Bland v. Fairfax County

Citations: 275 F.R.D. 466; 112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1167; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66908Docket: No. 1:10cv1030 (JCC/JFA)

Court: District Court, E.D. Virginia; June 20, 2011; Federal District Court

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Defendant Fairfax County's Motion to Quash Witness Subpoenas has been denied by the Court. The case involves allegations of sexual harassment by Lieutenant Timothy Young against firefighter Mary Getts Bland, who claims the County violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bland served seven subpoenas for trial witnesses, all of whom are employees or volunteers of the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, with service dates ranging from May 5 to May 11, 2011. The County contended that the subpoenas were improperly served via FedEx and certified mail, and that some were served too late to comply with procedural timelines. However, Bland's counsel reported that all contacted witnesses were willing to testify if not obstructed by work obligations. The Court will consider these arguments and has the discretion to enforce or quash subpoenas under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant contends that the subpoenas are invalid due to improper service, as they were delivered via FedEx and certified mail rather than through personal service. Plaintiff's Opposition does not address the service issue. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b), serving a subpoena requires delivering a copy to the named individual, and traditionally, personal service has been interpreted as necessary. However, recent cases have suggested that personal service is not mandatory for valid service under Rule 45. Notably, Hall v. Sullivan, a case from the District of Maryland, concluded that service via FedEx met the requirements of Rule 45(b), despite the prevailing view favoring personal service. The Hall court emphasized that the intent of Rule 45(b) is to ensure effective notice to the subpoenaed party, rather than to adhere strictly to personal service methods. In interpreting statutes, courts rely on the text of the provision, presuming that the legislature means what it states. Rule 45 specifies that any individual 18 years or older, who is not a party, can serve a subpoena by delivering a copy to the named person, but does not define "delivering." Courts typically interpret undefined terms according to their ordinary meaning.

The term "deliver" is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as "to bring or transport to the proper place or recipient; distribute." The definitions of "transport" and "convey" further clarify that these terms involve carrying or communicating from one place to another. The Court concluded that the common understanding of "delivering" does not exclude the use of FedEx or certified mail, as Rule 45(b) does not mandate personal service or prohibit alternative methods. The Court emphasized that interpreting "deliver" to only mean personal service would contradict the intent of Rule 1, which advocates for a just, speedy, and economical resolution of legal matters. The analysis aligns with the District Court of Colorado's decision in E.A. Renfroe Company, Inc. v. Moran, which similarly found that Rule 45(b) does not necessitate in-hand service and recognized the flexibility of the term "deliver" based on its ordinary meanings. Thus, Rule 45(b) permits delivery via FedEx or certified mail, especially when witnesses have been properly notified in advance.

Renfroe argued that interpreting Rule 45(b) to mandate personal service would make redundant the requirement for filing a statement with the court detailing the date and manner of service. The court emphasized that if personal service were the sole method allowed, there would be no need for such a statement. This aligns with the principle of statutory interpretation that prevents rendering any provision superfluous, especially when the statute's text does not necessitate one exclusive reading. The court concurred with Renfroe's position, noting similarities between Rule 4 and Rule 45, both of which encompass notice and compulsion elements. Rule 4(e) explicitly allows personal service of a summons and complaint, illustrating that when personal service is mandatory, it is clearly articulated in the rules. A recent case, OceanFirst Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., indicated that while the Sixth Circuit has not ruled on the necessity of personal service under Rule 45(b), other circuits (Fifth, Ninth, and D.C.) have affirmed that personal service is required. Proper service not only involves delivering the subpoena but also providing a witness fee and mileage allowance. OceanFirst noted that although the text of Rule 45(b) does not strictly require personal service, it states that service "requires delivering a copy" of the subpoena. The court highlighted that when personal delivery is mandated, it is expressly stated in the rules. The OceanFirst decision ultimately supported the view that Rule 45 allows for alternate service methods only after a party demonstrates diligent efforts to achieve personal service.

The Court acknowledges a growing minority position among various jurisdictions that allows for alternative methods of service for Rule 45(b) subpoenas beyond personal service. Notable cases illustrate this trend: Powell v. Time Warner Cable permits certified mail as satisfying Rule 45(b); New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds affirms that effective notice is the primary goal of service, rather than strict adherence to personal delivery; and Hawalani v. Wolfenbarger supports the use of certified mail for subpoenas. Other cases, including Cartier v. Geneve Collections and Tubar v. Clift, emphasize that while personal service is not mandated, reasonable assurance of delivery is necessary, highlighting the importance of actual receipt. Ultradent Products also validates certified mail as sufficient service. In re Falcon Air Exp. Inc. explicitly rejects the majority view requiring personal service, endorsing the minority view that allows substitute service. The Court concurs with this minority stance, particularly in this case where witnesses were willing to testify and received the subpoenas prior to trial through reliable means. The decision aligns with Rule 1's directive for rules to facilitate just and efficient case resolutions, suggesting that rigidly requiring personal service could hinder this objective. Consequently, the Court denies the Defendant’s Motion to Quash based on the method of service.

Defendant contends that certain subpoenas issued by Plaintiff were served late, specifically targeting the Vance, Hurtado, Ray, and Rivera subpoenas for quashing. Plaintiff asserts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3) governs these subpoenas rather than Local Rule 45(E). However, since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a) allows for the adoption of local rules, Local Rule 45(E) prevails regarding timeliness. Local Rule 45(E) mandates that subpoenas for witness attendance must be served at least fourteen days before trial unless the court orders otherwise for good cause. The Fourth Circuit's ruling in Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp. supports this interpretation, emphasizing that subpoenas served during a trial with less than fourteen days' notice are a violation of local rules.

Plaintiff references Federal Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(i), which requires a court to quash subpoenas that do not allow reasonable time for compliance but acknowledges that this rule does not apply here, as Plaintiff still provided reasonable time to comply despite the subpoenas being late. The court agrees that Local Rule 45(E) governs the situation. 

Regarding the good cause exception in Local Rule 45(E), Plaintiff argues that all witnesses were notified in advance of their need to testify and are willing to do so, which constitutes sufficient good cause to decline quashing the subpoenas.

The Court will deny the Defendant’s Motion to Quash the subpoenas. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas directed at third parties unless there is a claim of personal right or privilege regarding the information sought. The County argued it has standing due to its obligation to grant leave to the employees being subpoenaed, but the Court did not address this argument given its ruling on the Motion to Quash. The Hall case was cited, which limited its ruling to subpoenas duces tecum, emphasizing that for document production, a subpoenaed party can object, shifting the burden to the requesting party to compel production without requiring in-hand delivery, provided the service ensures actual receipt. A recent D.C. District case supported this view, noting that while there is a strict interpretation of Rule 45(b)(1), adherence may prioritize form over substance when the subpoenaed party acknowledges receipt.