Africa v. City of Philadelphia

Citations: 910 F. Supp. 212; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18752Docket: No. 85-2745

Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania; December 12, 1995; Federal District Court

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Plaintiffs Ramona Africa, Louise James, and Alfonso Leaphart have requested a revision of a portion of a court order issued on January 5, 1994, which granted summary judgment to the City of Philadelphia regarding the bombing of the MOVE residence at 6221 Osage Avenue, while denying it for the decision to allow the subsequent fire to burn. The plaintiffs aim to reinstate their claims related to the bombing, referencing the Third Circuit's suggestion in In re City of Philadelphia Litigation, 49 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1995), that these claims should be reconsidered. The City defends against this motion based on the "law of the case" doctrine. Judge Pollak has decided to grant the plaintiffs' motions.

On May 13, 1985, the City dropped an explosive device on the MOVE residence to arrest organization members, intending to destroy a rooftop bunker. This act led to a fire, resulting in the deaths of eleven of the thirteen occupants and significant property damage. The plaintiffs allege violations of state and federal rights by the City and its officials, primarily arguing that the bombing and resulting fire constituted an unreasonable seizure and excessive use of force under the Fourth Amendment, referencing the standard set in Tennessee v. Garner. 

In the initial ruling, Judge Pollak agreed with a previous magistrate's analysis, granting summary judgment to the City on the bombing claims but denying it for certain city officials regarding the decision to let the fire burn. The dismissal of claims against former Mayor W. Wilson Goode and Police Lieutenant Frank Powell was also included in the ruling, which led to an appealable final judgment. The denial of qualified immunity for the other officials was likewise appealable, and the judge certified the denial of summary judgment on the fire-related claims for appeal.

The Third Circuit's appeal in In re City of Philadelphia Litigation involved a split decision regarding excessive force standards during arrests. Judges Greenberg and Scirica favored the Graham v. Connor standard over Tennessee v. Garner, ultimately reversing the denial of qualified immunity for individual defendants and dismissing federal claims against them. Conversely, Judges Scirica and Lewis upheld the denial of summary judgment for the City on section 1983 claims, leaving only the City potentially liable. 

Judges Scirica and Lewis also discussed the Fourth Amendment implications of the decision to deploy an incendiary device, agreeing that this action, along with allowing a subsequent fire to burn, constituted excessive force. Judge Greenberg disagreed, arguing that there was no seizure related to the injuries of Ramona Africa or the deaths of John and Frank Africa, and maintained that the City's actions were reasonable. 

Despite his dissent, Judge Greenberg noted that the district court had partially granted summary judgment regarding the bomb deployment, which was not under appeal. He suggested plaintiffs might seek relief from this ruling under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) or 60(b)(6). Following this suggestion, plaintiffs filed motions to revise and vacate the summary judgment concerning the bomb's use.

The City contends that reinstating the dropping-the-bomb claim would breach the “law of the case” doctrine, which mandates that legal rulings remain consistent throughout litigation. The doctrine asserts that decisions made at one stage serve as binding precedents in subsequent stages. Specifically, an appellate court's ruling must be adhered to by the trial court upon remand. The City argues that a prior summary judgment in favor of former Mayor Goode on all federal claims included both personal and official capacity claims, implying that the Third Circuit's affirmation of this judgment indicates that no constitutional violation occurred regarding the bomb's use.

However, this argument has significant shortcomings. The summary judgment explicitly addressed only the personal capacity claims against Goode, based on qualified immunity, which suggests his actions could be seen as constitutional under reasonable belief. The judgment did not reference any official-capacity claims, indicating that the ruling on qualified immunity does not influence the City's liability. Therefore, the City’s assertion that reinstating the constitutional claims contradicts the Third Circuit’s decision is flawed, as the earlier rulings do not encompass the official-capacity claims.

Judge Scirica determined that the city cannot claim qualified immunity from liability, even if individual officials can, as per the precedent set in Owen v. City of Independence. The appellate judges' opinions indicate that the summary judgment favoring defendant Goode was based solely on qualified immunity. Judge Greenberg noted that the plaintiffs are appealing the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on these grounds regarding the explosive device incident. He expressed disagreement with his colleagues' view that the city was entitled to summary judgment concerning the bomb dropping, leading to the conclusion that the city should not have received summary judgment on that issue. The Third Circuit did not address the city's liability for the bombing, allowing for the reinstatement of claims against the city, which the court suggested as a viable option for the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argue that the decision to drop the bomb was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, constituting excessive force. The standard for evaluating such claims is based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Connor, which requires a reasonableness assessment based on the circumstances of each case. This involves balancing the severity of the intrusion on individual rights against the government's interests, taking into account factors such as the severity of the crime, any immediate threats posed by the suspect, and whether the suspect is resisting arrest. Judge Scirica emphasized that whether the dropping of the explosive device constituted excessive force is a factual question, as is the reasonableness of the decision to conclude the standoff before nightfall and the chosen method of resolution.

The decision to drop an explosive device on 6221 Osage Avenue is evaluated by weighing the City’s interest in arresting the MOVE members against the severity of the means used. The excessive force claim is allowed to proceed due to existing material fact disputes. The City presented evidence of threats posed by MOVE members, including statements about killing police and using explosives against the neighborhood. During the police's attempt to execute warrants, they encountered gunfire from MOVE members, leading to a prolonged exchange. 

Conversely, plaintiffs argue that at the time the bomb was dropped, the threat was minimal due to the prior evacuation of the neighborhood and the elapsed time since the gunfight. The City had a significant advantage in numbers and firepower, and alternatives to dropping the bomb, such as waiting until nightfall with artificial lighting, were possible. The ambiguity surrounding the perceived threat and the potential risks of using an explosive device, including the presence of gasoline tanks, raises questions about the reasonableness of the City’s actions under the Fourth Amendment. 

The court concludes that reasonable juries could differ on the appropriateness of the City's decision to use the bomb, allowing the plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against the City to proceed. An order is issued to reinstate these claims, while also confirming final judgments in favor of defendants Powell and Goode. The court identifies a significant legal question regarding the City’s liability under Section 1983, warranting an immediate appeal to potentially expedite the litigation process.