State v. Rademaker

Citations: 2012 S.D. 28; 813 N.W.2d 174; 2012 SD 28; 2012 S.D. LEXIS 28; 2012 WL 1356687Docket: 26095

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court; April 18, 2012; South Dakota; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ryan Rademaker appeals his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), contending that the Fourth Amendment required suppression of evidence obtained from the stop of his vehicle. The case arises from an incident at approximately 1 a.m. on a Sunday when Rademaker drove a friend home and encountered a sobriety checkpoint set up by law enforcement. Signs indicating the checkpoint were placed 100 yards away, but Rademaker turned onto a gravel road, which he claimed was his usual route and not an effort to avoid the checkpoint.

After observing Rademaker's actions, a police officer was instructed to stop him to investigate the avoidance of the checkpoint. Although the officer noted that Rademaker made a wide turn and drove potentially at excessive speeds, the trial court deemed that these observations could not justify the stop, as the officer did not witness the speeding until after activating his patrol lights. The officer ultimately stopped Rademaker, detected signs of intoxication, and confirmed Rademaker's admission of drinking, with subsequent breath tests revealing blood alcohol levels of .185 and .182.

Rademaker moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, arguing it violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied this motion, leading to Rademaker’s conviction, which he now appeals.

The Court reviews a denial of a motion to suppress evidence using a settled standard: legal questions are reviewed de novo while factual findings are subject to a clearly erroneous standard. In this case, Rademaker does not contest the trial court's factual findings, leading to a de novo review of the legal issues. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, which applies to vehicle stops by law enforcement. Generally, police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to search or seize property; however, an exception allows stops based on "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity.

The central issue is whether there was reasonable suspicion for stopping Rademaker's car without a warrant. The Court references State v. Thill, where the defendant's avoidance of a sobriety checkpoint created reasonable suspicion. Rademaker cites Eighth Circuit cases indicating that merely exiting a highway upon seeing a checkpoint sign does not provide sufficient reasonable suspicion, despite being suspicious. The Court agrees, stating that avoidance alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion but acknowledges that additional facts must be assessed to determine if reasonable suspicion exists in Rademaker's case.

Rademaker contends that the sole observable conduct leading to his vehicle's stop was his braking and turning onto a public road. However, the determination of reasonable suspicion is based on the circumstances at the time the stop was executed, not when the decision to stop was made. Reasonable suspicion is assessed through an objective standard, considering all facts available to the officer during the stop. 

The trial court identified several suspicious factors: Rademaker's avoidance of a checkpoint, the late hour (1 a.m.), and his unusually wide turn, which, while legal, raised concerns. Both this Court and the Eighth Circuit have noted that the time of day can contribute to reasonable suspicion. Additionally, the officer observed Rademaker driving at excessive speed for the conditions, which, although noted after the lights were activated, is relevant to the overall assessment.

In light of these factors—checkpoint avoidance, the late hour, the wide turn, and excessive speed—an officer of reasonable caution could suspect potential intoxication or criminal behavior. Therefore, while the avoidance of the checkpoint alone did not suffice for reasonable suspicion, the totality of circumstances justified the investigatory stop. Consequently, the stop was deemed lawful under the Fourth Amendment, affirming the trial court's decision. Chief Justice Gilbertson and Justices Konenkamp, Zinter, and Severson concurred.