Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.

Citations: 200 F.R.D. 539; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8013; 2000 WL 33342103Docket: Civ.A. Nos. 1:98-2075-22, 1:98-2982-22

Court: District Court, D. South Carolina; May 25, 2000; Federal District Court

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Consolidated employment discrimination cases under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981 are before District Judge Currie, involving a class action (Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. Inc.) with 98 named Plaintiffs representing over 4,000 African American employees at the Savannah River Site. The individual claim in Walker v. Westinghouse was also filed. The cases were reassigned after the death of Judge Simons. Key motions include Plaintiffs’ request for class certification, bifurcation of issues, and Defendants’ motion to strike class-wide punitive damages. Defendants also filed motions to exclude certain evidence related to class certification. Oral arguments were held on April 26, 2000, after which the court denied the motion for class certification and found the related bifurcation and punitive damages motions moot. Partial rulings were made on motions to strike specific declarations and studies, with some motions granted and others denied. The Lott action began in 1997 with ten original Plaintiffs and was later amended to include 88 additional Plaintiffs. Both cases were consolidated and monitored by Magistrate Judge McCrorey, leading to ongoing discovery proceedings.

The Third Amended Complaint is filed on behalf of current, future, and former African American employees of the Defendants, covering a three-year period prior to October 31, 1997. It represents a putative class action with 98 named plaintiffs alleging race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The primary aim is to secure injunctive relief for equal employment opportunities for Black employees, along with claims for back pay, compensatory damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. 

The complaint alleges a systematic denial of equal employment opportunities for African American employees in promotions, pay, training, and retention, as well as exposure to higher radiation jobs. Only twelve plaintiffs have completed the necessary EEOC/SHAC administrative remedies, while the remaining plaintiffs share similar claims that do not warrant separate EEOC filings. 

The four Defendants operate the Savannah River Site (SRS) under a contract with the Department of Energy, engaging in activities related to nuclear weapons and hazardous material processing. Approximately 20% of SRS employees are African American, who reportedly face discrimination in promotions, job evaluations, salaries, training, demotions, and hazardous job exposure. 

Specific allegations include the lack of a job-posting program prior to June 1997 and discriminatory practices in its implementation, alongside biased job evaluations that disadvantage African Americans. The Individual Assessment and Development Plan (IADP) and the Performance Assessment and Development Plan (PADP) are noted as particularly problematic for promoting racial biases. Additionally, nonexempt employees with four-year degrees have been adversely affected by the discontinuation of a promotional program. The complaint asserts that these practices have led to a disproportionate number of African Americans in high-radiation roles, resulting in higher exposure and illness rates compared to their white counterparts.

Allegations of discriminatory practices at SRS include an imbalanced workforce lacking proportionate representation of African Americans in professional and managerial roles. Plaintiffs assert that salary disparities exist between African American and white employees in similar positions, influenced by discriminatory job evaluation systems. They also claim that African Americans are denied equal access to training opportunities compared to white employees, with selection criteria based on subjective, race-based factors that hinder promotions and affect performance ratings. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege disproportionate demotions of African Americans through a process called "bust back," where FLSA-exempt employees are returned to nonexempt positions, driven by subjective criteria that impact African Americans more severely.

The complaint outlines ten claims for relief under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, corresponding to the alleged discriminatory practices. Plaintiffs seek class action certification, an injunction against Defendants’ discriminatory practices, and restoration to positions they would have held absent discrimination, alongside back pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.

Defendants have filed separate but similar answers, acknowledging the exhaustion of administrative claims by the first Plaintiffs but contesting its necessity for others. Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) confirms its role as a major employer at SRS under a DOE contract and acknowledges previous use of a performance evaluation system and the occurrence of demotions. Individualized defenses are provided for each of the 98 Plaintiffs, with Defendants denying substantial allegations and arguing that the case is unsuitable for class certification due to the need for individualized proofs, challenging commonality and typicality per Rule 23(a), FRCP.

