Blair v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.

Citation: 962 F.2d 1492Docket: Nos. 90-5133 to 90-5138, 90-5148 to 90-5150

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; May 5, 1992; Federal Appellate Court

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The appeal involves three asbestos-related cases where Plaintiffs-Appellees, former tireworkers Blair, Williams, and Powell, sued Defendants-Appellants Eagle-Picher and Owens-Corning for lung damage allegedly caused by asbestos fibers from the Defendants’ products. The Appellants contest the trial court's denial of their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of exposure to the Appellants' products to support a verdict. They also claim improper jury instructions on causation and raise additional trial-related errors.

The Plaintiffs worked at the B.F. Goodrich plant in Miami, Oklahoma, which operated from 1946 to 1986, manufacturing tires and utilizing asbestos-containing insulation products from the Appellants. The trial utilized a unique format, splitting the proceedings into common and specific phases, with simultaneous voir dire for two juries and separate voir dire for Powell's jury. Common evidence was presented collectively, while specific evidence regarding causation and damages was addressed separately for each case.

Each Plaintiff was allotted seven expert witnesses, while Defendants had a combined total of seven for all cases. Expert testimony was limited, and closing arguments were conducted individually. The juries ultimately ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs, awarding Jay and Mildred Blair $300,000 and $50,000 respectively, $600,000 to Williams after a remittitur, and $200,000 to Powell. These awards were adjusted based on prior settlements with other defendants. The Appellants' argument regarding the sufficiency of evidence is subject to de novo review, with the trial court's decision to be overturned only if the evidence overwhelmingly favors the Appellants.

To succeed in a products liability claim in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's product directly caused the injury, as affirmed in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Case v. Fibreboard, emphasized the necessity of demonstrating a causative link between the defective product and the plaintiff's injuries, rejecting the market share liability theory in asbestos cases. This ruling maintains that the burden is on the plaintiff to show a significant probability that the defendant's product caused the injury. The Court of Appeals endorsed a three-part analysis from Dillon v. Fibreboard, which requires evidence of regular exposure to a specific product over an extended period. 

The trial court's Master Order No. 4, which defined "significant probability" as merely the presence of a defendant's product at the workplace during the plaintiff's employment, deviated from the established standard by failing to require proof of actual exposure to the defendant's products. This misinterpretation risks undermining Oklahoma's causation standards. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the trial court should have granted the Appellants' motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict due to insufficient evidence of exposure to their products in the Powell case.

In the Williams and Blair cases, the Appellees provided adequate evidence justifying the district court's rejection of motions for directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. The evidence, viewed favorably for Mr. Powell, failed to demonstrate that he was exposed to asbestos from the Appellants' products. Key witness Mr. Ellis, an insulation applicator, acknowledged working around Powell but could not recall applying the Appellants' materials in Powell's vicinity, only confirming the storage of asbestos-containing materials in that area. Co-worker Mr. Brown indicated that the airborne dust present was primarily made up of soapstone, carbon black, and ground rubber, with only occasional insulation material, thus undermining any substantial link to the Defendants' products causing Powell's injuries.

Conversely, sufficient evidence of exposure was found for Williams and Blair. Ellis testified about his work with large quantities of Owens-Corning Kaylo and Eagle-Picher 'Super 66' cement at the plant, with potential exposure for Blair and other workers due to dust from Ellis’s insulation work. This evidence led to a reasonable conclusion of significant probability that the Appellants' products contributed to their injuries.

Additionally, the Appellants contested the jury instructions regarding causation, arguing they were improper. The standard for reviewing jury instructions emphasizes whether they accurately reflect governing law and adequately inform the jury on relevant issues. An error in jury instructions warrants reversal only if it is prejudicial when considering the entire record.

