Massachusetts Ass'n of Afro-American Police v. Boston Police Department

Citations: 106 F.R.D. 80; 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1569; 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1572; 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19459; 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,204Docket: Civ. A. No. 78-529-Mc

Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; May 28, 1985; Federal District Court

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Applicants for intervention have filed a motion to join as defendants, seeking to vacate a consent decree approved on September 16, 1980, and to be promoted to sergeant in the Boston Police Department. This motion is opposed by both the plaintiffs, Massachusetts Association of Afro-American Police, Inc., and the defendants, Boston Police Department, who have requested a five-year extension of the consent decree. Additionally, the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association and the Boston Police Detectives Benevolent Society have filed their own motions to intervene, opposing the extension. The original lawsuit, initiated by the plaintiffs in 1978, alleged employment discrimination by the Boston Police Department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. After extensive negotiations, a consent decree was established, which included validated promotional procedures, an affirmative action plan, and specific promotion goals for black officers. The decree prohibited the use of unvalidated promotional tests and mandated training opportunities for all eligible applicants. It was set to terminate five years after its entry unless extended due to unachieved objectives. The recent Supreme Court ruling in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts prompted the applicants to seek intervention on July 25, 1984.

Stotts is interpreted as limiting a trial court's remedial authority under Title VII to actual victims of discrimination, indicating the court lacked jurisdiction to adopt a Consent Decree without evidence of victimization. However, this interpretation is deemed overly broad. The Stotts case specifically addressed whether a city could be enjoined from using its seniority system for layoffs when a consent decree had only covered hiring and promotions. The Supreme Court ruled against such an injunction, reaffirming that courts can only award competitive seniority to individuals who have suffered illegal discrimination. This ruling cannot be generalized beyond its specific context.

Judge Mazzone's analysis in Deveraux v. Geary highlights that Stotts did not intend to invalidate all affirmative action programs in the absence of proven discrimination. The Stotts court implied that the remedies provided by the decree were valid and consistent with Title VII, despite the invalidity of subsequent layoffs affecting white employees. In the current case, the absence of layoffs violating a bona fide seniority system renders Stotts inapplicable. 

The applicants for intervention claim a vested interest in seniority and promotions, but mere hopes of promotion do not establish seniority rights. The consent decree aims to eliminate discrimination in police officer promotions without impacting existing seniority rights. Consequently, there is no basis for intervention, and the motion for intervention is denied. Both parties have also submitted a motion to modify and continue the consent decree per its provisions.

Paragraph 13 of the consent decree established on September 16, 1980, stipulates that the decree will terminate five years post-entrance unless a party moves for its continuation, claiming the objectives have not been fully met. The Court deems it premature to assess the achievement of these objectives four months prior to the scheduled termination and therefore will not grant or deny the parties' motion at this time, allowing for potential renewal of motions later. Relevant case law includes Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, which supports this position. Additionally, Stotts does not impact voluntary affirmative action plans in consent decrees, as clarified by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 28, which distinguishes its context from Stotts by emphasizing that Stotts addressed only "make whole" relief, not prospective relief. Other cases such as Aken v. Young and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education reinforce that Stotts did not overrule the support for voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans.