Katz v. Molic

Citations: 128 F.R.D. 35; 1989 WL 119264Docket: No. 83 Civ. 2943 (WCC)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; October 6, 1989; Federal District Court

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William Katz filed a pro se civil rights action against multiple defendants, claiming they conspired to violate his constitutional rights. The court previously required Katz to provide a more detailed factual basis for his complaint and later granted summary judgment to some defendants while denying a motion to dismiss from others, including New York's Attorney General and his assistants. The case has since been referred to Magistrate Nina Gershon for further pretrial proceedings. 

Currently, the court is addressing Katz's objections to Magistrate Gershon's Report and Recommendation, which dismissed his claim for failure to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gershon treated the defendants' summary judgment motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of a valid claim. Katz disputes the authority granted to Gershon regarding her ability to rule on dispositive motions, arguing that her referral was limited to discovery matters. The court is now requiring Katz to demonstrate why the case should not be dismissed due to failure to state a claim. 

The court's review process is outlined, emphasizing that it has the authority to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate's findings and that it can base its decision solely on the existing record without necessitating a new evidentiary hearing. The judge has reviewed all relevant documents, including Katz's objections and the defendants' response.

Plaintiff contests the Magistrate’s decision to convert a summary judgment motion into a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting that this conversion occurred without notice. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Magistrate lacked the authority to consider a Rule 12(b)(6) motion after two prior motions of the same nature had already been disposed of. The plaintiff also claims error in the denial of a request for further discovery to counter the defendants’ summary judgment motion. Despite these objections, the plaintiff fails to provide specific substantive challenges to the conclusions in the Magistrate’s Report, allowing the Court to accept the recommendations unless they are 'erroneous on the face of the record.' The report correctly applies the legal standards for dismissing a pro se complaint under § 1983 and assesses the relevant facts against legal theories, concluding that it is not 'clearly erroneous on its face.' However, the Court acknowledges a procedural flaw in how the Report was issued. Consequently, the Court instructs the plaintiff to justify why the case should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Court finds that the conversion from a Rule 56 summary judgment motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and supported by Second Circuit precedent, which allows for such treatment where appropriate.

The Magistrate has the authority to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim when faced with a motion for summary judgment. While circuit courts have not clarified the necessity of providing notice to parties in such dismissals, the plaintiff in this case claims prejudice due to a lack of notice regarding the conversion of the summary judgment motion into a motion to dismiss. The Court finds that, typically, parties should receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before a decision is rendered that affects them. However, in this scenario, the conversion of a summary judgment motion into a motion to dismiss—particularly when based solely on pleadings—is equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, where the court does not consider external evidence.

Rule 12(b) explicitly requires notice when converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion but is silent on the reverse situation, as seen here. The notice requirement is intended to allow parties to submit relevant outside materials for consideration in summary judgment contexts, but this rationale does not apply when external submissions are not appropriate. The standard for evaluating a pro se plaintiff's complaint involves accepting allegations as true and applying a less stringent standard, ultimately determining if the plaintiff can prove any set of facts that warrants relief. Thus, the Court concludes that treating a summary judgment motion as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim does not necessitate notice to the parties.

Referral of a summary judgment motion under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) permits Magistrates to oversee pretrial matters if designated by a district judge. In this case, the district judge referred the civil action to Magistrate Nina Gershon for pretrial supervision. The plaintiff contends that this referral did not grant the Magistrate authority to rule on dispositive motions, such as summary judgment, without an additional court order explicitly allowing such actions. The plaintiff asserts that a general pretrial order is insufficient for a Magistrate to decide dispositive motions. Local Rule 13 clarifies that unless specifically stated otherwise, a referral for general pretrial supervision does not include jurisdiction over dispositive motions. Consequently, a specific referral is necessary for Magistrate Gershon to rule on the defendants' summary judgment motion, and it was technically inappropriate for her to make such a ruling without the Court’s explicit authorization. Despite this procedural misstep, the substance of her decision appears correct. The plaintiff is ordered to show cause why the Court should not dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, with deadlines for submissions set for October 27, November 10, and November 24, 1989. The plaintiff's main objection pertains to the Magistrate's handling of the summary judgment motion rather than the motion to dismiss.