Kootenai Electric Cooperative, Inc. (KEC) is appealing a district court's summary judgment that dismissed its claim against The Lamar Corporation and The Lamar Company, L.L.C. for repayment of damages incurred from a personal injury case involving James E. Kuntz. Kuntz was injured while working on a billboard owned by Lamar, which was in close proximity to KEC’s high voltage power lines. The court ruled that KEC’s claim was barred by res judicata under the Idaho High Voltage Act (HVA), which mandates that contractors notify the utility before working near high voltage lines. Neither Kuntz nor Lamar provided this required notice. The HVA states that a violation leading to contact with high voltage lines makes the contractor liable for damages to the utility. KEC had safety measures to mitigate risks if it had been notified. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision.
Kuntz was severely injured while inserting a metal rod into a vinyl sign near a high voltage power line, resulting in the loss of both arms and significant thigh muscle. He filed a lawsuit in 2000 against Lamar and KEC, who asserted Kuntz's violation of the High Voltage Act (HVA) as an affirmative defense, claiming it was a proximate cause of his injuries. KEC cross-claimed against Lamar for negligence related to outdoor advertising regulations near high voltage lines.
Before trial, the court ruled that Idaho law and the 1992 version of the HVA applied, determining that Kuntz, as a subcontractor, failed to provide required notice, contributing to his negligence. The court granted KEC partial summary judgment against Kuntz and Lamar for their negligence. Kuntz also sought partial summary judgment against Lamar for negligence per se due to HVA violations, which the court granted.
A jury found both negligence and reckless misconduct by Lamar and KEC, apportioning fault as 12% to Kuntz, 38% to Lamar, and 50% to KEC, awarding a total of $19,931,504 in damages. KEC later sought indemnification from Lamar, but the court denied the request due to procedural issues. Appeals to the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's findings. On December 30, 2002, KEC filed a new lawsuit against Lamar in Idaho for indemnification under the HVA, to which Lamar raised several affirmative defenses.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties, leading to the district court granting KEC's Motion for Summary Judgment on October 22, 2003. The court found Lamar liable to KEC under the HVA for all costs related to Kuntz's contact with a high voltage line, including damages KEC owed to Kuntz. Lamar's Counter Motion was denied due to unresolved material facts regarding the potential laches defense. Despite the court not ruling on affirmative defenses, Lamar sought a Rule 54(b) Certificate, which was granted, allowing for an appeal. On October 19, 2005, the appeal was dismissed by this Court, returning the case for further proceedings.
Subsequently, Lamar filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment or Reconsideration, claiming the three-year statute of limitations had expired, either when the contractor failed to notify KEC of work on its power lines or when KEC first incurred costs related to the Kuntz lawsuit. Additionally, Lamar argued that res judicata applied, asserting that a cross-claim must include all claims against the co-party due to their adversarial relationship.
On November 15, 2006, the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, concluding that the statute of limitations had not expired since indemnification claims do not accrue until a judgment is entered. However, it found KEC's indemnification claim barred by res judicata, leading to the dismissal of the case. KEC appealed, contesting the res judicata ruling, while Lamar cross-appealed, asserting that KEC's claim was also subject to Idaho’s comparative negligence and contribution statutes, or alternatively, barred by the statute of limitations. Neither party sought attorney fees on appeal.
The Court's standard of review aligns with the district court's process for ruling on summary judgment motions, requiring no genuine issue of material fact for a judgment in favor of the moving party. All facts must be construed favorably toward the nonmoving party. The primary issue on appeal was whether the district court correctly ruled that res judicata barred KEC's claim under the HVA, which the Court affirmed, indicating KEC's claim could have been raised during the earlier Kuntz lawsuit. Other issues in the appeal and cross-appeal were not addressed due to this affirmation.
The HVA claim is characterized as a direct statutory claim against a contractor for violations of the HVA, rather than an indemnification claim, as the HVA does not mention indemnity. The court held that KEC should have raised its HVA claim in the initial action, as it was required to assert all claims against Lamar related to its cross-claim for apportionment. KEC appeals this ruling, arguing that its HVA claim is not barred by res judicata since it was not raised in the Kuntz lawsuit. KEC further asserts that, although it could have filed a permissive cross-claim simultaneously with its cross-claim for apportionment, it was not obligated to do so because there is no authority mandating that a permissive cross-claim becomes a mandatory counterclaim.
