Sigmund v. Starwood Urban Retail VI, LLC

Citations: 236 F.R.D. 43; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36318; 2006 WL 1545533Docket: Civil Action Nos. 03-1507 (ESH/JMF), 05-1366 (ESH/JMF)

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; June 6, 2006; Federal District Court

Lead Opinion SummaryLead Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Plaintiff Donald Wright Sigmund is seeking to compel Defendant Starwood’s designated representative to answer deposition questions related to the maintenance, repair, and condition of a rolling steel garage door involved in an incident where a pipe bomb exploded in his father's car. The background reveals that Sigmund sustained injuries from the explosion, which occurred in a parking garage owned by Starwood Urban Retail VI, LLC, and he has also sued his stepbrother, Prescott Sigmund, who allegedly accessed the garage through a broken door. Following discovery, Sigmund filed a second consolidated lawsuit against other companies involved in the garage's management and repair.

Sigmund initially served requests for admission to Starwood on September 30, 2005, but after receiving inadequate responses, he sought further information, resulting in a deposition held on January 12, 2006. During this deposition, Starwood’s representative, Constance Collins, was unprepared and refrained from answering critical questions. Additionally, documents requested during the deposition were not produced. Consequently, Sigmund filed a motion on April 28, 2006, to compel Starwood to respond to questions about the garage door's maintenance and to produce the necessary documents.

The memorandum highlights that under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a corporation must designate representatives to testify on its behalf regarding specified matters, and their testimony is deemed a statement of the corporation. The court has decided to grant Sigmund's motion to compel Starwood's representative to provide the requested information and documentation.

Rule 30(b)(6) aims to prevent corporations from evading responsibility through a practice known as "bandying," where multiple representatives deny knowledge of facts known to the organization. In response to a deposition notice under this rule, the corporation must designate a knowledgeable deponent and prepare them to testify on both personal knowledge and information reasonably known to the entity. The plaintiff claims that Starwood's designee, Constance Collins, was unprepared for her deposition, having not reviewed relevant documents, specifically a management contract with Cassidy Pinkard and a parking services agreement with Standard Parking. Starwood counters that the deposition's scope was limited to issues in the plaintiff's request for admissions, which Judge Huvelle deemed improper for such requests. Starwood argues Collins was adequately prepared and provided testimony within the deposition's scope regarding responsibilities under the agreements. However, when asked to clarify responsibilities for the rolling steel garage door, Collins refused to answer, citing the need for a legal conclusion, while Starwood contended that Judge Huvelle's prior ruling excluded such questions. The court found no support for Starwood’s claim that those questions were impermissible, as Judge Huvelle's order did not restrict inquiries about defendants' responsibilities. Consequently, the motion to compel is not denied based on Starwood's argument, and the court clarifies that requests for admission can pertain to both facts and legal opinions.

In 1970, Rule 36 was amended to permit requests that apply law to fact, addressing previous concerns that distinguishing between 'fact,' 'opinion,' and 'law' hindered the admission process. The amendment allows for admissions relating to the interpretation of contracts, as these involve applying law to specific facts. Objections claiming that documents 'speak for themselves' are deemed improper; parties must not object to requests about their understanding of a document's meaning or intent. In this case, the plaintiff can issue requests for admission regarding Starwood’s interpretation of its management contract with Cassidy and the parking services agreement with Standard Parking. Additionally, similar inquiries should be permitted during a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. 

Starwood's argument is weakened by case law supporting the use of contention interrogatories and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions for questions requiring law application to fact. The questions in this case are not overly complex and should be understandable to Collins, an attorney. Despite this, Collins was inadequately prepared for her role as Starwood’s representative; she did not consult with anyone from Starwood, nor did she read the contracts prior to her deposition. Consequently, her testimony would only reflect her personal interpretation and not Starwood’s official stance. Thus, she failed to adequately address questions about responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the rolling steel garage door. It is determined that Starwood must designate and prepare a witness to clarify their understanding of the maintenance responsibilities under the relevant contracts.

Starwood has not clearly established its position on responsibility for the maintenance and condition of the rolling steel garage door as outlined in the contracts. If Starwood asserts a lack of responsibility, the plaintiff is entitled to binding testimony on this matter. The plaintiff also requests the production of documents specified in his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice, referring to eight boxes of information related to the property that have allegedly not been produced. During Collins’ deposition, Starwood's attorney indicated an inability to produce these documents due to lack of physical means, stating they are with Cassidy. Starwood contends that most documents had already been produced and that the eight boxes belong to Cassidy, thus shifting the discovery responsibility to them. However, Starwood has not denied that the documents are responsive to the plaintiff's requests and only claims that "many if not all" have been provided, which is insufficient. Starwood must confirm that all responsive, non-privileged documents have been produced, or produce the additional documents within ten days of this order. Additionally, the Court had previously instructed the parties to agree on dates for expert depositions by May 19, 2006, but no notice has been filed. If the parties have agreed on dates, they must inform the Court; if not, a joint status report is required within five days. The Court grants the plaintiff’s motion to compel answers from Starwood’s designated representative, noting that Collins refused to answer questions without objection from Starwood’s attorney.