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a nuclear facility managed by WSRC for the Department of Energy (DOE) from 1989 to 1996, with Bechtel overseeing construction. In 1996, four Defendants agreed to a collaborative management structure, employing a multi-tiered hierarchy led by WSRC President Joseph Buggy, with vice-presidents from BNFL-SRC, BWSRC, and Bechtel. In fiscal year 1999, SRS had 1,009 managers, of whom 75 were African American, and 483 supervisors, with 120 African American. The Defendants operate under unified policies for human resources and share employees, with one overseeing Human Resources Division managing employee relations. A single Director of Human Resources governs functions for all Defendants, utilizing site-wide programs for performance evaluation and job assignments. The total workforce was 13,127 in 1999, categorized into four groups: 6,052 exempt employees, 5,176 non-exempt workers, 1,160 Selective Overtime Position (SOP) employees, and 739 construction craft employees under a collective bargaining agreement. During the five-year period, various employment policies were enacted, with Addendum A, Section III detailing different job evaluation and promotion procedures applicable to each employee category. In total, ten distinct promotion/job posting programs were implemented for the various employee groups over time.

A range of employment policies related to job evaluation and salary administration has been established. Plaintiffs' claims of demotion, termed "bust-back," are limited to nonexempt positions, allowing eligible nonexempt employees promoted to exempt roles the option to revert to nonexempt positions if preferred or if their exempt role is eliminated. The eligibility criteria for bustback have evolved significantly. Initially, in fiscal year 1994, nonexempt employees promoted to exempt positions before July 1993 retained unlimited bustback rights. By October 1996, this changed to allow bustback only within six months of promotion for nonexempts promoted after that date. Subsequently, the policy further restricted all former nonexempts promoted to exempt positions, requiring them to requalify for the nonexempt role within six months of returning.

Job evaluation programs mandate that managers conduct individualized assessments of their employees. For instance, the Individual Assessment and Development Plan (IADP) necessitates a joint discussion between the employee and manager regarding performance expectations, with evaluations signed by both parties and a second-level manager. Additionally, SRS monitors radiation exposure through monthly reports to ensure compliance with regulatory limits and strives to rotate employees in higher-risk positions, allowing nonexempt employees the option to use seniority for job assignments. Defendants assert that some African American employees in radiologic exposure roles have chosen to remain in high-risk positions despite having the option to transfer.

In regard to the defendants’ motion to strike the "Calhoun Study," this two-page exhibit submitted by plaintiffs for class certification includes IADP ratings by racial groups and a bar chart depicting IADP distributions among different racial groups, prepared by former WSRC employee Ms. Hurley. The data originates from WSRC’s internal human resources system, Tesseract. Defendants argue that the study is inadmissible due to its status as "statistical evidence" requiring expert testimony, though they do not dispute its accuracy.

Defendants argue that the Calhoun study lacks proper authentication under FRE 901, asserting that statistical evidence is malleable and requires expert testimony for support. However, Plaintiffs contend that the study, created by Habersham using basic arithmetic on raw data from Tesseract and reformatted by Hurley, does not necessitate expert testimony. They reference cases where simple arithmetic was deemed admissible without expert input. The court finds the Calhoun Study admissible for supporting Plaintiffs’ class certification motion, noting that it is based on the Habersham Report, a WSRC internal document, with no challenge to its accuracy.

Regarding the motion to strike the affidavit of Jinna J. Shin, a paralegal, Defendants claim it lacks personal knowledge and that Ms. Shin is unqualified as an expert. The affidavit details the number of SRS employees by EEO job category and includes calculations of African American employee percentages. Shin's affidavit is based on Dr. Bradley's expert report and a WSRC document on Equal Employment Operations. Her calculations involved combining data from both sources to present the racial composition of managerial positions at SRS.