Jury instructions specified that a "direct cause" of an injury is any cause that, in a natural and continuous sequence, contributes to the injury, regardless of whether it is the only or last cause. Additionally, to establish causation regarding asbestos exposure, plaintiff Jay Blair must prove that asbestos-containing products from the defendants were present at the B.F. Goodrich Miami Tire Plant during his employment and that he inhaled a sufficient quantity over time to cause any related injury. The defendants argue that these instructions allowed the jury to find them liable based on mere exposure; however, the court found no merit in this claim, emphasizing that the plaintiff must demonstrate significant exposure to the defendants' products, aligning with prior legal standards. The instructions were deemed adequate and not a reversible error. 

Regarding the appellants' claims of jury bias, two incidents were highlighted: first, the ailing plaintiff, Williams, was brought into the courtroom in a wheelchair, visibly ill, which allegedly affected the jury's perception during voir dire. Second, during opening arguments, Williams' counsel referenced his condition and linked it to asbestosis complications, further potentially inflaming jury emotions. Motions for mistrial based on these incidents were denied. Overall, the court maintained that the jury instructions were appropriate and that the conduct of counsel did not warrant a new trial.

Williams' counsel did not present evidence to substantiate claims made during the opening statement regarding Williams' condition. The court failed to instruct the jury on this error. Following the verdicts, the appellants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial were denied, although the court reduced the jury's initial $1.2 million award in Williams by half through a remittitur. The court criticized the excessive award as shocking to the judicial conscience and indicative of passion and prejudice, citing the lack of medical evidence and the plaintiff’s appearance in court. The key issues to determine include whether the remittitur could remedy the perceived passion and prejudice in the Williams verdict and whether statements made during oral arguments affected the Powell and Blair juries. 

Referencing Mason v. Texaco, it was established that excessive awards resulting from jury passion and prejudice cannot be remedied through remittitur, necessitating a new trial instead. The trial court’s findings in Williams suggested that the excessive verdict was indeed influenced by such emotions, supported by the judge's observations on the plaintiff's condition. The judge expressed disbelief at Williams' ability to attend court given his apparent illness, indicating a strong emotional response. These factors lead to the conclusion that the jury's verdict was similarly influenced by passion and prejudice, rendering the remittitur inappropriate and necessitating a new trial for the defendants in the Williams case.

Determination of whether the remarks made by Williams' counsel concerning Mr. Williams' condition prejudiced the Defendants in the Blair and Powell cases is essential. It is acknowledged that counsel's claim linking Mr. Williams' appearance to 'pneumonia, a complication of asbestosis,' lacked evidentiary support. Despite the Blair jury observing Mr. Williams during voir dire, no evidence indicates that the damages awarded or liability findings were influenced by passion or prejudice. The assertion that the Powell jury was prejudiced by counsel's comments is unfounded, as they did not see Mr. Williams. 

Appellants argue the trial format was unfair, limiting their defense capabilities. They specifically contest the restriction on the number of expert witnesses, capped at seven by the district court, and the 45-minute limit on cross-examination, claiming these restrictions hampered their case presentation. The court has broad discretion in trial conduct, and given the context of nearly 600 asbestos cases pending, the limits imposed were not seen as an abuse of discretion.

Eagle-Picher also contends that video cameras in the courtroom disrupted proceedings and infringed its right to a fair trial. However, a review of the record indicates no specific prejudice, and the trial court's remarks suggested the videotaping was unobtrusive. Thus, the court concluded that allowing the trial to be videotaped did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

The Blair Appellants argued that the district court made an error by issuing an Allen instruction to the jury after they reported being unable to reach a consensus following six hours of deliberation. The court instructed the jury to continue deliberations and strive for a verdict, but Allen instructions must be used cautiously, as they can lead to coercion. An Allen instruction will not warrant a reversal unless found coercive. In this case, the district court urged jurors to deliberate based on the evidence and law, emphasizing that they should not abandon their honest convictions. This approach was consistent with prior rulings that deemed similar instructions non-coercive. Consequently, the Appellants' claim of coercion was rejected. Additionally, the Plaintiffs-Appellees asserted that the district court improperly directed a verdict for the Defendants regarding punitive damages; however, the court found no error in that ruling. The decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in Blair was affirmed, while the decisions in Williams and Powell were reversed and remanded for further proceedings.