Court: District Court, District of Columbia; September 27, 2001; Federal District Court
A motion to intervene has been filed by the Dosar-Barkus Band of the Seminole Nation in a case initiated by the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma seeking Declaratory and Injunctive relief related to amendments to the Seminole Constitution. The proposed intervenors, the Freedmen, argue that the constitutional amendments in question threaten their rights and seek to join the lawsuit as Plaintiff-Intervenors. The Seminole Nation opposes the intervention, while the Defendants partially support it, provided it does not expand the lawsuit's scope. After reviewing the motion and related responses, the Court has decided to deny the Freedmen's motion to intervene.
The Seminole Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe located in Seminole County, Oklahoma, originally adopted its Constitution on March 8, 1969. Notably, the Constitution included a provision requiring Secretary of the Department of Interior (DOI) approval for all amendments. Amendments made in 1989 and 1991 attempted to eliminate this requirement, but the Nation failed to complete the process by obtaining necessary approval, leading to the BIA's disapproval of the 1991 amendment. An appeal to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) upheld the BIA's decision, asserting the Secretary's broad discretion over such amendments. Subsequent amendments in 2000 faced similar disapproval from BIA officials, which the Nation contested, resulting in the IBIA declaring a BIA letter regarding the amendments null and void. The Nation claims that failure to submit the amendments for approval has led to potential financial repercussions.
On August 30, 2000, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs at the Department of the Interior (DOI) sent a letter to the Seminole Nation, reiterating that the amendments to the Seminole Constitution proposed on July 1, 2000, had not been submitted for approval. The letter requested that these amendments be submitted within 20 days, warning that failure to comply would lead to disapproval of all proposed revisions. Concerned about the implications for the Nation's "health, welfare and safety," the Seminole Nation's Attorney General prepared to file a lawsuit against the DOI. However, an agreement was reached that the DOI would issue a "final decision" and postpone the actions outlined in the August letter.
On September 29, 2000, the DOI issued its final decision, requesting the submission of nine proposed constitutional revisions and expressing particular concern over amendments that would disenfranchise the Freedmen, descendants of escaped African slaves integrated into the Seminole Nation. The DOI deemed the removal of the Freedmen from membership invalid due to the Nation's failure to submit the amendments and rejected all proposed changes to the Constitution. Furthermore, the DOI stated it would not recognize future resolutions or actions of the General Council without Freedmen participation, which prompted the Seminole Nation to seek judicial review of this decision in U.S. District Court on October 3, 2000.
The Freedmen, or Estelusti, represent a significant portion of the Seminole Nation, descended from escaped slaves who lived among Native American groups in Florida. The Dawes Commission, under Congressional authority in 1906, established two membership rolls for the Seminole Nation: the "Freedmen Roll" for Estelusti members and the "Seminole Blood Roll" for others. The Dawes Rolls are still used today to determine membership, allowing individuals to trace their ancestry back to these rolls for recognition as members of the Seminole Nation.
The 1866 Treaty between the United States and the Seminole Nation recognizes individuals of African descent as citizens with equal rights within the Nation, despite their exclusion from the Dawes Rolls. The Freedmen, descendants of these individuals, are now at risk of losing their citizenship due to proposed amendments to the Seminole Nation's Constitution. They seek to intervene in a lawsuit to protect their rights, particularly regarding access to communal Tribal property, which refers to a $56 million Judgment Fund awarded for land ceded in 1823. This fund resulted from claims filed in the early 1950s, culminating in a ruling by the Indian Claims Commission. The Distribution Act of 1990 outlines how this fund is to be managed, requiring a "Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood" (CDIB) for participation, issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The Freedmen contend that the Seminole Nation's implementation of this Act effectively excludes them from benefits, leading them to sue the BIA for denying their CDIB requests.
The district court in Davis dismissed Freedmen's claims against the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) due to the failure to join the Seminole Nation, which could not be included because of sovereign immunity. The Tenth Circuit reversed this dismissal, remanding the case for the district court to determine if the Seminole Nation is a "necessary" or "indispensable" party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. This determination is still pending.
Proposed intervenors, including the Freedmen, are seeking to broaden the scope of the current lawsuit to include issues similar to those in the Davis case. The Freedmen assert a right to participate in Judgment Fund benefits and to obtain a share of the Fund. However, the court rejects this interpretation, finding the Freedmen's proposed ten-count complaint overly broad. The complaint targets both the federal government and the Seminole Nation, alleging various violations including federal law breaches, equal protection clause violations, and breaches of trust, along with seeking partition of the Judgment Fund Trust and addressing waste against federal defendants.
In contrast, the Seminole Nation's issue solely pertains to the BIA's role in amending the Seminole Constitution, which has some proposed amendments related to the Freedmen's tribal status. However, the Seminole Nation's claim does not require the court to consider the implications of these amendments on the Freedmen. The court's review, under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), will be limited to the administrative record regarding the DOI's decision not to recognize certain amendments to the Seminole Constitution, which may affect the Freedmen's membership rights but do not directly address their entitlement to membership or the merits of the Seminole Nation's actions. The DOI's review focuses on whether the amendments were submitted for approval and their compliance with existing statutes and treaties.