Shin calculated percentages regarding the representation of African Americans in SRS management and executives, submitting an affidavit to support the Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants argue for its exclusion, citing that Shin lacks personal knowledge of the SRS workforce composition and that her calculations rely on basic math, which they believe requires expert testimony for validity. However, they do not dispute the accuracy of her calculations. The court finds that while it typically prefers qualified experts, the exclusion of the Shin affidavit is unnecessary, as Shin possesses personal knowledge of the arithmetic she performed. This satisfies the personal knowledge requirement for affidavits. The court compares the Shin affidavit to a prior study, concluding that both use simple mathematics derived from Defendants' own data, thus rendering the Shin affidavit admissible for class certification purposes.

Additionally, Defendants seek to strike specific paragraphs from the declarations of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Ivan D. Smith, and Ray McClain, arguing that Smith lacks personal knowledge and mischaracterizes the record. They also claim McClain’s declaration is hearsay. Smith’s declaration summarizes evidence of racial harassment and the inadequate responses from Defendants' management, alongside details from Affirmative Action Plans that highlight the underrepresentation of African Americans in management roles.

Mr. Smith's Supplemental Declaration includes the Report by Dr. A. James Ruttenber, which indicates a systemic pattern of assigning Black employees to higher radiation exposure jobs at the Savannah River Site (1991-99). Additionally, the declaration includes Dr. Outz's report, which critiques the defendants' employment practices for failing to meet legal standards, and Dr. Bradley's report, which identifies racially discriminatory practices affecting Black employees' job opportunities. The Declaration of McClain presents extracts from the deposition of Phyllis Calhoun-Hurley, a named Plaintiff, regarding hearsay accounts of racial comments made by George Harley, Vice-President of Human Resources.

Plaintiffs argue that the declarations serve to highlight pertinent evidence for the court and do not constitute improper testimony from counsel, providing citations to the underlying documentary evidence. They assert that Ms. Calhoun-Hurley’s statements are admissible under the hearsay exception for agent statements made during employment, citing FRE 801(d)(2)(D). In response, Defendants submitted two volumes of deposition excerpts to argue mischaracterization of evidence in the Smith declarations.

The court finds that while the Smith declarations may be favorably inclined toward the Plaintiffs, they do not demonstrate any "gross" mischaracterization. However, the court determines that they do not constitute substantive evidence but rather legal arguments supporting the class certification motion. As a result, the court partially grants and partially denies the Defendants' motion to strike: it strikes the Smith Declarations as evidence but denies the motion regarding the exhibits attached to them, as those exhibits are admissible independently. The McClain Declaration is deemed admissible, as it merely identifies an exhibit and presents hearsay that falls within the established exception. Thus, the motion to strike the McClain Declaration is denied.

Plaintiffs are seeking class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), asserting that the opposing party has acted in a manner applicable to the entire class, necessitating final injunctive or declaratory relief. Alternatively, they propose a hybrid certification: a liability class under Rule 23(b)(2) and a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), contingent on common questions of law or fact predominating over individual issues, and the class action being the superior method for adjudication. Class certification is procedural, and the merits of the claims are not to be weighed during this determination, as established in Eisen v. Carlisle. The Fourth Circuit emphasizes adherence to Rule 23 requirements, particularly in Title VII cases, highlighting the need for a detailed analysis of each case's facts to assess suitability for class action status, as reiterated in General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon. In Broussard v. Meineke, the court cautioned against certifying classes that combine factually and legally distinct claims, ultimately reversing a certification order due to the disparate nature of the claims. The burden of proof for establishing class status lies with the Plaintiffs, and the court must evaluate whether the proposed class of over 4,000 employees fits within the parameters of Rule 23, indicating that class certification involves a two-tier inquiry.

To establish a proposed class action under Rule 23(a), four prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) numerosity, indicating the class size makes joinder impracticable; (2) commonality, where there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) typicality, meaning the representative parties’ claims are typical of the class; and (4) adequacy of representation, ensuring the representatives protect the class's interests. If these criteria are met, a further assessment under Rule 23(b) must determine if the action fits into one of three recognized class categories regarding the risk of inconsistent adjudications, appropriateness of injunctive relief for the class, or predominance of common questions over individual concerns.

