Chapman v. Bernard's Inc.

Citations: 198 F.R.D. 575; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4470; 2001 WL 21582Docket: No. Civ.A. 97-40127-NMG

Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts; January 2, 2001; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Karyn Chapman, acting as administratrix for her deceased son Ashton’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Bernard’s Inc. and Mattress Discounters, alleging negligence and other claims following Ashton's death on March 24, 1994, when he was trapped between a mattress and the foot rail of a daybed produced by Bernard’s. Mattress Discounters has submitted motions for dismissal of the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and for a separate entry of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Chapman supports the motion for separate judgment. 

In the background, Chapman claims to have attempted settlement negotiations with both defendants since 1999, with Mattress Discounters engaging in discussions that led to mediation in September 2000. On November 27, 2000, Chapman settled with Mattress Discounters for $400,000, releasing them and their insurer, Travelers Insurance Company, from her claims. Despite attempts by Mattress Discounters to engage Bernard’s in settlement discussions post-mediation, Bernard’s expressed no interest in settling. Bernard’s has cross-claimed against Mattress Discounters for contribution or indemnification and opposes the dismissal of Chapman's claims, fearing it would extinguish their cross-claim. The Court will address Bernard’s concerns regarding its cross-claims separately.

The Massachusetts statute on contribution among joint tortfeasors stipulates that a good faith release or covenant not to sue granted to one tortfeasor does not discharge the others from liability unless explicitly stated, but it does reduce their claims by the amount of the release. Furthermore, it discharges the tortfeasor receiving the release from contribution claims by others. To determine if Mattress Discounters is discharged from Bernard’s cross-claim, the court must evaluate whether the Settlement Agreement was made in good faith, which is defined by Massachusetts courts as free from collusion, fraud, or dishonesty. The burden of proving good faith initially lies with the party seeking discharge, who must present the settlement agreement and its terms. If the nonsettling party raises a valid issue regarding good faith, an evidentiary hearing is warranted, although such hearings should be rare to promote settlement.

Bernard’s claims that Mattress Discounters acted in bad faith by not including it in settlement negotiations and violating local rules regarding settlement authority were found unpersuasive. Mattress Discounters met its burden by providing the Settlement Agreement and demonstrating it was made in good faith. Bernard’s failed to meet its burden of proof, as it was aware of the settlement negotiations and had previously rejected a settlement offer from Chapman. Consequently, the court concluded that Bernard’s contribution claim against Mattress Discounters is discharged under M.G.L. c. 231B, § 4.

Neither Mattress Discounters nor Chapman violated Local Rule 16.4, as subsections (B) and (C)(4)(c) pertain only to court-ordered mediation. Although the court encouraged mediation in its Scheduling Order dated March 16, 1998, the parties did not request a mediator or seek court involvement. Rule 16.4 does not mandate that one tortfeasor include another in settlement discussions.

Regarding indemnification, the right to contribution arises from the shared fault of joint tortfeasors, while indemnity allows a party without fault, compelled to defend against another's wrongful act, to recover losses from the wrongdoer. Indemnity is applicable only when the indemnitee has not participated in the negligent act. In this case, Bernard’s lacks a valid indemnity claim against Mattress Discounters, as it cannot be held derivatively or vicariously liable for Mattress Discounters’ actions. This is supported by the Slocum case, where the court ruled that indemnification was not warranted since the driver could not be vicariously liable for the manufacturer’s conduct.

With respect to the dismissal standard, Mattress Discounters seeks dismissal of Chapman’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute or comply with rules. However, Chapman has not engaged in delay tactics or failed to comply with procedural rules. Therefore, Bernard’s motion will be treated under Rule 41(a)(2), which allows for voluntary dismissal with court approval, ensuring no other party suffers prejudice. The court may dismiss claims against fewer than all defendants, as Rule 41(a)(2) refers to claims against individual defendants. Mattress Discounters requests dismissal based on the Settlement Agreement.

Rule 41(a)(2) allows for motions for dismissal by both plaintiffs and defendants. In this case, dismissing Chapman’s claims against Mattress Discounters will not harm Bernard's interests, as the Settlement Agreement has already released Mattress Discounters from liability on the cross-claim for contribution, and Bernard’s has no legal right to indemnification from Mattress Discounters. Therefore, Mattress Discounters does not need to remain in the lawsuit, making dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) appropriate.

Regarding Rule 54(b), which allows for the entry of final judgment on fewer than all claims or parties, it requires an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. The purpose of this rule is to enable an immediate appeal when a party would otherwise face hardship due to delays. However, Mattress Discounters has not shown any hardship from not having a separate judgment entered, nor does it have grounds for appeal since Chapman has released it from liability.

Consequently, the court orders: 1) the dismissal of the complaint against Mattress Discounters with prejudice; 2) the denial of Mattress Discounters' motion for separate entry of judgment; and 3) the denial of the plaintiff's motion supporting Mattress Discounters' request for separate judgment. Furthermore, Chapman's support for the separate judgment implicitly agrees to the dismissal of the action against Mattress Discounters.