Wilkerson v. Utah

Citations: 99 U.S. 130; 25 L. Ed. 345; 1878 U.S. LEXIS 1517Docket: 686

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 17, 1879; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Duly organized Territories possess legislative authority over all lawful subjects not conflicting with the U.S. Constitution and laws. The Territory of Utah was established by Congress on September 9, 1850, granting legislative power to the governor and legislative assembly. The case involves a prisoner charged with the willful and premeditated murder of William Baxter, who pleaded not guilty. After a fair trial, the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder. The presiding justice sentenced the prisoner to be publicly executed by shooting on December 14. Following the trial, the prisoner appealed, and the Supreme Court of the Territory affirmed the lower court's judgment. The current writ of error was filed under a Congressional act allowing such appeals in cases involving capital punishment or convictions for bigamy or polygamy. The assignment of error claims the court erred in affirming the sentencing judgment, with no prior exceptions noted. Under Utah law, murder is defined as the unlawful killing with malice aforethought, which can be express or implied. First-degree murder is characterized by premeditated intent and depraved disregard for human life, carrying a mandatory death sentence or life imprisonment upon jury recommendation.

The prisoner, having been convicted of first-degree murder, is subject to a death sentence as stipulated by existing Territorial law. Historical provisions from March 6, 1852, to March 4, 1876, mandated that a convicted individual could be executed by shooting, hanging, or beheading, depending on judicial discretion or the convict's choice. However, the Revised Penal Code, which repealed prior laws, establishes that individuals guilty of first-degree murder shall face death, but lacks specific execution methods beyond stating that the court must determine the punishment. The court concludes that there are no grounds to reverse the prior judgment, emphasizing that United States circuit courts lack the authority to impose a death sentence by any method other than hanging, as dictated by federal law. Furthermore, the legislative powers of organized Territories enable them to create laws regarding offenses and their punishments, as long as they do not conflict with the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. There are indications that Congress did not intend to restrict Territorial legislative power regarding execution methods, noting historical practices and military regulations that allow for varied methods of execution without explicit prescription in military laws.

Repeated instances of capital punishment are prescribed in military law, mandating death for certain offenses without specifying the execution method. In the absence of congressional regulations, customary military practice has established that execution typically occurs by shooting or hanging. Notably, mutiny without loss of life and desertion are usually punished by shooting, while spies are hanged. The same customs apply to other military offenses, with both shooting and hanging being recognized methods of execution, which may be specified in the sentence.

In comparison to other countries, similar rules regarding execution methods exist, with the common practices reflecting the nature of the offenses. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, but authorities indicate that shooting for first-degree murder does not fall under this prohibition. Convicted soldiers for capital offenses predominantly receive shooting sentences, with detailed ceremonial procedures outlined in military law literature.

In civil law, the common law dictates that sentences must be pronounced by the court where the conviction occurred, adhering to statutory punishments for crimes. Hanging is traditionally the prescribed method for capital offenses, although historical practices sometimes involved more severe punishments, such as drawing and quartering or public dissection. While these methods were occasionally mitigated due to humanitarian considerations, they reflect historical cruelty in capital punishment practices.

Chitty notes that while the king cannot increase the severity of a treason sentence, he can mitigate or remit parts of it. The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, as stated in the relevant amendment, effectively forbids torturous punishments. Despite this, the court's sentence in the current case does not fall under this prohibition, nor did the Supreme Court of the Territory err in upholding the original judgment. 

Prior to the 1876 code, a 1852 statute mandated that individuals convicted of capital offenses face death by specific methods, with an option for the condemned to choose among them. However, the current code lacks such provisions for an execution method and instead stipulates that those guilty of first-degree murder "shall suffer death" or may receive life imprisonment at the jury's recommendation. In this case, the jury did not recommend life imprisonment, leading to a legally correct sentencing of death. 

If the statute had specified a method of execution, the court would be bound to follow it unless deemed cruel or unusual under the Eighth Amendment, a claim not made by the prisoner's counsel. The absence of specific execution methods in the statute grants the court the authority to determine the execution method while ensuring compliance with the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Consequently, the court is obligated to establish the execution method for first-degree murder convictions while adhering to constitutional limits.

Common law allowed for various methods of execution beyond hanging, and it did not require courts to specify the execution method, time, or place within the sentence itself. Instead, such details were often determined by the judge through a capital case calendar prepared by the clerk at the term's end. For example, in murder cases, the calendar would typically state, "let him be hanged by the neck," which provided the only guidance for execution officers. The document references multiple cases (Hartung v. The People) to argue against the notion that courts lacked authority to determine execution methods; however, the court firmly disagrees with this interpretation. The judgment in question is affirmed.