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Proler International Corp. v. Hugo Neu Corp.

Citations: 964 F. Supp. 1140; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21026Docket: Civil Action No. H-96-3289

Court: District Court, S.D. Texas; November 14, 1996; Federal District Court

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A principal involved in multiple scrap-metal joint ventures is facing acquisition by a competitor, prompting another principal to seek arbitration regarding the merger. The company being acquired opposes this arbitration, asserting that the joint-venture agreements do not mandate arbitration for corporate transactions such as equity sales and mergers. Proler International Corporation, the leading entity in scrap metal collection, is involved in three joint ventures with Hugo Neu Corporation. Neu and Proler operate independently in the scrap industry, with Neu also engaged in non-Proler ventures. 

Legal proceedings ensued with Neu suing Proler in New York and Proler countering in Texas. Neu subsequently sought to halt interference with its arbitration efforts in New York. A court conference was held to discuss emergency relief and coordinate actions between the New York and Texas cases, with plans for further hearings. 

In July, Neu publicly offered to acquire Proler's interests in their joint ventures, which Proler declined. Subsequently, Proler announced a merger agreement with Schnitzer Steel Industries, which includes a $7.50 per share offer, contingent on majority stock tendering. Neu raises several objections to Schnitzer's acquisition, claiming it constitutes a prohibited transfer, threatens market competition, grants access to confidential information from joint ventures, and could create management impasses due to required unanimous decisions.

Joint ventures established by Neu and Proler in the 1960s include arbitration clauses mandating that disputes arising from the agreements be resolved through arbitration. The agreements impose restrictions on transferring joint-venture interests without consent, though they allow either party to merge, consolidate, or reorganize without such consent. Management decisions require unanimous agreement from both parties. Neu argues that a proposed merger constitutes a prohibited transfer of joint-venture interests, but this claim is disputed. Neu asserts that the determination of whether an event falls under the agreement is for arbitrators, while the court decides the scope of the arbitration clause. 

The contract stipulates that a prohibited transfer results in loss of management participation rights, making the interest non-voting. For an arbitrable claim to arise under the transfer clause, Proler must first have transferred its interest by merging, and Neu would need to assert that Schnitzer could not vote its newly acquired interest. However, Schnitzer's acquisition of Proler’s stock is not contestable by Neu, as Proler is bound by the non-transfer provisions but Schnitzer and Proler's shareholders are not parties to the contract. The merger post-acquisition is also permissible under the contract's terms, which have allowed both Neu and Proler to evolve without arbitration over disputes. Neu's ability to convert internal corporate decisions into arbitrable claims is limited by the agreement's language. Neu's concern that the merger will create a management impasse is premature, as the ventures continue to operate effectively without any current impasse.

Neu and Proler are in disagreement regarding the use of jointly-controlled documents related to their merger discussions. Neu contends that Proler improperly disclosed information about their ventures during negotiations with Sehnitzer and refuses to assist Proler with disclosures to the Justice Department for merger approval. Despite a revised confidentiality agreement effective October 1, Neu has obstructed Proler's counsel from accessing necessary documents located at a joint venture site in Los Angeles. The revised agreement permits disclosures from June 11 onward, and Neu has agreed to cooperate in an accounting review related to the merger. Neu's contention regarding arbitration over possible trade secret disclosures during negotiations has been rendered moot by the revised agreement, as Neu has not demonstrated any actual injury from prior disclosures.

Proler has sued Neu for tortious interference, claiming Neu's reluctance to provide documents constitutes obstruction and bad faith. However, Neu has not acted in bad faith, and its conduct does not amount to tortious interference, as it has fiduciary duties to its shareholders to protect their interests. Neu and Proler, as competitors in the scrap metal business, are entitled to safeguard both their separate and joint interests. Neu's delays in disclosing data, while potentially uncooperative, do not meet the threshold for tortious interference.

Neu argues that any tortious interference claims by Proler fall within the arbitration provisions of their venture agreement. Neu asserts that the arbitration clause and other contractual provisions should be interpreted together to settle disputes. However, the exception for mergers in the transfer clause indicates that such claims are outside the arbitration clause's scope. Consequently, Neu cannot invoke the venture contract to defend against claims related to Proler's business relations that are unrelated to their joint ventures.

Anti-trust implications arise from Neu's concerns regarding the Schnitzer-Proler merger, despite Neu not formally pleading an anti-trust claim. Neu posits that the merger could disadvantage its competitive position, particularly as Schnitzer may become a predatory competitor. The relevant industry participants include Neu, Proler, Bonodo, and Schnitzer, each engaged in various joint ventures and operations across California. Neu's operations in Oakland directly compete with the Neu-Proler venture in Los Angeles, while Schnitzer operates in Stockton. Neu has only suggested potential anti-trust issues without asserting competitive injury as part of the joint venture's operations.

Regarding jurisdiction, Neu previously claimed the court lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient presence in Texas. However, after initiating a motion to compel arbitration, Neu cannot subsequently prevent Proler from utilizing the court's authority. The primary legal conflict between Neu and Proler revolves around Neu's attempt to disrupt the merger through arbitration. If the court denies Neu's motion, no immediate harm or past injury is evident. The dynamics of corporate control may necessitate judicial intervention in the future, warranting reevaluation of the case as circumstances evolve.