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Converse v. General Motors Corp.
Citations: 893 F.2d 513; 1990 WL 2295Docket: No. 434, Docket 89-7702
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 9, 1990; Federal Appellate Court
The appeal centers on whether Connecticut state law dictates how a federal diversity case is considered commenced regarding the statute of limitations under Conn.Gen.Stat. Ann. 52-577a. Plaintiff Marshall G. Converse challenges the summary judgment dismissing his products liability suit against General Motors, Hamill Manufacturing, and Firestone, asserting that the complaint was timely filed but not served until after the limitations period expired. Converse contends that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 3, the action is commenced by filing the complaint, making his case timely. However, the district court and magistrate ruled that Connecticut's requirement of actual service is critical for the commencement of the action under state law, leading to the dismissal of Converse's complaint. The court affirmed this ruling, emphasizing that the Connecticut service rule, not the federal filing rule, governs the commencement of actions for statute of limitations purposes. The background includes the tragic deaths of Converse's children in 1984 and the subsequent filing of the complaint in 1987, just before the limitations period expired, but with service occurring afterward. The defendants successfully argued that Converse’s failure to serve the complaint in time barred his claim. Converse argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) 3 dictates when a diversity action under Connecticut law is considered commenced for the purpose of the Connecticut statute of limitations, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 52-577a. The court disagrees, emphasizing that when reviewing a summary judgment, the focus is on whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable trier of fact could favor the nonmoving party, as established in prior cases. The court cites the Erie doctrine, which dictates that state law governs the commencement of diversity actions for state statutes of limitations. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the Supreme Court ruled that state service requirements, rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, control in diversity actions. This principle was reaffirmed in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., which stated that state service requirements integral to the statute of limitations apply in federal court for state law actions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) addresses the method of service but must comply with state law if there is no conflicting federal rule. Converse's claim is based on the Connecticut Product Liability Act, which specifies a three-year statute of limitations for product liability claims from the date the injury, death, or property damage is first sustained or discovered. Connecticut law lacks a specific provision defining when a claim is considered "brought," but the Connecticut Supreme Court has established that actual service on the defendant is necessary to meet the state's statute of limitations. The court emphasized that the action is deemed commenced upon service, as this informs the defendant of the plaintiff's intent to pursue the claim. Although Converse acknowledges that his complaint was served after the statute of limitations expired, he argues that the service requirement is not essential to Connecticut's statute of limitations. This argument is based on two cases which incorrectly suggested that the lack of a statutory provision meant the service requirement was non-integral. The court highlighted that judicial decisions carry the same weight as statutory provisions and that the prior cases were decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. Armco, which clarified the connection between service of process and the policies underlying statutes of limitations. The ruling in Walker underscored that the service requirement is integral to the statute's purpose of providing defendants with peace of mind after a certain time and preventing the unfairness of defending against old claims. As a result, the running of the limitations period is governed by New York's rule requiring service of process, reaffirming that Rule 3 cannot toll a state statute of limitations in diversity cases. Converse argues that the Connecticut "saving" statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. Ann. 52-593a, reflects a lenient approach to the statute of limitations for plaintiffs, although it does not apply directly to his case. This statute allows a cause of action to remain valid if the process is served to an authorized officer or sheriff within the statutory timeframe, provided it is completed within fifteen days of delivery. However, the court clarifies that this exception cannot be extended to cases where process was not properly delivered. Judge Zampano's ruling in Cocco v. Preferred Mutual Ins. Co. supports that the statute implies the legislature's endorsement of a judicially recognized rule for commencing actions. Furthermore, the court aligns its decision with the principles established in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, emphasizing that a state law action barred by the state’s statute of limitations should not proceed in federal court merely due to diversity of citizenship among the parties. Ultimately, the court finds Converse's additional arguments unpersuasive and upholds the district court's judgment.