Regarding numerosity, the court assesses whether the class size makes joining all members impractical, considering factors such as the size of the class, ease of identifying members, service feasibility, and geographic distribution. There is no strict numerical threshold; the determination relies on the court's judgment based on the case's facts. The court finds the proposed class of over 4,000 employees meets the numerosity requirement, as the defendants do not contest this aspect.

Commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) requires that individual and class claims share common legal or factual questions, although the presence of common questions alone does not suffice; they must advance the litigation. Typicality examines the relationship between the named plaintiffs' injuries and the conduct affecting the class, allowing for a collective attribution of the challenged behavior. The commonality and typicality requirements often overlap, particularly in Title VII cases, and may be collectively referred to as "the commonality criteria."

The criteria established in Falcon serve as benchmarks for assessing the economic viability of class actions and ensuring that the interests of class members are adequately protected even if they are not individually represented. The Supreme Court's decision in Falcon limited "across-the-board" challenges to class certification, particularly in discrimination cases, emphasizing the necessity of demonstrating evidence of centralized decision-making. In Falcon, the plaintiff, alleging discriminatory failure to promote due to his Mexican American status, sought to certify a class of similarly situated individuals. Although the Fifth Circuit initially approved the certification based on the across-the-board rule, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating that the plaintiff did not meet the commonality requirement outlined in Rule 23. The Court distinguished between an individual claim of discrimination and the broader assertion of a discriminatory policy, highlighting the need for substantial evidence that connects individual claims to a pattern of discrimination applicable to the proposed class. In essence, the Court determined that the plaintiff could not bridge the gap between his individual experience and the broader class claims necessary for certification, thus denying the formation of a single class regarding promotion and hiring practices based on ethnic discrimination.

Significant evidence of an employer's general discriminatory policy may support a class claim from both applicants and employees if discrimination occurs similarly in hiring and promotion practices, particularly through subjective decision-making. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants utilize subjective and standardless employment processes, seeking class certification based on these claims, as referenced in the case of Falcon. In the Fourth Circuit case Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., the court overturned a district court's class certification order, emphasizing that commonality determinations were speculative and insufficient for Title VII cases. The plaintiffs, who were female employees denied promotions across various Southern Bell facilities in North Carolina, relied on statistical evidence from these locations. The Fourth Circuit found the record inadequate, noting that the dispersed workforce made it unlikely that a common employment pattern existed. The court outlined five factors for district courts to evaluate during certification reviews: 

1. The nature of the alleged unlawful employment practice and its impact on the class.
2. The uniformity or diversity of the employer's relevant employment practices, considering workforce size, geographical dispersion, and administrative decentralization.
3. The uniformity or diversity of class membership regarding common questions of treatment.
4. The structure of the employer's management organization and the consistency of employment policies.
5. The timeframe of the allegations and the likelihood of consistent conditions throughout that period.

Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet the commonality requirements and that the record lacked critical information. Applying the Stastny factors to the current case, the court will evaluate the plaintiffs' claims regarding five specific employment practices: promotion and evaluation, salaries, training, hazardous job assignments, and demotion.

Different employment policies at SRS apply to various employee types, and among the 99 named Plaintiffs, no single employment practice is challenged by all. Consequently, there is no class-wide impact on past, present, or future African American employees. Defendants’ Addendum C and E demonstrate the diversity and lack of commonality among claims. Plaintiffs' efforts to frame the case as a “pattern and practice” disparate impact suit are viewed as a consolidation of 99 individual accounts of disparate treatment. The court emphasizes that a “pattern or practice” case requires evidence of the employer's standard operating procedures adversely affecting the protected class, which is not demonstrated here. The Fourth Circuit does not recognize a private cause of action for “pattern and practice” discrimination under Title VII. While Plaintiffs provided statistical evidence of disparate impact, the Supreme Court has stated that statistics alone do not meet the burden for class certification. The court notes that commonality is generally easier to establish in disparate impact cases, which typically involve objective, uniformly applied standards. However, the Plaintiffs’ claims are not seen as genuine; the case lacks the characteristics of a bona fide disparate impact scenario, particularly due to the influence of numerous managers’ conscious decisions.

