Sugarhill Records Ltd. v. Motown Record Corp.

Citations: 105 F.R.D. 166; 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 717Docket: No. 83 Civ. 6176 (SWK)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; March 18, 1985; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Three motions are currently pending before the court in the case concerning the album "Cold Blooded." The first motion, filed by Motown Record Corporation, seeks to vacate a Notice of Deposition for employee Brenda Boyce and requests a protective order to have any depositions taken in California. The second motion, by the plaintiff Sugar Hill Records, aims to compel defendant Rick James to attend his deposition. In response, James has filed a motion to delay the deposition and have it conducted in Buffalo.

The case itself involves allegations stemming from the production of "Cold Blooded," for which Rick James wrote lyrics for nine songs and performed all of them. Notably, the album features guest appearances from Smokey Robinson, Billy Dee Williams, and members of the group Grand Master Flash and the Furious Five. In 1980, these performers entered an exclusive recording agreement with Sugarhill, which claims the defendants' actions constitute tortious interference with this contract and misappropriation of rights. Additionally, Sugarhill alleges violations under the Lanham Act due to misleading credits on the album packaging, which incorrectly attribute performances to "Grand Master Flash," a name Sugarhill asserts refers to only one artist, Joseph Saddler, who did not perform on the album. These claims are contested by the defendants.

Motown asserts that Brenda Boyce, its Director of Creative Administration, obtained telephonic consent from Sugarhill employee Diane Moore for the use of certain performances. Sugarhill sought a preliminary injunction to stop the album's sale featuring "Grand Master Flash," but Motown agreed to remove references to both the artist and Sugarhill for future pressings. The court denied Sugarhill's motion, finding insufficient evidence of irreparable harm, and directed both parties to proceed with expedited discovery. In response, Sugarhill served discovery requests, including a Notice of Deposition for Boyce and Rick James, which has led to a suspension of discovery proceedings.

Motown has moved to vacate the Notice of Deposition for Boyce, arguing she is not an officer, director, or managing agent, thus not eligible for deposition as designated. Sugarhill contends that allowing the deposition would serve judicial economy and maintains that Boyce possesses the necessary capacity to represent Motown in this matter. The procedural framework for corporate depositions under Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is outlined, specifying the requirements for designating deponents and the implications of failing to designate someone with appropriate authority.

Motown submitted an affidavit from counsel, describing Boyce simply as "an employee," without detailing her role or position within the company. The argument presented claims that Motown can designate anyone for deposition unless specified as an officer or director, overlooking Boyce's potential status as a "managing agent." It is established that Boyce is neither an officer nor a director; thus, it must be determined if she qualifies as a managing agent based on several factors: 1) her ability to exercise judgment in corporate matters, 2) reliability in providing testimony for the corporation, 3) the existence of individuals in higher authority, 4) her general responsibilities related to the litigation, and 5) her alignment with corporate interests. The burden of proof lies with Sugarhill. Although Sugarhill did not provide evidence regarding Boyce's role, her affidavit indicates she is the Director of Creative Administration, responsible for obtaining necessary consents, including those implicated in the current case. She engaged with Sugarhill to secure these consents and acted under the assumption that oral consents would suffice. Despite not receiving written consents, she proceeded with the album's sale based on her expectations. Boyce's affidavit suggests she identifies with Motown's interests, is the sole knowledgeable employee about the consents in question, possesses authority to act on behalf of Motown, and can reliably testify for the corporation.

Motown has relied on Boyce to testify on its behalf, as shown by its request for her affidavit in opposition to Sugarhill’s preliminary injunction motion. The determination of whether Boyce qualifies as a “managing agent” remains unresolved, and while doubts exist regarding her status, these should be settled in favor of Sugarhill at this stage to allow discovery to proceed. Therefore, Sugarhill has met its burden of proof, albeit narrowly. Motown may present another knowledgeable individual if it chooses.

Motown seeks to conduct depositions in California, citing the general rule that corporate defendants are deposed at their principal place of business. However, exceptions exist, allowing depositions to occur elsewhere for convenience and judicial economy. The discretion to determine the deposition location lies with the court, which finds it appropriate for the deposition to take place in New York. Motown, being a large corporation, cannot credibly claim significant hardship from travel for a deposition in New York, nor can it argue that the absence of Boyce or another witness would cause substantial disruption.

Additionally, the court does not find Sugarhill’s document request to be burdensome, as there is no evidence to suggest the requested records are excessive. Motown's New York counsel can review documents in New York, making it unnecessary to hold the deposition in California. Overall, conducting the deposition in New York is deemed more convenient and efficient, particularly given the presence of multiple attorneys from New York.

Motown has the option to produce its witness in New York or cover the airfare and hotel expenses for Sugarhill's counsel if the deposition occurs in California. Judge Harlan may order the deposition at a distant location under terms that reflect reasonable expenses in taxable costs. According to Local Rule 15, if depositions exceed 100 miles from the courthouse, the requesting party may need to pay for one counsel's attendance for each opposing party. If Sugarhill wishes to depose additional Motown witnesses, it must bear the reasonable costs of bringing those witnesses to New York.

The parties are required to agree on a time and place for the deposition of Boyce, to occur within thirty days. Regarding Rick James, Sugarhill initially scheduled his deposition at the courthouse but later consented to delay it due to his tour. James opposed rescheduling until after his tour and filed a cross-motion for a protective order to move the deposition to Buffalo. Since the tour is complete, the aspect of his motion to delay is moot, and his request to hold the deposition in Buffalo is denied. The Court finds New York to be as convenient as Buffalo and will not change the deposition's location, granting Sugarhill's motion to compel James's deposition, which must occur within thirty days.

Motown's motion to vacate is granted in part, allowing them to designate another employee to testify regarding consents but denied in all other aspects. James's protective order motion is denied. The Court clarifies that the deposition notice for Brenda Boyce was intended to represent discovery for Motown, not for her individually, and acknowledges her capacity to testify on behalf of Motown regarding relevant agreements. The location of the attorneys is also deemed a relevant consideration.