Cruz v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. PR, Inc.

Citations: 304 F.R.D. 92; 90 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 506; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175778; 2014 WL 7174258Docket: Civil No. 08-1424 (FAB)

Court: District Court, D. Puerto Rico; December 16, 2014; Federal District Court

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Cesar I. Cruz filed two motions to set aside a judgment from April 18, 2011, which dismissed his claims with prejudice and was affirmed by the First Circuit on November 7, 2012. The first motion, filed on March 7, 2014, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, failed to provide specific facts or legal arguments, instead directing the Court to consider submissions from a different case. The defendants, Bristol Myers Squibb and associated entities, opposed this motion. Six days later, Cruz filed a second motion, claiming new evidence revealed that the defendants used a "sham affidavit" in their summary judgment motion, and he requested the judgment be set aside based on this information. The defendants opposed the second motion and sought sanctions against Cruz for vexatious litigation. The memorandum explains that Rule 60(b) allows for relief from a final judgment under specific conditions, emphasizing that such motions are extraordinary and should be granted sparingly, with a one-year limit for certain grounds.

Plaintiff Cruz's motions to set aside judgment, interpreted as being filed under Rule 60(b)(2) and (3), are deemed untimely. In his first motion, Cruz references Rule 60 only once and omits it entirely in his second motion, expecting the Court to infer the applicable subsection. The Court emphasizes that parties are responsible for substantiating their claims and cannot rely on the Court to identify legal grounds. Cruz's first motion lacks substantial legal analysis, while his responses indicate reliance on newly discovered evidence and accusations of fraud against the defendants. However, both motions are filed more than a year after the April 2011 judgment—specifically, in March 2014, which is thirty-five months post-judgment and twenty-three months beyond the one-year limit set by Rule 60(c)(1). Citing precedent, the Court concludes that this delay constitutes an absolute bar to relief. Therefore, both motions to set aside judgment are denied.

Plaintiff Cruz's motions to set aside the judgment do not meet the criteria outlined in Rule 60(b)(4), (5), or (6). Cruz asserts that the judgment should be voided due to reliance on incorrect information, but fails to establish that the court lacked jurisdiction or violated due process, which are necessary for a judgment to be considered void under Rule 60(b)(4). The court denies the motions under this rule.

For Rule 60(b)(5), which pertains to judgments that are no longer equitable when applied prospectively, the court clarifies that this rule applies only to forward-looking judgments, such as injunctions, not to the dismissal of claims via summary judgment. Cruz misinterprets the rule, and thus the court denies the motions under Rule 60(b)(5) as well.

Under Rule 60(b)(6), a catch-all provision, Cruz's request for relief based on newly discovered evidence is inapplicable, as it is premised on grounds already covered by subsections (2) and (3) (newly discovered evidence and fraud). Consequently, the court denies Cruz’s motions under Rule 60(b)(6) because it cannot grant relief based on a premise already addressed by other subsections.

Plaintiff Cruz's allegation of fraud is deemed meritless by the Court. Cruz seeks to set aside a judgment based on the 'rule of equity' established in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. and Marshall v. Holmes, which allow for independent actions to address gross injustices that deviate from res judicata. The Court clarifies that Cruz's claims regarding a 'sham affidavit' from Human Resources Director Grisel Castro do not constitute a 'grave miscarriage of justice.' Cruz contends that discrepancies between Castro's deposition statements and a newly discovered July 2008 reduction-in-force disclosure report indicate fraud. However, the Court finds no contradiction; Castro's explanation regarding a mistake on an October 2008 report does not conflict with the July report's potential errors. Thus, Cruz’s fraud allegation is considered baseless, leading to the denial of his motions to set aside judgment.

Additionally, the Bristol Myers defendants request sanctions against Cruz for vexatious litigation. They assert that Cruz has repeatedly submitted unintelligible filings intended to mislead the Court. Cruz counters that his issues merit judicial consideration. While the Court recognizes Cruz's attempts to reopen the case as vexatious, it does not classify them as 'egregious' enough to warrant sanctions, ultimately denying the defendants' request. The Court concludes by denying Cruz’s motions to set aside the judgment. This memorandum was prepared with assistance from Elizabeth Barreto, a law student.