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Noga v. American Motors Corp.

Citations: 115 F.R.D. 211; 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2412; 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1307Docket: No. MISC. 1272

Court: District Court, D. Arizona; March 24, 1987; Federal District Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the court deliberated whether Richard G. Snyder, a retired safety researcher, could be compelled to testify in a lawsuit filed by J. Russell Noga against American Motors Corporation (AMC) concerning a Jeep accident. AMC sought extensive documentation and testimony from Snyder, whose research had previously been utilized in litigation against AMC. Snyder contested the subpoena, claiming it was burdensome and that his research data was privileged. The court ruled that while it could compel testimony about relevant facts, it could not mandate Snyder to form new opinions or provide prior opinions without specific conditions being met. Furthermore, the court found no general academic privilege under federal law that would protect Snyder's research data. The court quashed the subpoena, emphasizing the burdensome nature of AMC's discovery efforts and highlighting the absence of adequate protections for researchers classified as regular witnesses rather than experts. This decision underscored the challenges faced by researchers in legal proceedings and the need for potential legislative action to clarify the scope of discovery for involuntary expert witnesses. The ruling ultimately protected Snyder from being compelled to testify under the existing legal framework.

Legal Issues Addressed

Burdensomeness of Subpoenas

Application: The court found that subpoenas could be quashed if they were excessively burdensome, and this principle played a significant role in quashing AMC's subpoena against Snyder.

Reasoning: The discussion highlights that burdensomeness is a key factor in quashing subpoenas, while Snyder's claims of privilege lack legal support, aligning with previous rulings that no federal common law privilege protects expert witnesses.

Classification of Involuntary Expert Witnesses

Application: Snyder was classified as a regular witness rather than an expert, affecting his entitlement to compensation and legal protections typically afforded to expert witnesses.

Reasoning: Instead, Snyder is categorized as a regular witness rather than an expert, limiting his legal grounds for demanding payment for his testimony.

Compelling Testimony from Experts

Application: The court determined that although it can compel an expert to provide relevant factual testimony, it cannot compel them to form new opinions or provide previously formed opinions unless they have testified before and no other qualified experts are available.

Reasoning: The court clarifies that while it can compel testimony from an expert regarding relevant facts, it cannot require the expert to form new opinions. Additionally, previously formed opinions can be compelled only if the expert has testified before and no similarly qualified experts are available.

Discovery Process and Researcher Protections

Application: The court highlighted the need for legal and research communities to reassess protections for researchers to prevent potential harassment in the discovery process.

Reasoning: The excerpt emphasizes the importance of protecting researchers from indirect harassment related to their work, particularly when confidentiality promises are made to study participants.

Lack of General Academic Privilege

Application: The court confirmed that no general academic privilege exists under federal law that would prevent Snyder's research data from being discoverable.

Reasoning: The court emphasized that evidence is only protected by specific privileges, and no general academic privilege exists for Snyder's information.