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Roth v. Carvel Corp.
Citations: 905 F. Supp. 196; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18119; 1995 WL 716732Docket: 95 Civ. 5029(LAK)
Court: District Court, S.D. New York; December 4, 1995; Federal District Court
The parties involved in an attorney's fee dispute agreed to resolve their conflict through binding arbitration, establishing procedural rules and a method for appointing an arbitrator. Following this agreement, the Court ordered the action to be discontinued upon the appointment of the arbitrator. However, the parties deviated from the agreed-upon selection process and are now in disagreement over the appointment and potential disqualification of the arbitrator for bias. Plaintiff Herbert F. Roth, who represented defendant Carvel Corporation, initiated this action to recover unpaid fees that Carvel deemed excessive. During a scheduling conference, the parties signed an agreement to arbitrate, specifying that the president of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY) would provide a list of five arbitrators, from which each party could object in rotation. The ABCNY fulfilled its role by supplying the list. Roth struck one name, and Carvel accepted the remaining ones. Roth then selected the second name on the list, which Carvel initially did not contest. The appointed arbitrator disclosed a minor acquaintance with Roth and expressed willingness to serve unless objections arose, which Carvel later raised after the arbitrator had already communicated his acceptance. Carvel's motion seeks to disqualify the arbitrator, contending that the selection process was not properly followed. The Court must first determine whether it can entertain this motion, given that its order for discontinuation hinged on the appointment of an arbitrator. Despite the parties' failure to adhere to the selection method specified in their agreement, it appears that an arbitrator was ultimately selected. Carvel argues that it had the right, but not the obligation, to strike names from the list, which is at the center of the dispute. The language of the arbitration agreement indicates a mechanical process for selecting an arbitrator, where each party strikes two names from a list of five. Carvel's statement on November 7, 1995, suggesting acceptance of four individuals, implied consent for the plaintiff to choose one arbitrator from those four. On November 8, the plaintiff informed Carvel of his intent to designate an arbitrator, and Carvel did not object, allowing the plaintiff to proceed. The parties can modify their selection method, and no provision in the agreement mandated disclosure of any alleged bias before appointment. The claim of bias does not alter the conclusion, as such issues are typically for the arbitrator to decide initially, with any bias claims subject to judicial review post-award. Consequently, the appointment of the arbitrator is valid, the case is no longer pending, and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the application. Even if jurisdiction existed, the court would deny the request, directing objections towards any reviewing court instead. The motion is denied, and the case is closed.