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Barrett v. Tomkins Industries, Inc.

Citations: 930 F. Supp. 508; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9445; 1996 WL 376410Docket: No. 95-4025-RDR

Court: District Court, D. Kansas; June 12, 1996; Federal District Court

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This legal memorandum pertains to an employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, currently before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court has identified several uncontroverted facts despite challenges due to the defendant's lack of direct responses to the plaintiff's claims and the introduction of new facts in the defendant's reply brief, which the plaintiff has not addressed.

Key facts established include: the defendant owns the Ruskin Division, which consists of five manufacturing plants located in various states, producing sheet metal products for the construction industry, with offices in Grandview, Missouri. The plaintiff has been employed at Ruskin since 1975, holding various positions, including purchasing manager at the Parsons, Kansas plant, the largest of the facilities. After starting as an office manager, the plaintiff transitioned to inventory control manager and subsequently to division senior buyer before becoming interim purchasing manager in late 1986.

Cosslett Moore was hired as the Materials Manager in 1986 to oversee purchasing and inventory across all plants. The hiring decision was allegedly influenced by the belief that the plaintiff should remain with her husband, who worked in Parsons. Following Moore's resignation in January 1994, a debate arose regarding the necessity of his position, with the president suggesting it be eliminated as redundant, while his immediate supervisor disagreed. Ron Sevart was temporarily assigned to take over some of Moore's responsibilities, making multiple trips to Grandview, despite lacking college qualifications and questioning the full-time nature of Moore's role. The case raises critical issues regarding the hiring and promotion practices at Ruskin and potential discriminatory motives behind employment decisions.

Defendant advertised the 'Materials Manager' position, requiring a college degree and five years of related experience, both internally and externally. The internal advertisement did not specify a college degree. Plaintiff, age 47, and another female employee applied, but external candidates were ultimately selected and found unacceptable. Internal candidates were deemed qualified but not interviewed. Subsequently, the defendant posted a modified 'Materials Analyst' position, seeking candidates with a 4-year degree and 24 years of manufacturing experience, which was not advertised internally. John W. Hulse, a male under 40 with the necessary qualifications, was hired after being interviewed in May 1994. Plaintiff inquired about the Materials Manager position after Hulse's hiring and learned it had been downgraded without her prior knowledge. Although she expressed interest in the downgraded position, she was interviewed without being informed that it had already been filled. During the interview, she was not told she lacked the required academic qualifications. On June 29, 1994, she was notified that the position had been filled externally. Hulse's starting salary was $35,000, while plaintiff earned $38,143 as of June 1993. No women have held management positions in the Ruskin Division's operations department, where plaintiff is the highest-paid female. Notably, during a visit, a company vice president expressed frustration at plaintiff's inquiry about inventory control, indicating a negative perception of her contributions.

Moore's affidavit characterizes the plaintiff as a loyal, professional, and skilled employee with extensive experience in reading blueprints and part drawings. He acknowledges her aspiration to be promoted to his position but asserts that the company would not hire a woman for that role, viewing the sheet metal industry as male-dominated. Moore suggests that men may find the plaintiff threatening, whereas similar behavior from a male employee would be seen as aggressive and dedicated. He recalls a comment from O'Halloran in 1992 labeling a group of employees, including himself, as overaged and overpaid, and contends that if his position were truly unnecessary, it would have been eliminated before his resignation. Moore notes that his duties as Materials Manager were equivalent to those of the Materials Analyst.

In terms of legal standards for summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit states that it is appropriate when there are no genuine material facts in dispute, allowing judgment as a matter of law for the moving party. The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of material fact issues, after which the non-moving party must present specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial. The non-moving party cannot rely solely on allegations in pleadings, and the factual record must be viewed favorably for that party. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence does not support a reasonable finding for the non-moving party.

The plaintiff alleges age and sex discrimination relating to three job actions: the refusal to hire her for the Materials Manager position, the downgrading of that position to Materials Analyst, and the refusal to hire her for the Materials Analyst role. The defendant seeks summary judgment, arguing that the actions were motivated by cost-saving measures rather than bias. The parties have difficulty separating their arguments regarding the three job actions, often relying on the same evidence and reasoning.

The defendant's decision to downgrade the Materials Manager position led to the creation of a Materials Analyst role, which may have affected the compensation of Cosslett Moore’s replacement. The litigation focuses on two key questions: whether the plaintiff was discriminated against based on age or sex when the position was filled, and if so, what compensation is warranted. Evidence suggests the plaintiff applied for the position, was qualified, and that it was ultimately filled by a male under 40, while the plaintiff, at the time of application, was a 47-year-old female. This establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. Testimony indicates a belief that women or older individuals should not hold managerial roles at Ruskin, which the court finds relevant. Additionally, the plaintiff and another qualified female candidate were not interviewed for the original position, and the role was modified and readvertised externally without notifying them, raising further concerns about discriminatory practices. The court posits that defendant’s claims regarding the plaintiff’s qualifications and the rationale for the position's alteration may serve as a pretext for discrimination. While the court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment, it notes that if discrimination is proven, the plaintiff must demonstrate her potential compensation after Cosslett Moore's resignation, distinguishing this from the liability question at this stage. The court accepts the plaintiff's account of events for summary judgment purposes.