A manager or supervisor has assigned African American Plaintiff X a “3” IADP rating, while a white co-employee, Y, received a “5” rating and a larger salary increase for performing the same tasks, exemplifying individual disparate treatment. Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint reveals numerous individualized complaints, affirming their claims as disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. The defendants have tailored their defenses to each plaintiff, including statute of limitations, waiver, or release defenses, highlighting the unique nature of each case. Plaintiffs may seek to benefit from a disparate impact theory, which does not require proof of intentional discrimination, but under disparate treatment, they must demonstrate intentional race discrimination linked to adverse employment decisions. Without direct proof, their claims will be assessed using the McDonnell Douglas framework, imposing a higher burden on them. The court notes that disparate treatment claims often misrepresented as disparate impact claims have been previously rejected, as seen in Brooks v. Circuit City Stores, where the court dismissed the idea that subjective decision-making constituted a discriminatory practice. The claims focus on individual employment decisions rather than systemic issues. Regarding the second Stastny factor about diversity of employment practices and site conditions, although SRS operates as a contained one-site entity, its size and complexity align it more with multi-facility operations. SRS spans approximately 321 square miles and encompasses various operations, including nuclear operations, firefighting, medical services, construction, and janitorial services.

Over 12,000 employees are organized into 18 divisions, each with distinct management tiers, as stated by James Lander, Vice-President and Director of Human Resources. Four employers operate under an employee sharing agreement at the site. Defendants’ Addendum B details the Named Plaintiffs categorized by Pay Grade, FLSA Status, and Employer, illustrating the variety of occupations among a proposed class of over 4,000 African Americans, including roles such as General Counsel, day laborers, exempt and non-exempt employees, and union members under collective bargaining agreements. Linda Strickland’s affidavit outlines the unique evaluation, promotion, and training programs for craft employees. Employee roles at SRS fall into nine EEO job categories with over 60 job groups, with African Americans occupying approximately 459 different positions during the relevant period.

Referencing Stott v. Haworth, the Fourth Circuit found that a class certification for state employees alleging political patronage-related adverse actions was improper due to the vast diversity in employee positions. The court determined that the only common question among the proposed plaintiffs was whether their positions were subject to patronage dismissal, which did not warrant class treatment. The ruling emphasized the need for individual analysis of each plaintiff’s claim to address the varied job descriptions and responsibilities, requiring a case-by-case evaluation of First Amendment issues raised. The lower court also acknowledged the necessity of a position-by-position analysis when considering summary judgment motions.

Class certification is deemed inappropriate due to the necessity for individual case-by-case inquiries to resolve each Plaintiff's claims. The court, after reviewing the pleadings, finds that the only common question among the Plaintiffs is whether each experienced race discrimination, which does not meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23. Multiple courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have observed that the need for individualized inquiries undermines both commonality and typicality. This is evidenced by cases like Reyes and Gorence, where unique circumstances surrounding each plaintiff's claims rendered them unsuitable for class treatment. 

The employment decisions at issue were decentralized among approximately 1,500 managers, each exercising independent judgment, leading to thousands of decisions affecting the proposed class. For instance, of the 99 proposed class representatives, only 89 raised failure-to-promote claims against 422 distinct promotion decisions made by various managers, including some who were part of the proposed class. The lack of centralized decision-making in the employment practices challenged by the Plaintiffs further supports the conclusion that commonality is absent, aligning with the findings in Stastny and other relevant cases, which emphasize that centralized decision-making is crucial for class certification in promotion and hiring claims.

In the case of **Jefferson v. Ingersoll, Int’l Inc.**, the court identified a lack of centralized decision-making as a factor undermining commonality and typicality in a race discrimination claim regarding hiring, compensation, and promotions. This decision was reversed in part by the Seventh Circuit. In **Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int’l, Inc.**, commonality was found based on evidence of a company-wide discriminatory policy against African Americans. Conversely, in **Brooks v. Circuit City Stores**, the court determined that commonality was absent due to the need for subjective evaluations from diverse factfinders. The analysis of class diversity and common questions included the Fourth Circuit's ruling in **Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc.**, where the court reversed class certification due to a lack of commonality, typicality, and adequacy stemming from the variety of franchise agreements and individual defenses. This case highlighted the necessity for individualized examination of claims, echoing the Fourth Circuit’s stance that diverse employment actions preclude class certification. The current case reflects similar concerns, with differing employment policies affecting various class segments and individual defenses varying by claim. The court noted that individualized inquiries would also be needed for damages, as different plaintiffs reported distinct medical and emotional claims. Consequently, the court concluded that an absence of common questions exists, affirming that class certification is inappropriate when diverse employment actions lead to differing issues of proof.

The court disapproves the certification of a single promotion/termination class due to differing proof issues. Plaintiffs initially sought certification of one class for all five challenged employment practices but later suggested breaking it into three subclasses (exempt, non-exempt, and craft employees) without addressing the implications if parts were deemed improper for certification. The court emphasizes that it is not responsible for separating certifiable from non-certifiable claims. Despite considering the possibility of certifying parts of the class, the court finds that the proposed subclasses do not overcome the deficiencies of the larger class, particularly due to the diversity of jobs and decentralized management, which do not satisfy the commonality requirement. 

Regarding management structure, the court notes that the Individual Assessment and Development Process (IADP) was criticized but only affected certain employees. The IADP involved personalized goal-setting and decentralized decision-making, which undermines claims of uniformity. Additionally, various salary administration plans were in place, leading to individualized evaluations within the same employee class, further demonstrating a lack of centralized control. The court concludes that the plaintiffs' claims regarding compensation and job assignments are too diverse and decentralized to form a cohesive class.

The court highlights that of the 99 proposed class representatives, only 21 named Plaintiffs assert claims related to job assignments, with even fewer alleging health issues directly caused by radiation exposure. Specific claims from Plaintiffs Moses Myers and Michael Staley are noted as atypical, as most Plaintiffs report various physical ailments resulting from stress due to alleged discriminatory practices rather than direct radiation exposure. The court emphasizes that a broad class-wide challenge to hazardous assignments is unfeasible since many Plaintiffs do not hold jobs classified as radiologically-sensitive. Individualized assessments are necessary to determine if race influenced job assignments, especially since some African American employees have opted to remain in such positions despite having transfer rights. 

The court further notes that the demotion claims involve only 22 representatives and require unique evaluations related to the reduction-in-force guidelines and individual performance records. Similarly, training assignment decisions are decentralized and determined by direct supervisors, necessitating a thorough examination of the qualifications of those denied training against those who received it. This decentralized nature of employment practices and the need for individualized inquiries ultimately undermine the suitability for class certification. The court references Boley v. Principi to support its reasoning.

Certification was denied by the district court due to unique factual differences in the plaintiffs' claims, undermining the typicality necessary for commonality. The court referenced Gorence v. Eagle Food Centers, where a lack of typicality was found because the varied compensation and promotion decisions required individual comparisons. The defendants presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions specific to each plaintiff, indicating that resolving the numerous employment actions of the 99 named plaintiffs would necessitate individual assessments, ensuring fairness and preventing the dilution of claims.

Plaintiffs' argument regarding the subjectivity of employment practices acknowledged a decentralized management structure, where decisions are largely made by direct supervisors without higher management influence. Courts have determined that merely citing the Falcon subjectivity exception is inadequate to demonstrate a centralized discriminatory policy. The Sperling case noted that allowing discretion in employment decisions does not, by itself, indicate a company-wide discriminatory pattern.

