United States v. Phillip Zabawa

Citations: 719 F.3d 555; 2013 WL 2372281; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11061Docket: 11-1519

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 3, 2013; Federal Appellate Court

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Phillip Zabawa, while in federal custody, assaulted a federal law enforcement officer, who responded with a headbutt that resulted in a cut over the officer's eye. A federal grand jury indicted Zabawa for assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b), but the district court ruled that the term "inflict" in § 111(b) should be interpreted as "cause." The Circuit Court disagreed, stating that "inflict" is a more precise term, and emphasized that the officer's injury could have resulted from his own actions rather than Zabawa's. Consequently, the court reversed Zabawa's conviction under § 111(b).

The incident began when Zabawa, transferred from Wayne County Jail to the courthouse, refused to close his cell door and displayed agitation. Detention Officer David Murphy attempted to handcuff him after he lunged and punched Murphy, leading to a struggle during which Murphy sustained the injury. The grand jury's indictment only cited the cut as the injury, and despite a trial being scheduled, numerous delays occurred over more than five years, including a motion for a competency evaluation that faced significant administrative delays.

Zabawa was subject to delays after a second order, taking 26 days for transport, 37 days for evaluation, and 18 days for return to custody. In July 2009, a psychologist deemed him competent for trial, which the court confirmed the following month. In October 2009, Zabawa filed a motion to dismiss his indictment, claiming violations of his rights to a speedy trial, which delayed proceedings by an additional 10 months. The district court denied this motion. A bench trial occurred from August 30 to September 1, 2010, resulting in a conviction for inflicting bodily injury on Officer Murphy, leading to a 222-month prison sentence. On appeal, Zabawa challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). The key fact is that the cut on Murphy’s eyebrow may have resulted from Murphy’s own actions rather than Zabawa’s. The dispute centers on the interpretation of "inflict," with the government arguing it means proximate cause and Zabawa asserting it requires a direct act of harm. The district court sided with the government's interpretation, and the appellate review of this interpretation is de novo. The term "inflict" is not defined in the statute, so its ordinary meaning is considered, with dictionaries providing conflicting definitions that could support either party's view. The court's task is to determine the most accurate interpretation of the statute.

Agency cases represent an exception regarding the interpretation of "inflict," which, when analyzed, supports Zabawa's view. The term "inflict" is more specialized than "cause," typically denoting direct physical harm, as illustrated by phrases like "inflicted heavy losses on the enemy." Departing from this meaning often conveys irony, as in the example of a speaker delivering a boring speech. The excerpt highlights that "inflict" implies a direct physical cause, contrasting with "cause," which is broader. This distinction is pivotal in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), which specifies "whoever inflicts bodily injury," emphasizing direct physical causation. The direct cause of Murphy's injury is the individual who inflicted it, potentially including Murphy himself.

The government's argument, relying on policy considerations from an 1868 case, suggests that the interpretation of "inflict" should align with legislative intent to protect federal officers. However, the text of the statute explicitly uses "inflict," indicating a deliberate choice to require a tighter causal link between actions and injuries for severe penalties. The excerpt notes that while eight years in prison is significant, the 20-year penalty remains for cases where a defendant's actions directly cause harm. Two other circuit courts have examined "inflict" in this context: one aligned with the current interpretation, while the other, United States v. Garcia-Camacho, conflated "cause" with "inflict" but may still align with the present case due to the direct nature of the injuries involved.

In United States v. Jackson, 310 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit addressed whether evidence was sufficient to support Ray Jackson's conviction under § 111(b) after he injured Deputy Marshal Randy Scott during an attempted arrest. The court determined that "inflict" does not require intent to harm but is more restrictive than "cause." It concluded that Jackson's actions directly led to Scott's injury while grappling, thus satisfying the definition of "inflict." However, the court found that the evidence did not support that Jackson inflicted harm under § 111(b), even though the government proved his guilt for felony assault under § 111(a)(1).

Zabawa contested his convictions under both § 111(a)(1) and (b) (the latter being moot) on the basis of a speedy trial violation. Under the Speedy Trial Act, a trial must commence within 70 days of the indictment or initial court appearance, excluding certain delays. The parties acknowledged 55 countable days elapsed before trial, agreeing on the exclusions for trial continuances, Zabawa’s speedy-trial motion, and a competency evaluation. Disagreement arose over four additional time periods, particularly one involving 108 days related to Zabawa's transportation for a competency evaluation. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) generally excludes transportation delays, but excess time beyond ten days is presumed unreasonable unless rebutted by the government, which would then count against the speedy-trial clock.

The government successfully rebutted the presumption of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act regarding Zabawa. Following the district court's transportation order, the Michigan Department of Corrections repeatedly denied Zabawa's transfer to federal custody due to legitimate reasons, including his broken hand requiring medical appointments, a one-month hunger strike, and protective custody due to his own disciplinary issues. These delays were attributed to Zabawa, not the government. Zabawa's claim that his 37-day competency evaluation should add time to the speedy-trial clock is contradicted by precedent, as 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) does not apply to Speedy Trial Act calculations. Furthermore, the 18 days of transport following his evaluation are excluded from the count due to a pending motion, and the speedy-trial clock remains stopped until a competency finding is made by the court. Ultimately, only 55 days are countable between his first court appearance and trial, indicating no violations of the Speedy Trial Act.

Regarding his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the court assessed four Barker factors: length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice. The delay was six years, which necessitated consideration of the other factors. Zabawa contributed significantly to the delays, including eight months due to his attorney's failure to prepare an evaluation order, 11 months for not arranging a doctor, and further delays from his own disruptive behavior and multiple postponements of trial. Overall, out of the 70 months from indictment to trial, Zabawa was responsible for at least 48 months of delay. His late assertion of the right to a speedy trial further weakened his claim.

The fourth Barker factor requires the defendant to demonstrate substantial prejudice resulting from the delay. Zabawa claims the delay hindered his ability to interview potential witnesses, noting he could only locate two of six prisoners present during the attack, neither of whom would cooperate. However, he has not articulated how their testimony would have benefitted his defense, given their proximity during the incident. Additionally, Zabawa argues that the brief nature of the attack would have led to faded memories over time, but mere loss of memory is insufficient to establish prejudice. He alternatively suggests the delay should be considered presumptively prejudicial due to its length; however, such a presumption only applies when the delay results from government negligence. Most of the delay in this case was attributable to Zabawa himself. Consequently, the Barker factors weigh against him, indicating that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated. The court affirms his conviction under § 111(a)(1), reverses the conviction under § 111(b), and remands for further proceedings.