Lamar contends that KEC's HVA claim is barred by both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Issue preclusion requires five factors to prevent relitigation of an issue: (1) full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (2) identical issue presented; (3) issue was actually decided previously; (4) final judgment on the merits in the prior case; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was involved in the earlier litigation. Claim preclusion similarly bars subsequent actions involving the same parties and claims that relate to the same cause of action, requiring (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.
The burden of proof for res judicata lies with the party asserting it, necessitating proof of all essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence. KEC argues that indemnification is a permissive cross-claim under Idaho R. Civ. P. 13(g), which should not be subject to res judicata. The district court acknowledged the tension between res judicata and Idaho R. Civ. P. 13(g), noting a lack of Idaho case law addressing this interaction. Rule 13(g) permits a cross-claim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the original action or a related property, which can include liability claims against the cross-claimant.
KEC initiated a cross-claim against Lamar on February 23, 2001, in the Kuntz lawsuit, alleging Lamar's negligence and violations related to outdoor advertising signs near high-powered transmission lines. Initially, KEC did not reference the High Voltage Act (HVA) but later included claims under the HVA and federal OSHA regulations, specifically 29 C.F.R. 1910.333. KEC sought summary judgment on these claims, arguing that the right to indemnification under the HVA arose only after damage occurred. During the summary judgment hearing, KEC's attorney indicated that the only missing element was the amount of damages, and the federal judge acknowledged KEC's pursuit of the HVA claim, ultimately ruling Lamar negligent as a matter of law for failing to provide notice under the HVA.
Despite achieving a favorable ruling on the HVA claim, KEC did not request the appropriate damages under Idaho law, nor did it include a damage request in its summary judgment motion or jury instructions. The jury found both Lamar and KEC negligent, attributing 38% of the negligence to Lamar and 50% to KEC. Following the jury verdict, KEC attempted to assert an indemnity claim against Lamar, seeking to hold Lamar responsible for KEC's share of the damages. The federal judge denied this request, emphasizing that KEC had not previously sought indemnification and could not do so post-verdict.
KEC claimed that a federal judge encouraged it to file a new lawsuit in Idaho state court, but the court's statement merely indicated that KEC's counsel might be seen in Idaho, which is not binding on Idaho courts. The district court determined that KEC's current action was barred by res judicata. The court clarified that while cross-claims are permissive, once a defendant asserts a cross-claim, they become adverse, and res judicata principles apply. KEC, having previously alleged that Lamar violated the Idaho HVA regarding sign regulations near transmission lines, sought to establish relative liability. Although KEC did not successfully state a claim for statutory indemnification, it pursued a claim for apportionment of damages, which arose from the same transaction as the prior case. KEC had already obtained summary judgment regarding Lamar's contractor status and failure to comply with Idaho HVA notice requirements. The court concluded that any indemnification claims related to these issues should have been raised in the previous federal case. KEC had the opportunity to bring its indemnification claim earlier but instead chose to pursue apportionment, leading to an unfavorable jury verdict. The court emphasized that res judicata aims to prevent parties from splitting causes of action and seeking multiple opportunities for relief.
The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissing KEC’s claim, reinforcing the rule against splitting claims, which applies regardless of differing remedies sought in separate suits. The ruling awarded costs on appeal to Lamar. Justice W. Jones dissented, arguing that res judicata does not preclude KEC's action. He contended that under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 13(g), a cross-claim is permissive, and KEC was not obligated to assert all claims against Lamar arising from the original cross-claim. He differentiated KEC's situation from the precedent set in Puckett v. City of Emmett, emphasizing that KEC was not relitigating the merits of the previous lawsuit but instead pursuing a separate statutory indemnification claim. Thus, he concluded that KEC's failure to raise its indemnification claim in the Kuntz lawsuit should not bar its current action based on res judicata.
The Court delineates the criteria for issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion (res judicata), concluding that KEC’s indemnification claim is not barred by either doctrine. Key elements include whether the issue or claim was previously litigated and whether a final judgment was issued. Claim preclusion also considers if the matter "might and should have been litigated" in the prior suit. KEC's indemnification claim under the HVA was not pleaded in the Kuntz lawsuit, thus it was not before the court. The federal district judge confirmed that since KEC did not plead for indemnity, it could not amend the pleadings post-trial. Although KEC referenced violations of the HVA in its Answer, it did not specifically seek indemnification or damages under the HVA. Furthermore, KEC’s cross-claim for apportionment of liability did not constitute a claim for indemnification. Consequently, KEC’s indemnity claim was neither litigated nor a claim that should have been litigated, as it was a permissive cross-claim under I.R.C.P. 13(g). Therefore, KEC's indemnification claim is not barred by res judicata. Chief Justice EISMANN concurs.
