Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n

Citations: 998 F.2d 1559; 1993 WL 264867Docket: No. 92-6104

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; July 19, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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David Anthony Doyle appeals the dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Oklahoma Bar Association and several of its officials, following dissatisfaction with how they addressed a grievance he filed against his ex-wife’s attorney. Doyle's claims are rooted in his belief that he has constitutional rights to have grievances investigated, to ensure a meaningful process for maintaining respectability in the legal profession, and to ensure compliance with the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s disciplinary rules. The district court dismissed his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), determining he failed to identify a constitutionally protected right.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court holds exclusive jurisdiction over lawyer licensing and disciplinary matters, having established rules that govern grievance processes through the Bar's General Counsel and the Professional Responsibility Commission (PRC). The PRC can file formal complaints against lawyers, but hearings conducted by a Tribunal are advisory only and do not impose discipline; only the Supreme Court has the authority to take disciplinary action. Doyle’s complaint focuses on the Bar’s handling of his grievance, which he submitted after a custody ruling in his favor was adversely affected by alleged perjury from his ex-wife's lawyer. While Doyle attached some communications related to his grievance, he omitted key documents, including the initial grievance itself.

When a written grievance is filed against a lawyer, the General Counsel of the Bar has the authority to either notify the filer and the lawyer of inadequate allegations or to serve the grievance to the lawyer after a preliminary investigation. In the case of Doyle’s complaint, the Assistant General Counsel communicated that the grievance did not constitute a legal ethics violation under the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. Doyle expressed dissatisfaction with this determination through two letters, prompting the General Counsel to promise a follow-up, which did not occur. Consequently, in August 1990, Doyle filed a grievance against the General Counsel for mishandling his initial grievance. This grievance referenced Rule 3.2(b), which mandates the General Counsel to investigate claims of lawyer misconduct. After not receiving a response from the Professional Responsibility Commission (PRC), Doyle contacted the Vice Chief Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, who informed him that direct correspondence on such matters was not permitted and provided additional explanatory materials.

Counsel informed Justice Opala about the status of Dr. David Doyle's grievance via a letter, detailing prior communications with Doyle, including a follow-up facsimile transmission that did not alter their position. Doyle subsequently amended his grievance against the General Counsel, claiming that the report to the Vice Chief Justice breached Rule 3.3, which mandates immediate notification of the Commission and disqualification of the General Counsel from the investigation upon receiving a grievance. Following this, the Executive Director of the Bar and Paul M. Vassar, a member of the Professional Responsibility Commission (PRC), confirmed that the General Counsel had disqualified himself, with Vassar appointed to handle the investigation. Vassar communicated to Doyle that he would conduct an investigation as warranted and requested that Doyle refrain from further contact unless initiated by him. Vassar expressed that Doyle's subsequent communication was perceived as an attempt to interfere with the investigation, which he deemed unacceptable for a Bar member.

Doyle's complaint alleges that Vassar's appointment infringed upon his constitutional rights, as Vassar had previously reviewed Doyle's grievances and determined no further investigation was warranted. Doyle claims he was wrongfully denied access to Vassar and argues Vassar's correspondence exhibited bias against non-American members of the public, undermining the fairness and procedural safeguards of the investigatory process. The complaint further states that these actions violated rights granted by the Oklahoma Bar Association's Rules. Additionally, Doyle accuses the Executive Director of the Bar and members of the PRC of failing to supervise the General Counsel adequately, which led to insufficient investigation of his grievance and delayed actions regarding the lawyer he complained about. Doyle contends these violations caused him significant damages, including unsuccessful state court litigation, anxiety over his grievances, lost business time, and incurred legal expenses. He seeks $4 million in damages from the defendants.

The court reviews the dismissal of the complaint under a de novo standard, focusing solely on the allegations within the complaint. A critical issue of standing arises, as it pertains to Doyle's ability to bring the suit. For standing to be established, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal injury directly linked to the defendant's conduct that can be remedied by the requested relief. The court finds that Doyle lacks standing, as his complaint primarily seeks disciplinary action against a lawyer and attempts to challenge a state court judgment, which does not constitute a distinct and palpable injury necessary for standing. The PRC, performing a prosecutorial role, retains broad discretion in its investigatory decisions, further complicating Doyle's claims.

Prosecutors hold sole discretion over whether to file complaints against lawyers, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court, which asserts that private citizens lack a legally recognized interest in the prosecution of others. Therefore, individuals cannot contest prosecutorial policies unless they are directly involved in a prosecution. This principle was highlighted in Leeke v. Timmerman, where a lawsuit was dismissed due to lack of standing, emphasizing that individuals do not have a federal right to demand prosecutions. Similarly, in the case of Dohaish, it was reiterated that a citizen does not have a legitimate interest to sue based on another's prosecution or non-prosecution. Doyle was found to lack standing in his appeal regarding a license-based discipline system, as he could not substantively engage in the disciplinary process.

