Reid, which imposed sanctions on plaintiff’s counsel, Tom L. Schwinn, due to his failure to timely complete the pretrial order. The plaintiff invoked K.S.A. 60-260(b)(1) and (6) for relief; however, this state rule is not applicable in federal court. Instead, relief from a magistrate’s order should be sought through a motion for review under Fed. R.Civ. P. 72(a) and D.Kan. R. 604(a). The court recharacterized the motion accordingly. The standard for reviewing magistrate orders on nondispositive pretrial matters is the 'clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard, affirming the magistrate's decision unless there is a firm conviction of error. The magistrate had broad discretion, which can only be overturned if clearly abused. In the March 2, 1992 order, the magistrate granted sanctions to defendant Rupe Energy, Inc. due to Schwinn’s non-responsiveness to their motion, treating it as uncontested. The magistrate noted that delays in completing the pretrial order were initially due to formatting issues and subsequent inaction by Schwinn, who provided no justification for his failure to complete the order. Consequently, the magistrate determined that expenses incurred from the delay warranted sanctions under Fed. R.Civ. P. 16(f), limited to those after June 28, 1991, when the revised pretrial order was sent to Schwinn. An affidavit of expenses amounting to $1,236.67 was filed by Rupe Energy's counsel, which Schwinn did not contest. The April 17, 1992 order confirmed the reasonableness of these expenses and mandated that Schwinn pay the sanction to opposing counsel by May 11, 1992, while also requiring a certification of payment. Plaintiff's motion for relief from the magistrate’s order is denied. The magistrate imposed sanctions only for delays after June 28, 1991, attributing earlier delays to both plaintiff’s counsel, Schwinn, and other counsel. While the court acknowledges Schwinn’s difficulties with office staff, these do not excuse his failure to timely complete the pretrial order. Schwinn's claims about defendant Rupe Energy's late arrivals at depositions and difficulties with former plaintiff Julie Ann Brooks-Mays were not presented to the magistrate and therefore cannot be used as justifications now. Additionally, Schwinn's suggestion for joint and several liability for sanctions with the plaintiffs lacks merit, as there is no evidence of sanctionable conduct by the individual plaintiffs. Plaintiff's counsel did not respond to the defendant’s motion for sanctions, which the magistrate granted as uncontested, nor did he contest the affidavit detailing attorney fees and expenses. As a result, Schwinn has waived his opportunity to contest the sanctions. The court finds no clear error or legal contradiction in the magistrate’s decision to impose sanctions. Consequently, the plaintiff's motion for relief is denied.