Court: District Court, D. New Mexico; July 14, 2011; Federal District Court
Defendant BNSF Railway Company's Motion to Compel Answers to Requests for Admission (RFA) was addressed by the Court in a hearing held on July 6, 2011. The Court's key determinations included: (i) the RFAs propounded by BNSF Railway to Plaintiffs Emilio J. Esquibel and Helen G. Esquibel would not be deemed admitted; (ii) the Esquibels’ objections to the RFAs were overruled; (iii) the Esquibels’ responses were found to be insufficient; and (iv) the Esquibels were granted until July 20, 2011, to supplement their answers.
The procedural background involves a wrongful death and negligence lawsuit originally filed by Victoria Stark-Romero on February 12, 2009, against multiple defendants, including BNSF Railway, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in New Mexico. The case was subsequently removed to federal court, leading Stark-Romero to file a Motion to Remand due to alleged procedural defects regarding defendant consent to removal. On March 31, 2010, the Chief Judge granted this motion. The Esquibels filed a Complaint in Intervention on July 19, 2010, and the case was again removed to federal court. Stark-Romero and the Esquibels then filed motions to remand, with the Court remanding Stark-Romero's claims on January 12, 2011, but denying the Esquibels' request for remand of their claims.
On May 25, 2011, BNSF Railway filed a Motion to Compel Answers to Requests for Admission (RFA), asserting that the Esquibels inadequately responded to RFAs, necessitating additional discovery motion practice. BNSF sought a court order to deem RFAs 20-33 admitted or, alternatively, to compel the Esquibels to answer RFAs 12 and 20-33 without objection, requiring explanations for any denials. On June 9, 2011, the Esquibels opposed the motion, claiming their objections were appropriate and that BNSF's requests sought admissions beyond the scope of Rule 36, including legal conclusions and matters outside their personal knowledge. BNSF replied on June 23, 2011, arguing that its RFAs were proper and within the Esquibels' knowledge, reiterating its request for the court to grant the motion to compel.
Relevant law indicates that RFAs expedite trials by allowing parties to admit certain material facts without formal proof, as per Rule 36(a)(1). Admissions are binding unless amended with court permission (Fed. R.Civ. P. 36(b)). Objections must be specified and cannot solely be based on the existence of genuine issues for trial (Fed. R.Civ. P. 36(a)(5)). The requesting party can challenge the sufficiency of responses, and the court may order compliance, potentially leading to admissions if the answers do not meet the rule's requirements (Fed. R.Civ. P. 36(a)(6)). The 1970 amendment to Rule 36(a) allowed requests regarding the application of law to fact, resolving prior conflicts about mixed law and fact requests, which can help narrow trial issues.
In McSparran v. Hanigan, the plaintiff acknowledged that the accident occurred on premises controlled by one defendant, which simplified the trial by eliminating a contested issue. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, requests for admissions cannot include legal conclusions unrelated to factual matters. Courts affirm that parties cannot compel admissions of pure legal conclusions, as demonstrated in various cases. Rule 36(a)(4) requires that if a matter is not admitted, the responding party must specifically deny it or explain why they cannot truthfully admit or deny it. When claiming lack of knowledge, the party must show they made reasonable inquiries but still lack sufficient information to respond. There is some conflict within Rule 36(a)(4) regarding the level of detail required in explaining inquiries made, leading to differing interpretations among courts about the necessity of detailing such efforts. Ultimately, Rule 36 mandates reasonable inquiries to gather information within the party's control.
A party responding to a Request for Admission (RFA) may satisfy the requirements under amended Rule 36 by stating they have made a reasonable inquiry but lack sufficient information to admit or deny the matter. This position is supported by case law, including *Asea, Inc. v. S. Pacific Transportation Co.*, where the Ninth Circuit addressed the adequacy of a railroad's response that indicated ongoing investigation and insufficient information. The district court deemed the RFAs admitted, but the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's discretion, emphasizing that a failure to comply with Rule 36(a) may lead to an admission. It noted that while a response claiming insufficient information may be acceptable if it includes a statement of reasonable inquiry, a vague or evasive denial does not meet the rule’s standards. The railroads argued for a construction of Rule 36(a) that allows their response to be compliant, citing *Adley Express Co.* for the notion that a simple declaration of reasonable inquiry suffices. The Advisory Committee’s Note further supports this interpretation, indicating that the rule requires only that the answering party undertake reasonable inquiry to obtain readily available information and state these efforts.
