Elias v. Naperville Eye Associates, Ltd.

Citations: 928 F. Supp. 757; 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,294; 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8487; 1996 WL 338820Docket: No. 96 C 1328

Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; June 18, 1996; Federal District Court

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Defendant Naperville Eye Associates, Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is granted. Plaintiff Helene R. Elias, who was discharged from her management position at Naperville at age fifty-six, alleged age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after filing a claim with the EEOC. The court established that although Naperville's payroll records indicated having twenty or more employees during certain weeks in 1994 and 1995, it never had twenty or more employees present on any given day during the required period, which is crucial for ADEA employer status. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the burden lies with the plaintiff to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction. The court accepted Elias's well-pleaded factual allegations as true but also examined evidence beyond the complaint. The ADEA defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with twenty or more employees for each working day in twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding year. The Seventh Circuit employs a "workplace method" for counting employees, which considers salaried workers as employees for each day on payroll but only counts hourly workers for days actually worked or on paid leave. This method differs from the payroll method used in other circuits, which counts total employees on the payroll regardless of their work status. Based on the workplace method, the court concluded that Naperville does not meet the ADEA’s employer definition, leading to the dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Subsequent events do not warrant overruling the precedent set in Zimmerman, and the court declines to do so. According to the Seventh Circuit's workplace method for determining employer status, a court must count only those weeks in which at least twenty employees are either physically present at work or on paid leave for each day of the week. If this criterion is not met, the week is excluded from consideration. In this case, the court concludes that Naperville is not an employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 

Elias claims discrimination occurred on January 23, 1995, necessitating examination of the years 1994 and 1995. Although Naperville had twenty or more employees on payroll for over twenty weeks in each year, it never had at least twenty employees physically present or on paid leave on any single day during those years. Thus, it failed to meet the ADEA's jurisdictional requirements, leading to the conclusion that Naperville is not an ADEA employer and cannot be held liable under this statute.

Elias also invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but since the ADEA does not apply to Naperville, her jurisdictional claim is unfounded. As she did not establish an alternative basis for jurisdiction, the court dismisses the Complaint with prejudice. The court notes that Elias is aware of the implications of the ruling and has expressed an intention to challenge the Zimmerman precedent. However, the court affirms that the existing workplace method is still applicable within the Seventh Circuit. Ultimately, given the undisputed facts and applicable law, the court concludes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, resulting in the dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice.