Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

Citation: 989 F.2d 289Docket: No. 92-2323

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 28, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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Richard Dietz, Robert Brooks, and Johnnie Armstrong appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a case brought by Toi Norfleet under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The background involves Norfleet leaving her children with a babysitter, Sheila Tolbert, while she was away. On August 18, 1991, her four-year-old son, Taureen, who had asthma, suffered an attack and was taken to the hospital. Following this, Tolbert was arrested, and Taureen was placed in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS). Taureen was later assigned to a certified foster home run by Armstrong, where he was not properly supervised regarding his medication. On August 20, Taureen experienced breathing problems, but Armstrong did not attend to him until it was too late; he died shortly thereafter. Norfleet claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Taureen's medical needs, violating his due process rights, and causing emotional damage to his brother, Aaron. The court granted summary judgment in part but denied it regarding qualified immunity. The defendants argued that their actions did not violate any clearly established rights. The district court concluded that reasonable officials should have recognized their duty to ensure the safety and medical needs of a child in state custody, which constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause if neglected.

The district court determined that the law regarding the violation of Taureen’s constitutional rights was clearly established at the time of the defendants' actions, thus denying them qualified immunity. To assess whether a right is clearly established, direct Supreme Court precedent is not necessary, nor must the specific action in question have been previously deemed unlawful. Courts should consider all relevant decisional law, including rulings from state courts and other circuits. In 1991, the court needed to ascertain if the right of a foster child to adequate medical supervision was explicitly or implicitly recognized in existing case law. 

While the Supreme Court has not directly defined due process rights concerning safety for foster children, it has addressed similar rights for prisoners and involuntarily committed individuals, establishing that the state must provide adequate care. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment requires states to ensure adequate medical care for prisoners. This rationale was later extended to the care of involuntarily committed mental patients in Youngberg v. Romeo, which recognized a constitutionally protected interest in reasonable care and safety for those in state custody. 

Additionally, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County, the Supreme Court acknowledged that while the state has no general duty to protect children in parental custody, it may have affirmative duties in specific circumstances, particularly when the state has removed a child from society and placed them in foster care. Several circuits have further explored the due process rights of children in state care, beginning with the Second Circuit's ruling in Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., which held that government officials could be liable for failing to act when they had a duty to protect individuals in their custody.

The Eleventh Circuit equates the rights of foster children involuntarily placed in foster homes to those of prisoners in penal institutions, allowing for § 1983 actions based on the similar nature of their situations. In Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, the court emphasized the need for legal protections for vulnerable children, akin to those afforded to imprisoned adults. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this perspective in Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, ruling that children in state-regulated foster homes are entitled to due process protections against unnecessary harm. The Seventh Circuit expanded on this duty in Morgan, asserting that the state must safeguard children in its custody, particularly from known or suspected abusers. Initially, the Eighth Circuit's view of state duty was narrow, confined to prison-like environments as seen in Harpole v. Arkansas Department of Human Services. However, this perspective evolved, as demonstrated in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District, and further in Wells v. Walker, where the court held the state has an affirmative duty to protect individuals when a special relationship exists or when it places individuals in danger. In Freeman v. Ferguson, the court addressed the state's duty to protect against private violence without limiting it to prison settings. The Eighth Circuit later clarified that the Due Process Clause imposes a duty on state actors to protect citizens in custodial settings or when they are placed in dangerous situations by the state.

A special custodial relationship was established when the state took Taureen from his caregiver and placed him in foster care, which imposes a duty on the state to protect his civil rights. In foster care, a child loses autonomy and must rely on the state for care, thereby creating an obligation for the state to provide adequate medical care and supervision. This obligation was clearly established in 1991, given the existing case law and the nature of the state's responsibilities toward Taureen. Arguments by Brooks and Armstrong claiming absolute immunity under Arkansas law were dismissed, as state statutes cannot exempt individuals from liability under federal law. Allegations of deliberate or conscious indifference made by Taureen could support a § 1983 claim, regardless of any state immunity. The district court's judgment was affirmed, and it was noted that an interlocutory appeal could be pursued regarding qualified immunity. Additionally, the court acknowledged a 1992 precedent establishing that children have a right to reasonable safety in foster care.