Moreover, Doyle's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 centered on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which encompasses procedural due process, substantive due process, and the incorporation of Bill of Rights protections against states. Doyle's arguments failed to establish a constitutional right to compel a state bar to investigate grievances against lawyers, echoing a similar ruling in Saier v. State Bar of Michigan, which affirmed that such a right is not constitutionally guaranteed. Consequently, the district court dismissed Doyle's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Doyle's arguments fail to grasp the court's reasoning and the rights protected under the Due Process Clause. He claims that the Federal Constitution obligates the defendants to take various actions on his behalf, including investigating grievances and altering state court judgments. However, substantive due process rights are not applicable to such demands, which pertain to personal liberties like marriage and family relationships. The Clause is designed to prevent the state from abusing power in a way that shocks the conscience, not to compel the state to act in the manner Doyle suggests.

Regarding procedural due process, it does not prevent deprivation of liberty or property but mandates fair procedures for such deprivations. A plaintiff must sufficiently allege a specific and enforceable property or liberty interest. Doyle's claims, first introduced in his appeal, assert a property interest akin to a driver's license, suggesting he was entitled to have his grievance processed. These claims, however, are deemed absurd, as they do not constitute a constitutionally recognized property interest. 

A protected liberty interest is created by the state imposing substantive limits on official discretion, which requires a legitimate claim of entitlement rather than mere desire. Doyle's references to compliance with Bar rules and monitoring of attorney conduct do not cite any specific Oklahoma law or regulation that guarantees a particular outcome based on established criteria. Thus, his claims lack the necessary foundation to assert a protected interest under Due Process.

Doyle has claimed a right to process, which is not an end in itself but serves to protect a substantive interest with a legitimate claim. The expectation of state-provided process does not equate to an independent liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. There is no constitutional right to compel prosecution or discipline of others, and the investigatory powers of the Oklahoma Supreme Court are not meant to serve the private interests of grievants but to aid the disciplinary process by filtering out unfounded misconduct claims. Only lawyers facing sanctions are entitled to the due process outlined in the Rules. Doyle's attempt to indirectly challenge a state court custody decree is deemed impossible and an abuse of regulatory proceedings, as the state court is not bound by regulatory outcomes. Any relief must be sought directly through the state court. Additionally, if Doyle believes he suffered from perjury or misrepresentation, Oklahoma law allows for civil action against such claims, with perjury also being a criminal offense. All of Doyle's arguments have been considered and rejected, with the conclusion that his complaint does not allege any constitutional rights violations. 

Regarding sanctions, the case is deemed frivolous, and Doyle and his counsel may be incompetent, as they were made aware through multiple complaints that their claims were legally unfounded under Section 1983. Despite this, they have continued to pursue baseless appeals that contradict established legal authority. The appeal is considered both frivolous and vexatious, warranting the imposition of sanctions. Under relevant statutes, the court has the authority to impose damages and costs for frivolous appeals, and Doyle and his attorney are required to show cause within 15 days why such fees and costs should not be assessed against them.

The district court's judgment dismissing Doyle's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is affirmed. Doyle and his counsel are required to demonstrate within 15 days why sanctions should not be imposed under Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912 and 1927. Doyle amended his complaint twice, with the second amendment referred to as the complaint. The court notes that recent amendments to the rules address the General Counsel's power over grievances, specifically concerning record-keeping. The court finds no distinguishing factors between this case and cited precedents, emphasizing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to both federal statutory and constitutional violations. However, Doyle does not assert any federal statutory claim. He references the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, particularly a supposed right of access to courts free from lawyer misrepresentations, which the court finds does not exist. Doyle's claim that a letter from the General Counsel to the Vice Chief Justice violated his due process rights is also dismissed, as he was neither on trial nor charged. Furthermore, Doyle raises a new First Amendment claim regarding the right to receive information, which the court declines to consider and would reject if it chose to. Lastly, Doyle's assertion of a constitutional right to the "respectability of the bar profession" is dismissed, affirming that regulation of the practice of law is a state matter, with the Oklahoma Supreme Court holding exclusive jurisdiction over licensing and disciplinary issues.

Doyle’s appeal raises a claim regarding injury to his reputation for honesty and morality due to a letter from the General Counsel to the Vice Chief Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which is contradicted by the contents of the letter itself. The Supreme Court established over seventeen years ago that such a claim is not actionable under Section 1983, as affirmed in Paul v. Davis. Additionally, Doyle criticizes the investigatory process for lawyer misconduct outlined in the Rules, asserting it is meaningless. However, he does not challenge the constitutionality or wisdom of these procedures, only their adherence. The court finds it unnecessary to consider the district court's conclusions on immunity and other defenses due to its ruling.