In Betts v. Sundstrand Corp., the court found that although subjective employment practices could lead to disparate impact claims, they do not meet the commonality and typicality requirements if objective factors are present. The court emphasized that even subjective processes must have objective elements to satisfy Rule 23's criteria. Similar conclusions were drawn in other cases, reinforcing that subjective factors alone cannot establish systemic discrimination without objective evidence.

Defendants’ evaluation, promotion, salary, and demotion policies emphasize objective criteria that direct supervisors must consider in employment decisions. The Plaintiffs’ assertion of subjective criteria is insufficient, as highlighted by their Addendum 2, which summarizes subjective factors. Between 1991 and 1994, promotions were based on an employee's demonstrated ability to perform higher-level work over time. From 1995 onward, the criteria evolved to require a demonstrated balance of knowledge, skill, and ability over time for successful performance at the higher level. Although some subjectivity exists, it is limited and regulated by clear job-related guidelines to ensure qualified candidates are promoted.

The 1999 promotions criterion for advancing within the same job family mandates that: 1) higher-level work is available and can be assigned; 2) the employee has demonstrated the necessary knowledge, skill, and ability over time; and 3) the employee meets all minimum qualifications, including experience. Time-in-grade requirements are necessary but should not solely dictate promotions. For moves to management or different individual contributor roles, employees must also meet the minimum qualifications and competency requirements.

Plaintiffs’ claims of commonality lack substantial proof; their statistical reports are flawed, aggregating data across divisions and employee classes without accounting for critical differences such as employee status and job requirements. These deficiencies prevent the statistical evidence from supporting a conclusion about disparities in decision-making units. In light of precedents, general statistics on workforce underrepresentation do not justify a class action that encompasses various types of discrimination, including hiring, promotion, and termination.

The Stastny commonality factor evaluates whether similar conditions existed throughout the relevant five-year period of the suit. It has been established that diverse employment policies were in effect during this time, as acknowledged in Plaintiffs' Addendum 1. Individual employees may have experienced various salary administration plans and multiple claims based on these different plans. The proposed class includes long-term employees affected by numerous policy changes, short-term employees with limited exposure to SRS policies, and future employees subject to existing policies. This variability undermines the argument for static conditions necessary for meeting the Stastny commonality criterion. Consequently, after evaluating the Stastny factors, the court concludes that the proposed class, even with suggested subclasses, does not fulfill the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement.

Regarding adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4), two key issues must be addressed: the qualifications of class counsel and the relationship of the plaintiffs' claims to those of the class. The court finds no dispute over class counsel's qualifications, satisfying the first prong. However, the Defendants raise concerns about potential antagonism among Plaintiffs' claims, particularly noting conflicts of interest within the proposed class. They highlight the inclusion of both African American individuals alleging discrimination and African American supervisors accused of discriminatory practices as a significant conflict. Approximately 25% of supervisors and 13% of managers in the proposed class are African American. Evidence from depositions indicates that some Plaintiffs assert discrimination by their African American supervisors. Additionally, conflicts may arise from class members competing for promotions or training opportunities, as several Plaintiffs claim race discrimination regarding denials of these opportunities, even when awarded to other African Americans.

Plaintiffs Marvin Moore, Pamela Wade, and George Bush allege they were denied opportunities due to discriminatory treatment, seeking injunctive relief to restore them to positions and benefits they would have received but for this discrimination. The court identifies significant conflicts within the proposed class that impede adequate representation under Rule 23. The Supreme Court in General Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC highlighted potential conflicts between employees and applicants competing for benefits. Here, granting relief to some plaintiffs would negatively affect others, as those "made whole" would vie for the same benefits, including wages and seniority. Additionally, individual plaintiffs have conflicting claims regarding employment policies, such as Plaintiff Curtis Coker, Jr. who opposes a "bust back" policy, while Clinton Edwards, Jr. supports it. This discord mirrors findings from Broussard, where differing interests among franchisees led to class certification issues. The court concludes that the diverse remedial interests of the plaintiffs are not aligned, making them inadequate representatives under Rule 23(a)(4). Furthermore, to meet Rule 23 standards, plaintiffs must show compliance with Rule 23(b) requirements.

