Gilleo v. City of Ladue

Citations: 986 F.2d 1180; 1993 WL 41280Docket: Nos. 92-2232, 92-2235

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; February 21, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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The district court deemed the City of Ladue's sign ordinance unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction against its enforcement, affirming the decision while modifying the award of attorneys' fees to Margaret P. Gilleo. The ordinance generally prohibits most signs but includes specific exceptions. Ladue justified the ordinance by citing aims to preserve community aesthetics, protect resident safety, and maintain real estate values. Gilleo placed a sign in her window advocating for peace, which led to her being informed of the ordinance violation. She filed a federal complaint asserting a First Amendment infringement, while Ladue sought a declaratory judgment asserting the ordinance's constitutionality. The district court ruled in favor of Gilleo, declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and granting her significant attorneys' fees.

The analysis of the ordinance's constitutionality hinges on whether it is categorized as 'content-neutral' or 'content-based.' The court referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, which identified similar issues with a billboard ordinance that favored commercial speech over noncommercial speech and selectively permitted certain types of noncommercial speech. The court concluded that Ladue’s ordinance is also a 'content-based' regulation due to its preferential treatment of certain speech types. Additionally, the court considered Ladue's arguments regarding the 'secondary effects' doctrine, which allows a content-based regulation to be treated as content-neutral if it aims to address undesirable secondary effects unrelated to speech content, as articulated in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.

A regulation that does not target the content of expression is considered neutral, even if it affects some speakers differently. The city of Ladue claims its ordinance aims to mitigate secondary effects from excessive signage, such as visual blight and decreased property values. However, Ladue fails to demonstrate that the banned signs cause more harm than permitted signs, undermining its justification that the ordinance addresses secondary effects rather than content. The ordinance discriminates against certain sign categories without adequate basis, suggesting a content-based restriction, which is subject to strict scrutiny. For such restrictions to be constitutional, they must serve a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored. Ladue's interests, while substantial, are not compelling enough to justify the content-based restriction, and the ordinance is not the least restrictive means available. Consequently, the district court's ruling that Ladue's ordinance is unconstitutional is affirmed. Additionally, the court's decision not to implement Ladue's alternate plan for sign size is upheld, as its constitutionality was not contested. Regarding attorneys' fees, the district court awarded Gilleo $74,813.45, including a 15% enhancement for contingency, which was deemed inappropriate following the Supreme Court's precedent in City of Burlington v. Dague. This results in a reduced fee award of $65,055.00.

Ladue’s ordinance is found to violate the First Amendment by prioritizing commercial speech over noncommercial speech and by favoring specific types of noncommercial speech. The district court's permanent injunction against the ordinance is affirmed, with the attorneys’ fee award reduced to $65,055.00. The ordinance broadly defines 'sign' and allows several types of signs, including municipal, residential, and commercial signs in designated districts, while limiting noncommercial signs significantly. Although the ordinance is deemed viewpoint neutral, it is not content-neutral, as it restricts public discussion on certain topics, contrary to First Amendment protections. Ladue’s argument regarding a 'secondary effects' doctrine and the rationale for limiting sign proliferation lacks substantial factual support, as it fails to justify why content restrictions are necessary when it limits the quantity of signs for various entities. The ordinance's constraints on noncommercial signs, particularly in commercial areas, remain questionable and inadequately justified.