Snyder v. Fleetwood Rv, Inc.

Citations: 303 F.R.D. 502; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139409; 2014 WL 4928932Docket: Case No. 2:13-cv-1019

Court: District Court, S.D. Ohio; October 1, 2014; Federal District Court

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Lora Snyder has initiated legal action against Fleetwood RV, Inc. and Spartan Chassis, Inc., alleging defects in a motor home she purchased. During discovery, Spartan Chassis issued a subpoena to her husband, Don Snyder, for specific documents, prompting the Snyders to file a motion to quash the subpoena and seek attorney fees. The subpoena requested seven categories of documents, but the Snyders objected to five, citing attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine for categories related to correspondence with their attorney and deposition notes. They argued that the requests for tax documents and certain notes were burdensome and not likely to yield admissible evidence.

The court's decision on the motion to quash is guided by Rule 45(d)(3), which necessitates quashing a subpoena that demands privileged material or causes undue burden. While irrelevance or overbreadth are not explicitly grounds for quashing under the rule, courts have held that discovery relevance under subpoenas aligns with that of Rule 26. Although subpoenas may be quashed for clearly irrelevant requests, a district judge is not required to assess admissibility prior to trial. Generally, the burden of proof for justifying a motion to quash lies with the party filing it, though there may be exceptions regarding relevance.

In legal proceedings, if the relevance of requested discovery is apparent, the burden of proof lies with the party resisting the discovery to demonstrate a lack of relevance. Conversely, if the relevance is not clear, the party seeking discovery must establish its relevance. The Snyders contend that the documents requested in subpoena categories 2, 3, and 4 are protected by attorney-client privilege. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, state law governs privilege in civil cases where state law supplies the rule of decision, particularly in diversity actions. The court must apply the same substantive law that would be applied if the case were in state court, in accordance with the Erie doctrine. 

The Snyders and Spartan reference both Ohio and federal law regarding attorney-client privilege, but do not cite any other state's law. Given that the motor home sale occurred in Ohio, and Ms. Snyder resides there, the court will analyze privilege under Ohio law, which is governed by statute and common law principles. Ohio law stipulates that communications made in confidence for legal advice between a client and attorney are protected from disclosure unless waived. The burden to prove exclusion based on attorney-client privilege is on the party asserting the privilege. The Snyders argue that communications between Mr. Snyder and his wife’s attorney should be considered indirect communications between Ms. Snyder and her attorney, referencing Ohio's statutory definition of 'client' as someone who consults an attorney for legal services, either directly or through a representative.

The Snyders reference State v. Shipley to argue that a close relative can act as an agent for a client regarding attorney-client communications. In Shipley, the court upheld the privilege of the client's communications despite the presence of the client's brother, focusing solely on whether the brother's presence waived the privilege. Shipley drew from Bowers v. State, which similarly affirmed that a client's admissions remain privileged even with a parent present, provided their involvement is necessary. However, a more recent case, State v. Whitaker, applied a narrower interpretation, determining that a mother is not an agent for her adult son regarding confidentiality.

The Snyders' situation differs from Bowers as they are not dealing with a minor. Despite the interpretations, the Snyders failed to offer evidence that the communications in question are protected by attorney-client privilege. Specifically, they did not demonstrate that any documents requested in the subpoena were communications made by Ms. Snyder through Mr. Snyder as her representative. Instead, the memorandum suggests Mr. Snyder's expertise in automotive matters positions him as a consultant rather than a mere conduit for Ms. Snyder's communications. Moreover, Mr. Snyder's involvement as an "interested party" indicates he may be expressing his own interests rather than solely relaying Ms. Snyder's communications. The statutory definition of "client" requires that the source of the communication must be the client, and although the Snyders assert that Mr. Snyder often communicates on Ms. Snyder's behalf, they do not substantiate this claim with an affidavit or other evidence. Consequently, the court cannot regard these communications as initiated by Ms. Snyder through Mr. Snyder, nor for the sixth category of documents claimed to be protected by the privilege.

The Snyders claim work product protection for notes taken by Don Snyder during John Mestlin's deposition on June 25, 2014, arguing these notes were prepared in anticipation of litigation and thus protected by the work-product doctrine. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, documents prepared in anticipation of litigation are generally not discoverable unless the requesting party demonstrates a substantial need for them and cannot obtain their equivalent without undue hardship. The court references the case law, indicating that parties can establish anticipation of litigation through various pretrial evidence methods, but such claims must be detailed and specific, not merely conclusory.

Mr. Snyder's affidavit indicates he took minimal notes, hinting at relevance but failing to establish that they were prepared for trial or on behalf of his wife or her counsel. Consequently, the Snyders did not meet their burden to prove the notes qualify as work product. Regarding subpoena categories 1 and 5, Mr. Snyder contends these requests are unduly burdensome and irrelevant. The court agrees, stating these categories do not appear relevant, especially Mr. Snyder's tax documents from 2010 onward, as he is not a party to the case and the damages claimed by Ms. Snyder do not pertain to his earnings. Spartan argues that Mr. Snyder's financial status is relevant due to his relationship with Ms. Snyder, but this claim relies on speculative reasoning. A statement by Mr. Snyder about financial concerns does not justify the relevance of his tax returns. Although Mr. Snyder did not demonstrate undue burden, the court concludes that this part of the subpoena is outside the scope of Rule 26.

Spartan requests Mr. Snyder's yellow notepad, excluding deposition notes related to John Mestlin, which are preserved separately. The request is not limited in subject matter but seeks all notes in the notepad. Mr. Snyder's affidavit indicates that some notes are unrelated to the current litigation. Any relevant notes not provided to the court reporter must be requested more specifically by Spartan. Additionally, if the yellow notepad contains notes pertinent to the case, Mr. Snyder may already be required to produce them under other requests from Spartan. However, the request as stated does not comply with Rule 26. The Snyders seek attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses under Rule 26(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, finding most document categories within the Rules and the unsupported categories not entirely frivolous, deems sanctions inappropriate. The motion to quash is granted in part and denied in part: granted for categories 1 and 5 of the subpoena, denied for the rest. Responsive documents must be produced within fourteen days, and the request for attorney’s fees is denied.