Plaintiffs argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or as a “hybrid” under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(2) requires that the opposing party has acted on grounds applicable to the class, allowing for final injunctive or declaratory relief for the class as a whole. However, certification is not suitable if the relief sought is primarily monetary damages, as established in Zimmerman v. Bell. The court determines that the main relief sought by Plaintiffs is substantial individual compensatory and punitive damages due to alleged stress from a discriminatory environment, rather than injunctive relief. Any injunctive relief would need to be proven individually by each Plaintiff. 

For hybrid class certification, both (b)(2) and (b)(3) criteria must be met. The court cites Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., noting that even if Plaintiffs meet the (b)(2) requirements, they fail to satisfy (b)(3). To certify under (b)(3), common legal or factual questions must predominate over individual issues, and the class action must be superior to other adjudication methods. Factors for this assessment include the class members' interests in controlling individual actions, existing litigation on the controversy, the desirability of a specific forum, and management difficulties. 

The court emphasizes that the predominance requirement under (b)(3) is more stringent than the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a). Since Plaintiffs do not meet the lesser standard of Rule 23(a), they cannot fulfill Rule 23(b)(3) requirements. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose illustrates this, where the court reversed class certification for a race discrimination claim, stating that the predominant issue did not outweigh the individual legal and factual variations among claims.

The court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, concluding that the proposed class does not meet the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3). The inquiry into individual circumstances—such as whether a plaintiff was denied training or promotion based on race—parallels issues in the Jackson case, undermining the establishment of a cohesive class. The court references precedents from the United States Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit law, asserting that disparate impact claims and statistical evidence alone are insufficient for class certification. Furthermore, the proposed class lacks a representative who embodies the interests and injuries of all class members, creating a fictional "perfect plaintiff" that does not align with any real individual in the case.

The court assures that each plaintiff will have their individual claims thoroughly examined despite the denial of class certification. The related motions to bifurcate class liability issues and to strike class-wide punitive damages are declared moot. Additionally, the court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to strike certain declarations and affidavits. The consolidation of the Lott and Walker cases is lifted, and individual Civil Action Numbers will be assigned to each Lott Plaintiff. Plaintiffs are instructed to file Fourth Amended Complaints within thirty days, detailing specific claims and defendants for each plaintiff.

Defendants are required to file an answer or respond to each Fourth Amended Complaint within the designated timeframe under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The docket reflects entries from the Lott case, and a specific document list is marked by counsel. The initial group of ten plaintiffs includes Sherman Lott and others, with Mr. Walker's pro se complaint originating in the Southern District of Georgia on June 19, 1998. The plaintiffs reference the Calhoun Study to argue that African American employees received significantly lower performance evaluations under the IADP system and that SRS management was aware of these discrepancies. The court will consider Smith's comments as legal arguments, despite defendants contesting alleged mischaracterizations. The court notes a diminishing importance of certain factors due to technological advances affecting workplace communication and decision-making centralization at SRS, paralleling issues from the Stastny case. The current suit does not seek class certification for African American job applicants or challenge hiring practices, as it focuses on a limited number of employment practices, including evaluation systems and salary plans. The plaintiffs' Addendum 1 presents similar information but narrows the challenged practices; however, the court finds a lack of commonality and adequacy of representation for class certification under Rule 23(a) of FRCP, given the diversity of employment practices and plans involved. Disputes arise over the classification of salary plans, with the court recognizing at least six distinct plans. Additionally, certain employment programs do not specify criteria for advancement, further complicating the plaintiffs' claims for a broad-based class certification. The court concludes that it is improbable for a single plaintiff to have relevant interests across multiple employment areas within the specified timeframe.