Trustees of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 487 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Gimrock Construction, Inc.

Docket: No. 97-0072-CIV

Court: District Court, S.D. Florida; July 15, 1997; Federal District Court

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The court denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss regarding a lawsuit filed by the Trustees of various labor union trust funds against Gimrock Construction, Inc. The case centers on allegations that Gimrock breached a collective bargaining agreement by failing to contribute to union fringe benefit plans. The court recognized the "adoption by conduct" doctrine as applicable in Section 8(f) cases, which allows for labor agreements even without established majority status for the union. The Defendant had entered into multiple collective bargaining agreements under Section 8(f), which permits construction employers to negotiate directly with unions despite not having a majority of union members. The Trustees claim that Gimrock's conduct impliedly extended its obligations from the specified projects to additional projects, constituting a breach due to unpaid fringe benefit contributions. The court's ruling emphasized that the motion to dismiss would not be granted unless the plaintiff failed to prove any facts that could entitle them to relief, thus viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Defendant seeks to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the adoption by conduct doctrine is inapplicable to Section 8(f) contracts. The Court disagrees, providing a legal analysis of Section 8(f) pre-hire contracts, which receive special treatment under the Labor Management Relations Act. Typically, an employer cannot enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a union prior to the union achieving majority status. However, Section 8(f) allows construction employers to enter into pre-hire agreements with unions before they gain majority support. These agreements can be repudiated until the union demonstrates majority support, at which point the agreement transitions to a binding 9(a) agreement.

The doctrine of adoption by conduct is recognized in cases involving labor contracts, as established in NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., where intention to be bound is evidenced through conduct rather than written documentation. Subsequent cases have upheld this principle, although the NLRB altered its stance in Deklewa v. International Ass’n of Bridge, wherein it ruled that an employer cannot repudiate a Section 8(f) agreement until its expiration, ensuring stability in the pre-hire context. This ruling implies that once the agreement ends, the employer is not obligated to enter into new agreements, and the union cannot strike to compel negotiations.

The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Funds v. Henry interpreted Deklewa as indicating a shift in how the adoption by conduct doctrine applies to Section 8(f) agreements, emphasizing that 8(f) employers are bound to their collective bargaining agreements for their duration without a requirement to demonstrate majority union representation. This contrasts with employers outside of the 8(f) context, who are obligated to negotiate new agreements after the termination of existing ones. The Court notes that in the 8(f) context, the ambiguous nature of employer conduct complicates the application of the adoption by conduct doctrine.

The use of the doctrine of adoption by conduct in the Section 8(f) labor context may lead to increased litigation regarding whether an employer has accepted an agreement. Unions can eliminate ambiguity by insisting on a written agreement rather than relying solely on conduct. The Hawaii Carpenters court differentiated cases where unions had achieved majority status, indicating that those are not relevant to Section 8(f) employers. The court opined that the NLRB decision in Deklewa, which addresses the repudiation of a Section 8(f) agreement, does not affect the adoption by conduct doctrine, as the latter concerns the initial existence of an agreement. The court emphasized that until a union certifies majority status, a Section 8(f) employer has no obligation to negotiate a new agreement upon the expiration of a pre-hire agreement, rendering attempts to infer agreement from conduct futile. The court maintained that the reasons for rejecting the adoption by conduct doctrine were based on the nature of Section 8(f) relationships rather than changes in law from Deklewa. Furthermore, it argued that the Section 8(f) setting might justify the adoption by conduct doctrine precisely because employers are not required to negotiate post-agreement expiration, which could lead to potential exploitation. Outside of this context, unions have more bargaining power to secure written agreements. Despite these discussions, the court confirmed its recognition of the adoption by conduct doctrine in the Section 8(f) context, referencing binding precedents from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Haberman and the Eleventh Circuit's Southern Stress case. The defendant’s attempt to distinguish Haberman based on majority status does not negate the relevance of Southern Stress, which involved a true Section 8(f) employer. The court concluded that rejecting the rule of Southern Stress based on its limited examination of the issue would be inappropriate.

Defendant requests the Court to disregard the precedents set by Haberman and Southern Stress based on the NLRB’s Deklewa decision. However, the Court finds that the NLRB's revised stance on the binding nature of Section 8(f) contracts in Deklewa does not impact the adoption by conduct doctrine. The Defendant's main support for this exception stems from a footnote in the NLRB’s Garman Constr. Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which suggests that the adoption-by-conduct doctrine does not apply to Section 8(f) cases. Despite the clarity of this statement, the Court deems it insufficient to counter established precedent. While NLRB opinions can be persuasive, they are not binding on federal courts. The Court resolves that it would be imprudent to dismiss established Circuit precedent based solely on a footnote from a different matter. Consequently, despite indications that both the NLRB and Ninth Circuit may have rejected the doctrine in Section 8(f) cases, the Eleventh Circuit continues to recognize it. Thus, the Court denies the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and orders the Defendant to respond to the Plaintiffs’ Complaint by July 31, 1997. The term "majority status" refers to a situation where more than half of the employees are union members.