Substantially, the issues raised by the Freedmen are outside the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims in the Seminole Nation's Complaint. Proposed-Intervenors align with the Plaintiff, but the Court finds no justification for this alignment. The Plaintiff claims the authority to amend the Seminole Constitution to exclude the Freedmen, arguing that the Department of the Interior (DOI) cannot disapprove this action. The Proposed-Intervenors acknowledge that this stance contradicts the principle of Estelusti. Conversely, Defendants assert that the Seminole Nation's actions to remove the Freedmen and the new General Council formed post-removal are illegitimate and unrecognized by the U.S. government, indirectly safeguarding the Freedmen's citizenship rights.
The Freedmen's attempt to intervene as Plaintiffs appears driven by a desire to expand the litigation scope to introduce new claims against both current parties, rather than addressing the existing APA issues. They argue for this intervention under Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), but such requests face significant challenges. Established precedent holds that intervenors can only join on matters already before the court, preventing them from broadening the issues. The rationale for this rule aims to avoid procedural circumvention, which the Freedmen's proposal exemplifies. They claim the necessity to intervene to bring additional claims against the Seminole Nation that are not permitted in the Davis litigation. However, the Court remains unconvinced that the Seminole Nation's lawsuit opens the door to all possible claims from intervenors, noting the Freedmen fail to provide legal justification for their assumption of the Nation's loss of sovereign immunity in this context.
The Freedmen propose to take steps to stay or transfer the Davis action back to the District of Columbia to avoid wasting judicial resources, highlighting their intent to circumvent issues in the Oklahoma Court, which they criticize for its lack of engagement in the case. The court will not allow what it perceives as "judge shopping" and will limit its consideration of the Freedmen's intervention to a specific APA claim. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), a nonparty may intervene as of right if they have a timely application, a cognizable interest in the action, potential impairment of that interest, and inadequate representation by current parties. This circuit has established four criteria for such intervention, emphasizing the importance of timeliness and practical considerations in determining the involvement of interested parties. In this instance, the Freedmen's motion to intervene, filed two and a half months after the initial complaint and amidst minimal case progress, is deemed timely. Additionally, the Freedmen possess a recognizable interest in the litigation's outcome, particularly regarding the impact of a proposed constitutional amendment on their status within the Seminole Nation.
Unapproved tribal governing documents lack the binding authority of approved constitutional documents for Department of the Interior officials, allowing for scrutiny if necessary to maintain government-to-government relationships, especially if a constitutional provision violates the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The Freedmen possess a cognizable interest in the litigation, satisfying the second requirement for intervention. The third requirement involves assessing whether a judgment could impair the Freedmen's interests. The case does not question their right to funds from the Judgment Fund or any other financial resources from the Seminole Nation, indicating that the judgment will not affect their claims. The Freedmen acknowledge that the court could provide remedies for their asserted harms, such as directing the BIA to allocate the Judgment Fund or issue CDIB cards, but these remedies relate to different claims than those currently at issue. The primary interest of the Freedmen in this litigation is the impact of the Department of the Interior's decision on a constitutional amendment that excludes them from the Seminole Nation. If the court were to rule against the Department of the Interior regarding the amendment, it might adversely affect the Freedmen's rights to representation within the Seminole Nation, demonstrating their interest in the case. Lastly, the Freedmen’s interests appear to align with those of the Defendants, as both parties are concerned with the representation rights related to the Seminole Nation's governance and its relationship with the U.S. government, thus suggesting adequate representation.
Adverse interests between the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Freedmen are deemed outside the scope of the current litigation, which should instead focus on the pending Davis litigation in Oklahoma. The central inquiry is whether the DOI adequately represents the Freedmen's interests in this limited action. The burden of proving inadequate representation lies with the applicant for intervention, and this burden is relatively light, requiring only a demonstration that representation "may be" inadequate.
The Freedmen argue that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) does not prioritize Freedmen citizenship but rather procedural adherence regarding the Seminole Constitution amendments, suggesting that the BIA has not raised substantive defenses against alienation. While these claims initially seem to support the need for intervention, they overlook the nature of the current case, which involves a request for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of the DOI's decision against recognizing recent amendments to the Seminole Constitution.
Under the APA, federal courts are limited to reviewing agency conduct based solely on the administrative record at the time of the decision, without considering new arguments or theories introduced later. Consequently, any substantive defenses proposed by the Freedmen that are not part of the administrative record cannot be considered. The current evidence does not indicate that the DOI will inadequately defend its position in this litigation. Therefore, the Freedmen are not entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court will, however, consider the Freedmen's already-filed brief as an amicus curiae submission, as it may contain arguments relevant to the case. Ultimately, the court denies the Freedmen's motion to intervene, noting that their concerns exceed the legal questions currently addressed, and affirming that their interests are sufficiently represented by the DOI at this stage.
The Court denies the Freedmen’s motion to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) and also denies permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). The Court emphasizes that allowing intervention would significantly broaden the litigation's scope and delay the resolution of the main issues presented by the original parties. Instead, the Court will treat the Freedmen's brief as amicus curiae. The motion to intervene was filed by the Dosar-Barkus Band and the Bruner Band of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, which the Court has denied along with their requests for service and to file a response. The defendants in this case include the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior, sued in their official capacities. The Freedmen claim an interest in citizenship rights and financial considerations related to the Judgment Fund, but the Court finds their perspective too broad, stating that the litigation is limited to a specific agency decision regarding the amendment to the Seminole Constitution. The Court concludes that there is no identifiable property in this suit, countering the Freedmen's assertion that they have a property claim related to the litigation. The Court’s review is focused solely on the final agency decision documented in a letter from the BIA dated September 29, 2000.
