Washington v. Thurgood Marshall Academy

Citations: 230 F.R.D. 18; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14384; 2005 WL 1693727Docket: Civ.A. No. 03-2570

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; July 20, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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Judge Facciola addresses several discovery motions in this case referred by Judge Kollar-Kotelly. The plaintiff's motion to compel the defendant to respond to interrogatories and produce documents, as well as for sanctions, is stricken. The defendant's motions to quash subpoenas issued to End-to-End Solutions and the D.C. Public Schools are granted, while the motion to quash the subpoena for the District of Columbia Government Office of Unemployment Compensation is granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff's motion to quash and for a protective order regarding three notices of depositions and document production is similarly granted in part and denied in part.

The plaintiff, Jessica Washington, alleges her former employer, Thurgood Marshall Academy (TMA), breached her employment contract, misrepresented her job duties, wrongfully discharged her, and retaliated against her for advocating student rights. Washington claims TMA unilaterally altered her job responsibilities beyond what was agreed upon and failed to comply with federal laws. After a meeting where she requested a salary increase, she was informed of her impending termination if she did not resign. Washington applied for unemployment benefits, which were awarded despite TMA's claim she resigned voluntarily. She issued subpoenas to the D.C. Office of Unemployment Compensation and other entities, prompting the defendant's motions to quash, which led to the current rulings on the discovery motions.

A party is entitled to discover information deemed reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Relevance for discovery is broadly construed, allowing access to non-privileged information relevant to any party's claims or defenses. When a party seeks a protective order to limit discovery, they must demonstrate good cause and provide specific evidence of potential harm. The burden lies with the party requesting the protective order or seeking to quash a subpoena, requiring them to show extraordinary circumstances based on specific facts. Generally, a party lacks standing to challenge a subpoena issued to a third party unless they can claim privilege or a personal interest.

In the context of a plaintiff's motion to compel, the absence of a supporting memorandum violates Local Rule 7.1(a), resulting in the motion being stricken as the defendant did not have an adequate opportunity to respond. Regarding the defendant's motions to quash subpoenas issued to non-party entities (End-to-End Solutions, D.C. Public Schools, and the D.C. Office of Unemployment), the court notes that since these entities have not challenged the subpoenas, and the defendant has not claimed a relevant interest or privilege, the defendant lacks standing to quash under Rule 45. The court deems these motions as alternative requests for protective orders and will evaluate them according to the relevance standard set forth in Rule 26.

A subpoena was issued by the plaintiff to End-to-End Solutions for extensive records related to Thurgood Marshall Academy’s (TMA) compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including documents like contracts, correspondence, and invoices. End-to-End Solutions, engaged by the defendant for compliance services, is being sought to help establish evidence of TMA’s compliance with federal laws, which is central to the plaintiff's claim of retaliation for raising compliance concerns. The defendant contends that the actual compliance is irrelevant to the case, asserting that the focus should be on whether the termination was retaliatory. Additionally, the defendant argues that the subpoena is overly broad, requesting information that could infringe on the privacy rights of non-parties and lacks specificity. Although compliance records are deemed relevant to determining the defendant’s intent at the time of the plaintiff's termination, the subpoena's scope will be limited to documents specifically addressing potential violations of IDEA. Disclosures from this subpoena are restricted to use in the current case, with provisions for redaction of personal information before public filing.

A separate subpoena was issued to D.C. Public Schools for records pertaining to TMA’s compliance with IDEA, based on the plaintiff’s assertion that TMA was a subsidiary of DCPS and thus subject to relevant regulations. The plaintiff claims that DCPS audits TMA annually for compliance. The defendant opposes this subpoena, citing similar concerns regarding relevance and privacy issues for third parties not involved in the litigation.

DCPS records of compliance are relevant to the retaliation claim, similar to End-to-End Solutions records, as they may reveal the defendant's intent and state of mind, particularly regarding compliance with federal and local laws. However, the plaintiff's discovery request for DCPS files is deemed overbroad, particularly the request for 'memoranda, payment of monies, or correspondence' related to TMA, which is considered irrelevant. Discovery will be limited to records concerning TMA’s potential violations of IDEA and local D.C. regulations. Conditions for the subpoena include that documents shall only be used in this case and personal information in filings must be redacted before being made public.

Regarding the subpoena to the D.C. Office of Unemployment, the plaintiff seeks all unemployment records related to former employees of the Public Charter School of Thurgood Marshall Academy to support her claim of wrongful termination and to identify patterns of wrongful discharges. The defendant contends that the request is irrelevant and infringes on privacy rights. Nonetheless, the request is acknowledged as potentially leading to admissible evidence regarding TMA's behavior and the plaintiff's own unemployment claim. The plaintiff has agreed to limit the scope to the past five years, focusing on her unemployment claim and disputes involving TMA. Similar privacy protections will apply to these records, with restrictions on their use and requirements for confidentiality in disclosures.

Documents and pleadings submitted to the court that contain personal information of parties not involved in the litigation must be redacted before being filed publicly; unredacted versions will be filed under seal. The plaintiff opposes the defendant's motions to quash subpoenas directed at non-parties, arguing that the defendant lacks standing but does not provide grounds for standing in her own motion to quash a Rule 45 subpoena. Instead, the court will consider the plaintiff's motion for a Rule 26(c) protective order without addressing the standing issue. 

Defendant has issued subpoenas to the Law Office of Donovan W. Anderson, Woodland Job Corporation, and Friendship Edison Collegiate Academy to obtain the plaintiff’s complete employment files. The purpose of these subpoenas is to compare the plaintiff's previous duties as a 'Special Education Coordinator' with her responsibilities at TMA, assess her understanding of her position at TMA, and evaluate her claim that she did not leave jobs mid-year, which contradicts her deposition testimony. The plaintiff contends that the subpoenaed parties lack personal knowledge relevant to the lawsuit and that the subpoenas were served too late.

The discovery of the plaintiff's employment records is likely to yield admissible evidence regarding her duties and responsibilities and may inform the understanding of the employment contract in question. While the court recognizes the relevance of these records, it deems the subpoenas overly broad. The defendant should only access specific information related to the circumstances of the plaintiff's terminations, her job responsibilities at previous employers, and her representations of her role at TMA, rather than her entire employment file.

Plaintiff contends that the subpoenas issued by the defendant were untimely. Under Rule 34(c), non-parties can be compelled to produce documents as per Rule 45, which mandates that a court must quash or modify a subpoena if it does not allow reasonable time for compliance. The subpoenas were served on February 28, 2005, just twenty-seven days before the close of discovery, with depositions scheduled for March 2, 2005, two days after the discovery deadline. Despite the tight timeline, the court found that the subpoenas allowed reasonable time for compliance, as they were for document depositions only. The former employers of the plaintiff could comply by mailing documents rather than appearing in person. Even if personal appearances were required, the twenty-nine days provided was sufficient for compliance. The defendant's scheduling aimed to accommodate the subpoenaed individuals. 

While extending discovery deadlines without judicial approval is generally inappropriate, the court granted an extension until August 22, 2005, solely for the purpose of complying with the subpoenas. 

In the accompanying Order, the following rulings were made: 1) the plaintiff's motion to compel and for sanctions was stricken; 2) the defendant's motions to quash some subpoenas were granted in part and denied in part; 3) the plaintiff's motion to quash and for a protective order was granted in part and denied in part; and 4) discovery was extended. The court also noted that good cause exists for protective measures under Fed. R.Civ. P. 26(c) to prevent undue burden. Additionally, it highlighted that parties should have conferred before filing non-dispositive motions, which did not occur in this case.