No case has been identified that holds a response containing the statement required by Rule 36(a) can still be considered an admission. The Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism about whether merely stating that a reasonable inquiry was made and that the information is not readily available suffices to comply with Rule 36(a). The court highlighted the potential for abuse in the discovery process, arguing that allowing such responses would diminish the obligation of parties to conduct reasonable inquiries and could undermine the purpose of Rule 36(a) in narrowing issues before trial. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a response that does not admit or deny a request for admission fails to meet Rule 36(a) requirements if the party has not made a reasonable inquiry or if the necessary information is readily obtainable. A party may challenge the sufficiency of an answer and seek a proper response or admission. Typically, the district court should first mandate an amended answer, deeming the matter admitted only if a sufficient response is not provided in a timely manner, though this discretion rests with the district judge. The court also noted that the district court can impose severe sanctions, including ordering a matter admitted, if a party deliberately disregards Rule 36(a) obligations. The court agrees that Rule 36(a)(4) allows for the interpretation that a general assertion of having made a reasonable inquiry suffices, although a more detailed explanation was the intended purpose of the amendment. Specific detail is required when a party cannot admit or deny a request.
A respondent may lack sufficient knowledge to adequately answer a request for admission, which necessitates a detailed response as outlined in the third sentence of Rule 36(a)(4). If the respondent cannot admit or deny, they should follow the more general guidance provided in the first sentence. Interpreting Rule 36(a)(4) to mandate that a respondent lacking knowledge provide specific details about their inquiry would render the third sentence redundant, contradicting established legal principles against surplusage. The first sentence requires the respondent to explain why they cannot truthfully admit or deny, rather than detailing the inquiry process itself. This interpretation avoids imposing additional requirements that are not explicitly stated in the rule. Furthermore, since Rule 36 pertains specifically to requests for admissions—not interrogatories—requiring a detailed account of the inquiry would transform the nature of the request, potentially complicating the litigation process without significant discovery benefits. In complex commercial cases, requests for admissions are often limited in utility, primarily serving to authenticate documents or confirm basic facts, and excessive detail can lead to unnecessary disputes and delays. Ultimately, the third sentence is governed by Rule 11, which provides a more effective resolution for disputes arising from requests for admissions.
BNSF Railway requests the Court to deem Requests for Admission (RFAs) Nos. 20-33 admitted due to the Esquibels’ improper objections to RFAs Nos. 20-21 and 23-33, as well as their failure to respond to RFA No. 22. BNSF also seeks to compel the Esquibels to answer RFA No. 12 without objection. During the hearing, the Esquibels indicated they would supplement their responses within ten days, following the Court's inclination to overrule their objections and find their responses insufficient. They sought clarification regarding RFAs they believe require legal conclusions, particularly RFA No. 20, which states that the New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT) administers the federal grade crossing improvement program in New Mexico.
The analysis references Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(1), which permits requests applying law to fact but prohibits requests that pertain solely to legal conclusions. The excerpt cites case law, including Lakehead Pipe Line Company, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co. and Reichenbach v. City of Columbus, to illustrate the distinction between requests that seek factual admissions and those that seek legal conclusions. It concludes that while some requests may have been objectionable because they focused exclusively on legal issues, RFA No. 20 is not a purely legal question but relates to the factual administration of a program, thus requiring the Esquibels to admit or deny it or provide a detailed explanation for their inability to do so.
The Court overrules the Esquibels’ objections to the requests for admission, determining their responses do not comply with Rule 36(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Esquibels are required to either admit or specifically deny each request or explain in detail why they cannot do so. If claiming insufficient information, they must demonstrate they have made a reasonable inquiry to obtain the necessary information. This includes consulting with their counsel and any relevant personnel who might have the information. The Court finds the Esquibels’ responses inadequate and grants them ten days to supplement their answers. The motion to compel answers filed by Defendant BNSF Railway Company is partially granted, with the Court not deeming Requests for Admission Nos. 20-33 admitted, and the objections by the Esquibels are overruled. The deadline for the Esquibels to provide additional responses is set for July 20, 2011. The ruling is made by Chief Judge Bruce Black of the District of New Mexico.
