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Aull v. Cavalcade Pension Plan

Citations: 185 F.R.D. 618; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22351; 1998 WL 1031466Docket: No. CIV. A. 96-D-628

Court: District Court, D. Colorado; April 23, 1998; Federal District Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this ERISA litigation, the class Plaintiff sought discovery from Defendant Kevin Lewis and the law firm Rothgerber, Appel, Powers, Johnson, concerning fiduciary breaches and prohibited transactions related to the Cavalcade pension plan. The court granted the Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery against Lewis, denying the Defendants' protective order and partially granting compliance with a subpoena for documents. The central issue involved allegations that Lewis, having acquired a controlling interest in Furr's/Bishop's, Inc., used plan assets for personal gain, violating ERISA's fiduciary standards. The court examined whether Fidelity Investments could be liable for Lewis's actions under respondeat superior, considering his alleged agency relationship. The discovery requests were divided into categories, focusing on Lewis's acquisition and control over FBI, compensation agreements, and a job guarantee tied to the Gonzales litigation settlement. The court also deliberated on privilege claims, notably the fiduciary-beneficiary exception, which allowed disclosure of certain documents benefiting plan participants. Attorney-client and work product privileges were scrutinized, with the court finding no waiver despite assertions of good faith. The court's rulings facilitate further examination of potential fiduciary breaches, ensuring transparency and accountability in plan management.

Legal Issues Addressed

Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges in Fiduciary Context

Application: The court evaluated the applicability of attorney-client and work product privileges, affirming the fiduciary-beneficiary exception in allowing some discovery.

Reasoning: Judge Daniel previously ruled that the fiduciary-beneficiary exception permits some discovery of attorney work for the Cavalcade Plan, provided it benefits the Plan's participants.

Discovery Rights in ERISA Litigation

Application: The court addressed the Plaintiff's right to obtain discovery from Defendant Lewis in the context of ERISA claims, emphasizing the necessity of relevant documents to investigate potential breaches of fiduciary duty.

Reasoning: The court granted the Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery from Lewis, denying the Defendants' protective order, and partially granted the motion to compel compliance with the subpoena.

ERISA Fiduciary-Beneficiary Exception to Privileges

Application: The Plaintiff was granted access to documents under the fiduciary-beneficiary exception, which mandates fiduciaries to disclose necessary plan information to beneficiaries.

Reasoning: The fiduciary-beneficiary exception applies to the Gonzales documents.

ERISA Fiduciary Duty and Prohibited Transactions

Application: The Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Lewis engaged in prohibited transactions under ERISA by using plan assets for personal benefits, which necessitated discovery into his fiduciary actions.

Reasoning: The Plaintiff claims Lewis traded a Plan asset—its claim against Kmart—for personal benefits, potentially indicating he exerted discretionary control over the Plan.

Respondeat Superior in ERISA Liability

Application: The possibility that Fidelity Investments could be held liable for Lewis's actions under respondeat superior was considered, dependent on Lewis's agency relationship with Fidelity.

Reasoning: The Plaintiff asserts that while Fidelity is not an ERISA fiduciary, it could still be liable for Lewis's actions if he acted as its agent.

Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege

Application: The court assessed whether the Defendants waived attorney-client privilege by asserting good faith or counsel advice, ultimately finding no waiver.

Reasoning: The conclusion is that the Defendants' actions do not support a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, as their denial of bad faith does not constitute an affirmative act.